Introduction
We are often told that contemporary work is becoming increasingly individualized (see e.g. Beck, 2000; 2002; Lash and Urry, 1994; Sennett, 1999; 2006). The consequences of this individualization are, for example, the loss of social communities and the transformation of freedom into “the fundamental incompleteness of the self” (Beck, 2002: xxii). The individualization is therefore negatively determined in terms of what is missing or lacking from the individual, e.g. the individual has lost its sense of belonging to social communities. This is also an analysis we know from research on work-life balance. The role of the nuclear family has not only been eroded but has been replaced by the workplace (Hochschild, 2000). The employees seem to be more committed to their work than their families, which leads the employees to put more time into work because, as Arlie Hochschild writes, “time is a symbol of commitment” (2000: 69).
As much as I agree with Hochschild on this point, I believe that she misses something very important about the relation of work and life when she turns the question of commitment into a matter of time. When the committed employees invest themselves in work they not only give their time (and hence take time away from activities outside of work); in some sense we could say that they also invest themselves and their subjectivity in work. Kenneth Surin put it nicely,
Human consciousness, leisure, play, and so on, are no longer left to
‘private’ domains but are instead directly encompassed by the latest regimes of accumulation. The boundary between home and workplace becomes increasingly blurred, as does the demarcation between
‘regular’ work and ‘causal’ labour. (2005: 55)
Chapter VII: The Social Formation of Commitment
Introduction
We are often told that contemporary work is becoming increasingly individualized (see e.g. Beck, 2000; 2002; Lash and Urry, 1994; Sennett, 1999; 2006). The consequences of this individualization are, for example, the loss of social communities and the transformation of freedom into “the fundamental incompleteness of the self” (Beck, 2002: xxii). The individualization is therefore negatively determined in terms of what is missing or lacking from the individual, e.g. the individual has lost its sense of belonging to social communities. This is also an analysis we know from research on work-life balance. The role of the nuclear family has not only been eroded but has been replaced by the workplace (Hochschild, 2000). The employees seem to be more committed to their work than their families, which leads the employees to put more time into work because, as Arlie Hochschild writes, “time is a symbol of commitment” (2000: 69).
As much as I agree with Hochschild on this point, I believe that she misses something very important about the relation of work and life when she turns the question of commitment into a matter of time. When the committed employees invest themselves in work they not only give their time (and hence take time away from activities outside of work); in some sense we could say that they also invest themselves and their subjectivity in work. Kenneth Surin put it nicely,
Human consciousness, leisure, play, and so on, are no longer left to
‘private’ domains but are instead directly encompassed by the latest regimes of accumulation. The boundary between home and workplace becomes increasingly blurred, as does the demarcation between
‘regular’ work and ‘causal’ labour. (2005: 55)
The blurring of the boundaries of work and home happens because what traditionally has been regarded as the employees’ investment of desire outside of work is seen as a means of productivity for work. Individual desires such as playing soccer, having a hobby, or working for a political party in one’s spare time are seen as being potentially productive for the company, increasing the personal competency of the employees. It is the whole life of the employees that can become productive in work.
The social control of work hereby no longer functions by the exclusion of any means of life from the workplace, as was the basic assumption for accumulation of value in, for example, Frederick Taylor’s scientific management (1998). Today the productive labour power of the employees should not be detached from the employees’ ways of living; on the contrary, these ways of living should be included in work (see e.g. Lazzarato, 2004).
The committed employees of today therefore offer not only a body capable of working but also a mind capable of living for work. Commitment is therefore more than a matter of the employees identifying themselves with work (see e.g. McElroy et al., 2001), as they also are committed to ways of living that are regarded as being productive for the company. The employees are as productive assets not only human resources but also seen as human capacities. Thus, we should not understand commitment as individual investment of desire in work, but rather as individual expressions of a social desire, i.e.
what is regarded as productive by the company.
