The subject of work-life balance is normally seen as the already constituted human subject with certain individual properties, for example, characteristics and organizational features of work and home. In this sense it is the human subjects that perceive work/non-work conflict (see e.g. Sturges and Guest, 2004: 7), spillover (see e.g.
Gzrywacz et al., 2002), and work-life interference (see e.g. Sverko et al., 2002). It is the human subjects that achieve work-life balance (see e.g. Greenblat, 2002), which implies that the relation of work and home is carried out or actively constituted by human subjects.
In general, the discipline of work-life balance makes a distinction between the passive and the active perception of work-life interface (see e.g. Sturges and Guest, 2004: 15).
The former regards what affect the human subjects’ perception of work and life whereas in the later case it is perception in itself that can affect the way that something is experienced. It guides our perception of something. If perception can affect something it
110
means that there can be a potential conflict between what is given and the human subjects’ experience of this, for example, an ‘expectation gap’ (Porter and Steers, 1973).
Hence the human subject has so far been perceived as either affecting or being affected by the work-home interface (see e.g. Kinnunen et al., 2006).
Clark (2000) argues that there has been too much emphasis on the perspective in which the human subject is affected by the work-home interference. It is not this problem that I find interesting. Instead of discussing whether work-family interface is constituted by environmental and organizational factors or by the individual factors of the human subject and how this subject actively perceives the interface, I will say that the real subject of the relation of work and life is the one who expresses the relation. If the question of the subject of work and life is who constitutes the relation and not who constitutes the work-family interface then we can neither locate the subject as the affecting determinants or as the affect on the well-being. In place of these we must rather ask: who is expressing the relation of work and life?
In the following I will argue that the relation between work and life is expressed by what I, after Deleuze’s (2005) reading of Nietzsche, will call types. In Nietzsche, Deleuze finds a ‘typology’ that is a metaphysical system that replaces the old metaphysics and is the “foundation to the science of man” (Deleuze, 2005: 138; see also 2005: 135-138). Nietzsche’s writings are full of types: Christ, the Judaic and Christian priest, the slave man and the superman. These types are not defined by psychological traits, but “by determining what the will wants in the exemplars of this type” (Deleuze, 2005: 73; see also Deleuze: 2005: 60). Nietzsche as a ‘physician of culture’ does not designate a culture but rather specific types that express a particular way of living and thinking (Deleuze, 2005: 154; see also Ahern, 1995; Tongeren, 2000). For Deleuze a profound example of this is Nietzsche’s analysis of resentment and bad consciousness as symptoms of nihilism in On the Genealogy of Morals (2007) (Deleuze, 2005). The symptoms of bad resentment and consciousness are expressed by the types of the Judaic and Christian priest. A type is therefore not the same as a person, but rather that which is needed in order for the person to be able to say something (Deleuze, 2005: 124).
means that there can be a potential conflict between what is given and the human subjects’ experience of this, for example, an ‘expectation gap’ (Porter and Steers, 1973).
Hence the human subject has so far been perceived as either affecting or being affected by the work-home interface (see e.g. Kinnunen et al., 2006).
Clark (2000) argues that there has been too much emphasis on the perspective in which the human subject is affected by the work-home interference. It is not this problem that I find interesting. Instead of discussing whether work-family interface is constituted by environmental and organizational factors or by the individual factors of the human subject and how this subject actively perceives the interface, I will say that the real subject of the relation of work and life is the one who expresses the relation. If the question of the subject of work and life is who constitutes the relation and not who constitutes the work-family interface then we can neither locate the subject as the affecting determinants or as the affect on the well-being. In place of these we must rather ask: who is expressing the relation of work and life?
In the following I will argue that the relation between work and life is expressed by what I, after Deleuze’s (2005) reading of Nietzsche, will call types. In Nietzsche, Deleuze finds a ‘typology’ that is a metaphysical system that replaces the old metaphysics and is the “foundation to the science of man” (Deleuze, 2005: 138; see also 2005: 135-138). Nietzsche’s writings are full of types: Christ, the Judaic and Christian priest, the slave man and the superman. These types are not defined by psychological traits, but “by determining what the will wants in the exemplars of this type” (Deleuze, 2005: 73; see also Deleuze: 2005: 60). Nietzsche as a ‘physician of culture’ does not designate a culture but rather specific types that express a particular way of living and thinking (Deleuze, 2005: 154; see also Ahern, 1995; Tongeren, 2000). For Deleuze a profound example of this is Nietzsche’s analysis of resentment and bad consciousness as symptoms of nihilism in On the Genealogy of Morals (2007) (Deleuze, 2005). The symptoms of bad resentment and consciousness are expressed by the types of the Judaic and Christian priest. A type is therefore not the same as a person, but rather that which is needed in order for the person to be able to say something (Deleuze, 2005: 124).
