The Conditions of Work and Life - Metaphysical Labour Flexibility, Performance and Commitment i

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constituted. The metaphysical does not concern what is constituted, but how it is constituted. We should not think of the metaphysical as something between work and home. The metaphysical is rather in-between work and life, but in another way than we are used to thinking, because the relation is not already constituted as forms of harmony, equilibrium or balance between work and home, but is constituted by how the metaphysical relation in itself is transcending the expressions of work and life.

Consequently, the problematic forms in which work and life are expressed are not ready-made; they have to be invented. Of course there are other problems than the aforementioned, but the focus in the thesis will be on these three problematic forms as it was those that could be located in the expressions of the interviewed employees and managers. This does not exclude the possibility that there might be other problematic forms in which the relation of work and life are expressed, but these were simply not found in the empirical material.

This way of thinking about the relation of work and life in itself is rather complex, because it is not experienced by the human subject, as we normally would think. Instead, we have to think about the continuous modulations and expressions of the relation between work and life and understand how it is given expression to itself. The relation is both expressible (the objects of work and life as problems), expressing (the subject of work and life as types), expressed (the conditions of work and life as modes of individuations), and the relation between expressing and expressed (the consequences of work and life as effects).

Problem II: The Conditions of Work and Life

So far theories of work-life balance have been most concerned with the discussion of which conditions can be said to constitute the work-home interface (see e.g. Bacharach et al., 1991; Sverko et al., 2002). The answer to this problem is typical determinants like organizational factors and individual factors (see e.g. Crooker et al., 2002; Guest, 2002;

Lambert and Haley-Lock, 2004). However, these factors rather constitute the perception of work-life balance, as it was discussed in the previous section, so what should we do

if we want to discuss the conditions of the relation of work and life? In other words:

what is it that constitutes the relation between work and life?

Reversing it I will recommend that we do not determine the relation of work and home by referring to given and already constituted individual and organizational factors that determine the state of perceiving work-home interface, but suggest that we should move toward the conditions of work and life. Conditions are not that by which the given relation of work and life is actually given, but that under which the given relation is actually given. This means that conditions do not determine anything; they are themselves determined by being constituted as conditions. They do not explain anything, but have to be explained themselves. In other words, conditions are not determinants that determine the work-home interface; they are transcendental conditions that are constituted within production of how the given is given. The conclusion of this is that conditions are not active determinants but rather passive determinations. From this follows that conditions are not pre-establish but only have existence in so far as they are found to be conditioning something. They are therefore real conditions of actual expressions and not merely possible conditions for realized experiences. Consequently, conditions “are no broader than the conditioned: they are the conditions of real experience” (Deleuze, 1991b: 27). These conditions are therefore not possible conditions like, for example, conditions of work, home or human nature, but real conditions that can be found at work within the constitution of the relation of work and life. Conditions are therefore not given as general or abstract but are always local, unique and singularly determined. Subsequently we cannot speak about conditions in terms of determinants like work demands and personality as is traditionally the case within the literature on work-life balance (see e.g. Guest, 2002; Kossek et al., 1999), because conditions are not given outside of their constitution. It is not a simple conditioning that takes place with the problems of work and life.

The contemporary theories start by separating work and home in order to make it possible to account for the conditions of the boundary between them (Edwards and Rothbard, 2000: 180). However, the starting point will be something different altogether here, as it is the relation of work and life and what make them inseparable or

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indiscernible from each other. The question is therefore: what are the conditions that can be determined in the problematic expressions of work and life. In other words, the difference between work and life (and not the opposition between work and home) is exactly where we have to begin, as it is in these problematic forms that the conditions can be determined.