Deleuze offers a radically different understanding of desire and hence commitment than the one described by organizational commitment. For Deleuze, desire has neither a subject nor an object. Desire is not a subjective state of the human subject that is expressed in a longing for a missing object (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 108; see also Smith, 2007b: 73-74). For example, the human subject may have a desire to establish work-life balance, but the object of desire is not to be defined negatively as something missing (e.g. the missing balance in work and life) or as an object at all. Instead, the would-be ‘object of desire’ is the social formation, as Daniel W. Smith writes: “What we desire, what we invest our desire in, is a social formation, and in this sense desire is always positive” (2007b: 74). Desire is positive because it is determined by the
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productive object of the social formation and not on the object that it is missing. Desire is therefore not something that belongs to the human subject. As Deleuze puts it,
Desire is not then internal to a subject, any more than it tends towards an object: it is strictly immanent to a plan which it does not pre-exist, a plan which must be constructed. (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 89, quoted in Burchell, 1984: 47)
The social formation is in this sense neither something internal to the human subject nor is it a law or norm that the human subject must obey. It is an object that does not pre-exist our expressions of desire, but is constructed within these expressions.
This is not to say that human subjects do not have interests or needs. They do. However, these interests and needs are not expressions of individual will, as the individual will is always formed within the social formation. We have earlier referred to Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power in relation this discussion (see page 130). We can therefore only speak of individual interests within the context of a social formation (Smith, 2007b: 74), for example, the social formation of the company forms the human subjects’ interests in a particular way. This is an important revelation if we want to understand commitments as the formation of individual desire, as desire is then not something that can be derived from or explained by individual behaviours, needs and interests of the human subjects.
On the contrary we have to study how the needs and interests expressed by the human subjects are derived from the social formation. Human subjects do not give expression to an individual or private desire that belongs to them, but express a sense of belonging to a social formation. The social formation is therefore not represented by the individual interests and needs of the human subject; it is represented in the individual interests and needs. This is the positive definition of the social formation, not defined in terms of
“desiring what we do not have” (Colebrook, 2005: 91) but by connections in the individual expressions of desire. I call these connections ways of living. What needs to be studied is then how the social formation is expressed in the individual ways of living.
The social formation is in itself an undetermined social desire that does not desire
productive object of the social formation and not on the object that it is missing. Desire is therefore not something that belongs to the human subject. As Deleuze puts it,
Desire is not then internal to a subject, any more than it tends towards an object: it is strictly immanent to a plan which it does not pre-exist, a plan which must be constructed. (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 89, quoted in Burchell, 1984: 47)
The social formation is in this sense neither something internal to the human subject nor is it a law or norm that the human subject must obey. It is an object that does not pre-exist our expressions of desire, but is constructed within these expressions.
This is not to say that human subjects do not have interests or needs. They do. However, these interests and needs are not expressions of individual will, as the individual will is always formed within the social formation. We have earlier referred to Nietzsche’s idea of the will to power in relation this discussion (see page 130). We can therefore only speak of individual interests within the context of a social formation (Smith, 2007b: 74), for example, the social formation of the company forms the human subjects’ interests in a particular way. This is an important revelation if we want to understand commitments as the formation of individual desire, as desire is then not something that can be derived from or explained by individual behaviours, needs and interests of the human subjects.
On the contrary we have to study how the needs and interests expressed by the human subjects are derived from the social formation. Human subjects do not give expression to an individual or private desire that belongs to them, but express a sense of belonging to a social formation. The social formation is therefore not represented by the individual interests and needs of the human subject; it is represented in the individual interests and needs. This is the positive definition of the social formation, not defined in terms of
“desiring what we do not have” (Colebrook, 2005: 91) but by connections in the individual expressions of desire. I call these connections ways of living. What needs to be studied is then how the social formation is expressed in the individual ways of living.
The social formation is in itself an undetermined social desire that does not desire
anything but itself. It is determined when human subjects desire it by giving a certain expression to the social formation. In this sense the ways of living become the subjects of the social formation in so far as this object of desire is expressed in them. This means that the object of desire only exists in the expression of ways of living.