When the discipline of work-life balance talks about ‘types’ they normally do so with regard to various ‘types of work-family interface’ (see e.g. Frone et al., 1997; Kinnunen et al., 2006). However, these types of work-family interface differ from what I will call the types of work and life, because they do not express the relation of work and life in themselves, but are rather forms in which the relation of work and home can be perceived. They are ideal types that can be experienced and realized in the human subject’s perception. Types do hereby not refer to the various species that exist of the general genus of the nature of balance as a result of different perceptions (e.g. spillover, work-family fit or inter-role conflict). In contrast, I will say that types are real variations of the relation of work and life in themselves. But how should we make sense of this?
What is a type? It is a difficult concept to grasp because, on the one hand, the relation between work and life is expressed by types and on the other hand, types are derived from the relation of work and life itself (see also Deleuze, 1999: 55). This means that we should define types by how they are giving expressions to something expressed in them. They are in this sense different from ‘human subjects’ because they do not actively constitute the relation of work and life. Instead, this constitution takes place passively in them. It is not the individual subjects that individuate themselves (individualization); rather; it is a passive relation or synthesis of work and life that is expressed in them and which make them individual in a singular sense (individuation).
These individuating forces are not properties of the human subject, but forces of the relation of work and life as discussed earlier. In other words, it is not a personal essence of the human subjects that they express but the impersonal essence of the relation of work and life. We discussed this in the section before in relation to how modes of individuations were constituted. However, even though types in this sense are passive by expressing something else (the relation between work and life), they are also active because they give determination to modes of individuation that in themselves are undetermined. It is in this determination that types become distinct from each other. It is not types that actively determine the modes of individuation, but in these passive determinations they become distinct. We therefore have to be careful not to think that passivity is the same as inactivity. This is not the case, because there is a lot of activity going on in this passivity. It is just not an activity that belongs to the human subject.
112
The relation between work and home has an identity of balance like harmony, equilibrium or integration that expresses the human subjects’ state of balance (see e.g.
Voydanoff, 2005: 825). The human state is seen as being either in equilibrium or disequilibrium, in balance or out-of-balance. In this sense the contemporary theories of work-life balance presume that the human subjects possess something identical, a human state, in which the relation of work and life is mediated. On the contrary, I will propose that those who express the relation of work and life posses an individuating difference, that is something that makes types distinct from each other, not by the diversity between their individual characteristics or qualitative essences but by the variation in which the relationship between work and life is expressed in them. So instead of saying that work-life balance is conditioned by individual and organizational characteristics, I will say that the relation of work and life is conditioning individual differences and that these can only be located within how this relation is expressed in various modes of individuation by singular types.
The individual differences arise when the relation of work and life is expressed in modes of individuation as these expressions of the relation of work and life vary in degree and intensity. There is a difference in kind between the relation of work and life that is expressed within the problematic expressions of work and life, but there is a difference in degree between the various expressions of the relation of work and life.
For example, one employee is described as being committed. However, this does not necessarily mean that the person is more committed. It only means that the relation of work and life is expressed in a different degree in the expression of the different types.
The reason for this is that the expression of commitment belongs to the relation of work and life and not the human subject. This is also why later in the analytical chapters of the thesis I will discuss commitment as a social and individuating concept and not as an individual concept.
The relation between work and life is therefore not a subjective determination that takes the form of balance. Thus it is not possible to speak about a personal experience of the relation of work and life. From a univocal standpoint we should rather understand this
The relation between work and home has an identity of balance like harmony, equilibrium or integration that expresses the human subjects’ state of balance (see e.g.
Voydanoff, 2005: 825). The human state is seen as being either in equilibrium or disequilibrium, in balance or out-of-balance. In this sense the contemporary theories of work-life balance presume that the human subjects possess something identical, a human state, in which the relation of work and life is mediated. On the contrary, I will propose that those who express the relation of work and life posses an individuating difference, that is something that makes types distinct from each other, not by the diversity between their individual characteristics or qualitative essences but by the variation in which the relationship between work and life is expressed in them. So instead of saying that work-life balance is conditioned by individual and organizational characteristics, I will say that the relation of work and life is conditioning individual differences and that these can only be located within how this relation is expressed in various modes of individuation by singular types.