Instead of focusing on the conditions of possibility like time and space that constitute the boundary between work and home, we will focus upon the virtual transcendental conditions for the actual (Williams, 2005b: 222). This means that conditions are determinations of the determinable object of work and life that can be founded in the actual determined object of work and life. In the pure problematic form the object of work and life is virtual transcendental conditions. This move from possible to virtual conditions can be thought of as a move from extensive to intensive conditions of work and life. Extensive conditions like time and place might still be invoked in the constitution of the relation of work and life, but these forms of time and space are not given outside of their intensive constitution. Time and place are no longer given measure or determinants that can settle the metaphysical question of what work is;

instead, these are intensive coordinates that are determined in the expressions of work and life. We will return to this idea later in the analysis in relation to how employees define the productive relation between work and life. Here it is shown how time and place are not given measures but highly flexible measures that the employees invoke in determining what work is, for example, when they decide to call the activity of sending email in the evening work if it is an activity that they do for more than 30 minutes. Time is therefore not a given measure or condition for the productivity but is a measure that is constituted to determine what work is. In other words, the conditions of work and life are not given by pre-establish categories, but are instead to be found within the singular constitution in the employees’ expressions of work and life.

Later in the analysis I will talk about these conditions as ‘productive rules’. These rules do not only govern our intuition or mind but are also what constitute ‘our’ mode of individuation (see also Bryant, 2008: 12). These rules differ from individual and organizational factors by not being conditions of the human experience or conditioned

by human nature; they are, rather, constituted inside the human expression of the relation of work and life. However, it is important that we do not interpret ‘productive rules’ as the sociological codes, rules, expectations or values. These would constitute a role (e.g. Goffman, 1971; Mead, 1972) or an identity (Luhmann, 2000: 367-370). These sociological perspectives are founded on a basic distinction between persona and role, which also can be traced within contemporary themes and discussions like authenticity and cynicism in organizations studies (see e.g. Contu, 2008; Costas and Fleming, 2009).

Furthermore, this perspective can be found in some theories of work-life balance that make a distinction between work role, home role and person (e.g. ‘me time’) (see e.g.

Brown, 2004).

Productive rules do not constitute roles or identities; they constitute modes of individuation. This implies that what is important is not the constitution of the individual or personal boundary between various roles or identities (see e.g. Brannen, 2005; Clark, 2000; 2001; Desrochers and Sergeant, 2004), but instead the constitution of the limits of work and life. Limits of work and life are not the same as the actual given boundaries of work and life. Limits do not concern these actual forms, but are about the limit between the condition and the conditioned, which means that the limit is rather given inside the constitution of the human subjects’ expression of work and life.

Thus, limits are not a matter of finding the conditions for the boundary between work and home (see e.g. Clark, 2000; 2001). Instead, it is a question of the limit of the relation of work and life as individuation, or how the relation of work and life is expressed. The relation of work and life is therefore not an individual problem but a problem of individuation. Individuation has nothing to do with how people become certain individuals, however. That is a matter of individualization. Individuation is not what determines particular human subjects, because work and life do not belong to them, on the contrary the relation between life and work is individuated when the relation is expressed in various modes of individuation and by types of individuation (we will discuss the concept in detail in the next section).

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The problem of individuation is raised in the problematic objects of work and life, flexibility, commitment and performance, that was discussed above not only raises the relation of work and life in ways in which the relation of work and life can be expressed;

these problems make the relation between work and life expressible. These expressible relations of work and life are determined and conditioned by being expressed by types.

Conditions are modes of individuation or productive rules that can be established as governing and constituting the expressions of work and life in types. The constitutive elements have only existence in so far as they are constituted inside the expression of the relation between work and life. Hereby, the constitutive elements are no longer independent and dependent variables but problems in which the variables becomes determinable.

Conditions are therefore always expressing the limits of the individuation of work and life (we do not know what a body can do). Whereas the active human subject is setting an individual and personal boundary between work and home an individuating limit of work and life that can be found passively expressed in types, i.e. what are the conditions in the constitution of the relation of work and life that I give expression to?

Individuation is not a matter of personal problems but impersonal problems, because they are not constituted on the human nature or by the human subjects’ perception of work and life.

In this sense work and life are pre-individual. They do not belong to human subjects and are undetermined before they are expressed in and by modes of individuation. This means that they are not determinants of the relation of work and life, which means that it is not a role or work-home interface that determines any individual point of balance.