From a Deleuzian perspective commitment is then expressed when the employees invest desire in a social formation. The individual interests of the employees in, for example, work and home only exist and make sense within this social formation. Hence, what I will study in this chapter is not the interests of the employees in work and home but how their investments in the social formation affect their ways of expressing their interests in work and home. I deploy this understanding of commitment in an attempt to understand what constitutes the relation between the interest in work and the interest in home, so it is not just a matter of the employees balancing their interests in work and in home.
In the empirical analyses it is argued that commitment always expresses an individual relationship of work and life, because neither workaholics i.e., employees that do not have a life outside of work, nor employees with an instrumental relation to work, i.e.
employees who insist that life is separated from work, are recognized as being committed. Commitment is in this sense always an expression of difference in degree of work and life, e.g. how much interest in work is expressed in relation to the interest in life outside work. The workaholic is too committed to work, and the employee with an instrumental view on work is not committed enough. However, we should not understand this as an expression of the individual desire in various opposing interests, because these interests belong to the same person. Rather, we should understand this individual expression of commitment as an expression of the social formation, i.e. as an investment in the social formation. For example, when employees plan their holidays they take peak periods of work into consideration and plan holidays outside of these periods; by this means they invest in the social formation.
I will analyze this as the expressions of ‘we’ in Red. This social formation is undetermined in the sense that it is a collective desire that neither has a subject
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(individual will) or an object (norm). It is not at all clear who belongs to this ‘we’ that the managers and employees of Red refer to, and which is mentioned several times in the company’s mission statement The Red Touch. This ‘we’ not only includes the traditional members of the company, but also the families, customers, partners, and society when these express and share the desire expressed as this undetermined abstract
‘we’. I will argue that this organization of ‘we’ is a principle for the division of work and life that works by distribution of commitment. In the analysis I show how the employees are expected to be interested in and committed to the goals, values and missions of the company, the private lives and individual development of colleagues, share the goals and beliefs of the working group, and are expected to have commitments outside of work. I will not try to explain this complex net of commitment by referring to an exchange of interests between employees and employer; instead, I will show how these expressions of commitment are investments in a social formation of desire.
The empirical point of departure for this study of the social formation of commitment is seven focus group interviews with employees and managers in Red. The empirical case and methods are described in the previous chapter.
The chapter is structured in the following way. The next section is a critique of organizational commitment for containing desire in the individual human subject. Then I discuss commitment in work and home as a social organization. These matters are analyzed empirically. In this analysis I show how commitment is a social organization of interests and expectations in work and life that are expressed in the employees’
arguing for their ways of living and what they regard as a fair day’s work. In the final part of the analysis I discuss the Red vision statement The Red Touch.
A Short Critique of Organizational Commitment
Why do employees desire to be a part of an organization? This important question within organizational commitment on the constitution of the relation between employee and organization has been discussed as behaviour (Becker, 1960; Ritzer and Trice, 1970;
Stebbins, 1970; Salancik, 1977), attitude (Mowday et al., 1979; O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Porter et al., 1974), and psychological states (Allen and Grisaffe, 2001; Allen and
(individual will) or an object (norm). It is not at all clear who belongs to this ‘we’ that the managers and employees of Red refer to, and which is mentioned several times in the company’s mission statement The Red Touch. This ‘we’ not only includes the traditional members of the company, but also the families, customers, partners, and society when these express and share the desire expressed as this undetermined abstract
‘we’. I will argue that this organization of ‘we’ is a principle for the division of work and life that works by distribution of commitment. In the analysis I show how the employees are expected to be interested in and committed to the goals, values and missions of the company, the private lives and individual development of colleagues, share the goals and beliefs of the working group, and are expected to have commitments outside of work. I will not try to explain this complex net of commitment by referring to an exchange of interests between employees and employer; instead, I will show how these expressions of commitment are investments in a social formation of desire.