The individual differences arise when the relation of work and life is expressed in modes of individuation as these expressions of the relation of work and life vary in degree and intensity. There is a difference in kind between the relation of work and life that is expressed within the problematic expressions of work and life, but there is a difference in degree between the various expressions of the relation of work and life.
For example, one employee is described as being committed. However, this does not necessarily mean that the person is more committed. It only means that the relation of work and life is expressed in a different degree in the expression of the different types.
The reason for this is that the expression of commitment belongs to the relation of work and life and not the human subject. This is also why later in the analytical chapters of the thesis I will discuss commitment as a social and individuating concept and not as an individual concept.
The relation between work and life is therefore not a subjective determination that takes the form of balance. Thus it is not possible to speak about a personal experience of the relation of work and life. From a univocal standpoint we should rather understand this
as an impersonal expression, which implies that it is the constitution of the expression of work and life that transcends the human subject (and not vice versa). The type is determined in and by the way that this impersonal expression is constituted. It is this determination of the problematic elements that “constitute the conditions of real experience” (Smith, 1998: xxiv; see also Deleuze, 1990: 260).
The relation of work and life is the difference of work and life in itself from which the differences expressed internally to modes of individuations can be derived. The relation is derived by how it is expressed in the modes of the relation of work and life. Hence, the relation is studied as a difference between work and life, but it is important that this difference is not individual, because we will then end up reducing it to the identity of balance. It is only given as an articulation of individuation expressed by a type.
This is how individuals are distinct. They may all be talking about flexibility in a certain problematic form, but the relation of work and life is expressed in distinct ways in each case. The reason for this is that it is not the relation between work and life that expresses itself; it is expressed in these problematic forms. The human subject does not become distinct by determining its own balance; on the contrary a passive relation of work and life speaks in these neuter forms by being expressed. So long as the human subject is still determining, we will continue to be talking about anthropology (see Deleuze, 1997: 192).
The relation of work and life is expressed in the problematic forms when types are expressing the relation. It is in this sense that the relation of work and life transcends types that become impersonal expressions of the relation of work and life. Types are therefore important because they are our only access to and hence possible understanding of the relation of work and life. Besides types are problematic forms and modes of individuation which are important as these are the transcendental forms that make it possible to talk about how these types are expressed. In other words, what are these constituting principles within these singular expressions? The distinction between problematic forms and modes of individuation is that the former is a determinable form in which the relation can come into existence and the later is the determined form as it
114
can be located within the expression of types. These are the transcendental forms that we see as forms of knowledge in this thesis, as we have discussed earlier in chapter 1.
From this change of focus follows that types are not simple individuals, but composite individual that are not individualized by simple motives but by an individuation, composition or infinity of extensive parts. This means that the relation of work and life is a mode of individuation in which the relation of work and life is determined as a singular expression. The relation of work and life is expressed in different modes of individuations. Thus these modes of individuation are central for the analysis of the relation of work and life because they can transcend the given impersonal expression.
This implies that I will not begin the empirical analysis of the relation of work and life with the human subject but with the modes of individuation that are expressed by types expressing the relation of work and life.
This focus on types rather than human subjects implies some important analytical changes that we need to be aware of, because this means that the relation between work and life is neither defined by what human subjects are nor what they could be, but by how types give expressions to work and life. In the following section I will shortly summarize the changes.
First, types express the relation of work and life, and not a nature or a personal essence of balance. Second, they do not actively constitute the relation of work and life, but only passively give expression to the relation of work and life that is constituted inside these expressions. Third, types are singular expressions of the relation of work and life whereas human subjects have a particular experience of a general nature of work-life balance. Fourth, types are not given outside of the expressions of work and life as is the case with human subjects that are already constituted by human nature. Types are not constituted or given as individuals outside of the expressions of work and life. Fifth, modes of individuation cannot be located outside of these expressions of work and life in types. This means that the conditions of work and life are not generally determined but have to be determined in every singular type. Sixth, whereas human subjects speak of their balance between work and life, I would say that types express the relation of
can be located within the expression of types. These are the transcendental forms that we see as forms of knowledge in this thesis, as we have discussed earlier in chapter 1.
From this change of focus follows that types are not simple individuals, but composite individual that are not individualized by simple motives but by an individuation, composition or infinity of extensive parts. This means that the relation of work and life is a mode of individuation in which the relation of work and life is determined as a singular expression. The relation of work and life is expressed in different modes of individuations. Thus these modes of individuation are central for the analysis of the relation of work and life because they can transcend the given impersonal expression.