The conditions of the human subject’s work-life balance are not individual but pre-individual, wherefore human activities do not refer to their predetermined or general factors but to their individuation. In this sense the relation of work and life is neither characterized by the individual properties nor the behaviour of given human subjects, but rather by an expression of work and life. It is not the subjective and objective characteristics of the human subjects’ work-life balance that are interesting, but rather how various modes of individuation are expressed in them.

these problems make the relation between work and life expressible. These expressible relations of work and life are determined and conditioned by being expressed by types.

Individuation is not a matter of personal problems but impersonal problems, because they are not constituted on the human nature or by the human subjects’ perception of work and life.

However, this does not mean that they express something personal about their own work-life balance; or that they talk about their individual and organizational factors and in this sense define the nature of their particular work-life balance; instead something impersonal about work and life is expressed in them. The consequence of this is that we cannot talk about work-life balance as a general trait or characteristic of the individual human subject, but we can say something about the impersonal expressions of the relation of work and life.

We therefore have to speak about the common and the social in impersonal terms rather than the general in personal terms. This means that I am not interested in making a conclusion about work-life balance in the form of statements about the common nature or essence of human subjects, i.e. how general subjective and objective characteristics are. The nature of the relationship between work and life does not depend on the characteristics of the human subject, but on

The internal characteristics of the problem as such, the imperative internal element which decides in the first place its truth or falsity and measures its intrinsic genetic power: that is, the very object of the dialectic or combinatory, the ‘differential’”. (Deleuze, 1994: 161-162)

This relates to the discussion earlier in the chapter about flexibility. Flexibility does not characterize the individual essence of the human subject, but characterizes the individuation of the relation of work and life as it is constituted inside the expressions of types.

The type is constituted as an internal effect of the relation of work and life itself. It is this praxis of impersonal constitution that is important if we want to understand how the relation between work and life is constituted. Modes of individuation are the constituting principles that can be located within the types that are expressing the relationship between work and life as a capacity to be affected. “The individuating is not simply individual,” as Deleuze writes (1994: 38). But it rather should be answered

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by locating principles of individuation in the expressions of the interviewed employees and managers. The factors that make the employees distinct are expressed, but not by the employees and managers themselves; instead, it is rather “that which acts in them as a transcendental principle” (Deleuze, 1994: 38). It is “an intrinsic mode of being” which is expressed in the expression of the relation of work and life: the expressed degrees of flexibility, performance and commitment. However, these degrees or intensities should not be thought of as individual extensities (e.g. personal interests in work and home);

rather, they are intensities of the relation of work and life (e.g. what desire desires in me). It is therefore not the individual who is flexible or the boundary that is flexible; it is the relation of work and life that is expressed as degrees of intensity. This expression can be expressed in different degrees by various types of individuation.

These principles do not have form but are undetermined in themselves. This means that the conditions have to be traced in their real expression and not in their potential form of how the human subject perceived a balance between work and life (e.g. harmony and equilibrium). The condition of the relation of work and life is “what one is made of”

(Buchanan, 1999: 6). Conditions are not potential experiences but rather virtual expression that is constituted inside the expressions of work and life. We would normally think that conditions have an independent existence as ideal categories outside of their constitution inside the human subjects’ expression (e.g. individual and organizational factors). The given is not given as such, but is only given inside the human subjects’ expression, which implies that conditions are not given outside of their constitution inside the human subjects’ expressions. Conditions depend on how they are constituted and expressed inside the given. In fact, they can only be localized by an analysis of the various relations and functions of dependency, because they are not simply regulative elements for how the given is given, but are elements that determine how the relation of work and life is constituted inside the given. This means that constitutive elements are determined inside the constitution, and are not given as such outside of this constitution.

From this follows some important changes of focus. First, the focus is on how the problematic forms are produced (flexibility, performance and commitment) and not on

In document Metaphysical Labour Flexibility, Performance and Commitment in Work-Life Management (Sider 108-115)