The empirical point of departure for this study of the social formation of commitment is seven focus group interviews with employees and managers in Red. The empirical case and methods are described in the previous chapter.
The chapter is structured in the following way. The next section is a critique of organizational commitment for containing desire in the individual human subject. Then I discuss commitment in work and home as a social organization. These matters are analyzed empirically. In this analysis I show how commitment is a social organization of interests and expectations in work and life that are expressed in the employees’
arguing for their ways of living and what they regard as a fair day’s work. In the final part of the analysis I discuss the Red vision statement The Red Touch.
A Short Critique of Organizational Commitment
Why do employees desire to be a part of an organization? This important question within organizational commitment on the constitution of the relation between employee and organization has been discussed as behaviour (Becker, 1960; Ritzer and Trice, 1970;
Stebbins, 1970; Salancik, 1977), attitude (Mowday et al., 1979; O’Reilly and Chatman, 1986; Porter et al., 1974), and psychological states (Allen and Grisaffe, 2001; Allen and
Meyer, 1990; Mathieu and Zajac, 1990). Whatever the difference between these perspectives on organizational commitment they have one thing in common, which is that they believe that the commitment to be a part of the social organization is to be found in the individual will of the human subject.
Within the research on organizational commitment Natalie J. Allen and John P. Meyer have a prominent role. They have developed a typology of commitment, which is widely used and referred to within research on organizational commitment (see e.g.
Gautam et al., 2004; Jaros et al., 1993; McDonald and Makin, 1999). Allen and Meyer (1996: 253; see also Allen and Meyer, 1990; Meyer and Allen 1984; 1991) divide the psychological linkage between employees and organization into three types of commitment.
Affective commitment is when the employees want to identify themselves with, be involved with, and are emotionally attached to the organization. Rosabeth Moss Kanter has defined it as “the attachment of an individual’s fund of affectivity and emotion to the group” (1968: 507; quoted in Meyer and Allen, 1991: 64). The employees form an emotional bond to the organization.
Continuance commitment is when employees have to remain members of the organization because the additional cost of leaving is too high. It is therefore a calculation of costs and benefits of staying in the organization. Howard Becker calls it side-bets (1960). Kanter defines it as “[the individual] profit associated with continued participation and a ‘cost’ associated with leaving” (1968: 504; quoted in Meyer and Allen, 1991: 65).
Normative commitment is when employees ought to stay in the organization because they feel a sense of obligation. The employees have internalized the norms of the organization and identify themselves with the goal, values, and missions of the organization (Jaros et al., 1993: 954-955). All three forms of commitment explain the relationship of employees and organization. However, they all do so by referring to the internal feelings of the employees who continue to be related to the organization
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because they have to, want to or ought to (Allen and Meyer, 1996). In other words, the employees feel a sense of being locked in, a sense of belonging, or a sense of duty to the organization (Jaros et al., 1993: 953-954). Robert Marsh and Hiroshi Manneri define it as an individual moral or subjective norm when the employee “considers it morally right to stay in the company regardless of how much status enhancement or satisfaction the firm gives him over the years” (1977: 59; quoted in Meyer and Allen, 1991: 66).
Organizational commitment then describes and explains the individual desire of the employees. In doing so they have raised the question of the social from the perspective of an individual will, as to why they are interested in become or continue to be a member of the organization. The social relation is therefore a matter of the match between the needs and interests of the employees and employer.
The problem is that the perspective on organizational commitment hereby understands the social desire from the perspective of the individual human subject. For example, why does the human subject desire to be a part of the organization? This means that the determination of the social is based on what the human subjects are lacking, for example, choosing to stay in the company because they need the money or can realize their interests in accounting by working in the company. From this perspective the question of work-life balance is therefore reduced to being a matter of how the private desire of the human subject has been invested in various social organizations such as work and home. In the following section I will suggest a reversal of this relation so desire is social and interest is expressed by the individual human subject.