This implies that I will not begin the empirical analysis of the relation of work and life with the human subject but with the modes of individuation that are expressed by types expressing the relation of work and life.
This focus on types rather than human subjects implies some important analytical changes that we need to be aware of, because this means that the relation between work and life is neither defined by what human subjects are nor what they could be, but by how types give expressions to work and life. In the following section I will shortly summarize the changes.
First, types express the relation of work and life, and not a nature or a personal essence of balance. Second, they do not actively constitute the relation of work and life, but only passively give expression to the relation of work and life that is constituted inside these expressions. Third, types are singular expressions of the relation of work and life whereas human subjects have a particular experience of a general nature of work-life balance. Fourth, types are not given outside of the expressions of work and life as is the case with human subjects that are already constituted by human nature. Types are not constituted or given as individuals outside of the expressions of work and life. Fifth, modes of individuation cannot be located outside of these expressions of work and life in types. This means that the conditions of work and life are not generally determined but have to be determined in every singular type. Sixth, whereas human subjects speak of their balance between work and life, I would say that types express the relation of
work and life. The difference is that types are on the same level as work and life, because it is in ‘what they express’ that ‘what is expressed’ has existence and vice versa.
Seventh, work-life balance constantly focuses on the individual subject’s perception and experience of the nature of balance. But from a typological perspective there is no individual subject of enunciation (see also Deleuze and Guattari, 1999: 79). There is not an individual human subject that expresses or experiences the relation between work and life. Instead, we will say that what is expressed is always social, because it is not the individual psychological traits of the perceiving human subject that constitute or express the relation of work and life. This is also why I believe that it is a social problem rather than an individual problem of work and life. This is not to say that work-life balance is a personal experience that has to be discussed socially, as a public campaign against stress currently states (Videnscenter for Arbejdsmiljø, 2009). The relation between work and life as it is expressed in the expressions of types is profoundly social since it is pre-individual and does not belong to the personal essence of human subjects. If we continue to accept the perspective set forward in the public campaign, we will never be able to discuss the relation of work and life as a social problem, because it will constantly be reduced to the individual experience and hence the individual personal trait of the human subject.
In the following two subsections I will address some of the practical and methodological implications that this suggested idea of types has for conducting interviews and making use of examples.
Interviews
These thoughts have radical consequences for the conduct of interviews and how we should think about the interviewees as human subjects. It is radical because it moves the focus from the personal experience of balance towards the impersonal expression of the relation of work and life. It was simply no longer relevant to understand how they perceived the relation between work and home. Instead, it was important to see how they expressed the relation of work and life and in which problematic forms these expressions took form.
116
What is said by the interviewee does not refer to the individual in the sense of a
“primordial ‘I’” (Deleuze, 1999: 7), but to the relation of work and life that is expressed in modes of individuation. It is on purpose that we do not write that it is expressed by the individual human subject, as the expression simply does not belong to the individual.
This is also why Deleuze in Foucault refers to this expression of the relation as ‘non-person’ (1999: 7). The ‘non-‘non-person’ not only echoes Maurice Blanchot, as Deleuze writes, but furthermore Deleuze’s own writing on Nietzsche. It is not an ‘I’ who speaks, but an impersonal ‘he’, ‘one’, ‘who’, ‘which one’, who expresses the being qua being (see Deleuze, 2005: 76-77).
The types are neither ‘subjects’ in the sense that they speak of the relation nor that they speak on behalf of themselves as human subjects. On the contrary types are ‘subjects’ in the sense that the relation is expressed in them. The relation in itself is expressed in the impersonal expressions of types. This implies that what is expressed about the relation is not derived from the human subject but from the relation in itself. In this sense relations have an anonymous function: they speak in types, which is also why Deleuze talks about types as a derived function of the relation in itself (1999: 9, 15). Hence, types are not derived from perception of work and home. Instead, they express the relation in itself by offering it something qualitatively different in which it can become expressible and expressed. That is by being expressed by types (Deleuze, 1999: 11).
The relation is pure expression in itself, but the expression is in itself pure nonsense, which has to be expressed for itself to make sense.
The objects per se of the relation of work and life are the problematic forms and the intrinsic modes of individuation in which the relation of work and life is expressed.
What is interesting to study is the way that the employees and managers as types are expressing the relation of work and life and hereby giving expression to something that is unthought or unthinkable in itself, but that becomes thinkable in these expressions.
The relation of work and life is expressed as something that is unthought or unthinkable in itself, but is made expressible by being expressed by types.