Commitment in Work and Home
The research on work-life balance has discussed the conflict between the employees’
commitment in work and home (see e.g. Bielby and Bielby, 1989; Sturges and Guest, 2004). In this perspective the employees have experienced work-life balance as a conflict of interests (Bailyn et al., 2004), involvement (Greenhaus et al., 2003) and identity (Bielby and Bielby, 1989). The discussion of commitment within research on work-life balance has emphasized the change in the employees’ relations and feelings towards work. The employees are no longer only working to live, they are living to work (see Sturges and Guest, 2004). The employees’ commitment in work has resulted
because they have to, want to or ought to (Allen and Meyer, 1996). In other words, the employees feel a sense of being locked in, a sense of belonging, or a sense of duty to the organization (Jaros et al., 1993: 953-954). Robert Marsh and Hiroshi Manneri define it as an individual moral or subjective norm when the employee “considers it morally right to stay in the company regardless of how much status enhancement or satisfaction the firm gives him over the years” (1977: 59; quoted in Meyer and Allen, 1991: 66).
Organizational commitment then describes and explains the individual desire of the employees. In doing so they have raised the question of the social from the perspective of an individual will, as to why they are interested in become or continue to be a member of the organization. The social relation is therefore a matter of the match between the needs and interests of the employees and employer.
The problem is that the perspective on organizational commitment hereby understands the social desire from the perspective of the individual human subject. For example, why does the human subject desire to be a part of the organization? This means that the determination of the social is based on what the human subjects are lacking, for example, choosing to stay in the company because they need the money or can realize their interests in accounting by working in the company. From this perspective the question of work-life balance is therefore reduced to being a matter of how the private desire of the human subject has been invested in various social organizations such as work and home. In the following section I will suggest a reversal of this relation so desire is social and interest is expressed by the individual human subject.
Commitment in Work and Home
The research on work-life balance has discussed the conflict between the employees’
commitment in work and home (see e.g. Bielby and Bielby, 1989; Sturges and Guest, 2004). In this perspective the employees have experienced work-life balance as a conflict of interests (Bailyn et al., 2004), involvement (Greenhaus et al., 2003) and identity (Bielby and Bielby, 1989). The discussion of commitment within research on work-life balance has emphasized the change in the employees’ relations and feelings towards work. The employees are no longer only working to live, they are living to work (see Sturges and Guest, 2004). The employees’ commitment in work has resulted
in a blurring of the distinction between work and non-work, because work for the committed employees is not distinct from non-work by being uninteresting. It is rather another interest in the life of the employees. This means that the employees have to balance between different interests, personal involvements and identities in life. The employees are at the same time interested and committed in work and non-work.
From the perspective of work-life balance these thoughts about desire and interests make it possible to discuss the social aspect of life balance. For example, work-life balance is discussed as what is more interesting – work or family? This question of work-life balance is then determined by whether the employees want to invest their private desire in the social realm of work or home. Hence, work-life balance is not only about the distinction between the social spheres of work and home, but also about the distinction between private desire and social interests. However, if we want to apply the abovementioned reversal of social desire and private interest to the discussion of work-life balance, then there is no opposition between the spheres of work and home on the individual level.
The reason for this is that there is only a singular expression of the social commitment.
It is not an expression of the human subject’s desire to be a part of work life or home life, but an expression of the individual desire as an investment in the social formation.
This is not a division or opposition of work and home but an expression of different degrees of investment of desire in the social formation. It is an expression of more or less commitment, for example, if the employees say that they are more interested in home than work. However, this does not imply that they hereby express a distinction between different interests of theirs since these refer to the personhood of the employees and not the social formation. Instead, this is an expression of investment in the social formation. The difference in kind is not between work and home, which only can be distinct in terms of interests, but a difference within life itself. Hence, we could say that the difference of work and life on the level of desire is indiscernible exactly because it cannot be comprehended in terms of distinct interests.