Traditionally, the discipline of work-life balance has described the impact and consequences of work-home interface on the human subjects in terms of well-being, satisfaction and stress (see e.g. Kinnunen et al., 2006; Sverko et al. 2002). The question has been: how do factors of home and work affect a human being? This implies that the relation between work and life is mediated by the interface of work and home. It is what the human subject perceives and what it is affected by. Accordingly the link between the experience and the affect of this experience is explained and mediated by the work-home interface (see e.g. Kinnunen et al., 2006: 152). In this sense the relation between work and life has been subsumed under the identity of the work-home interface. There is an inseparable link between the experience of work-life balance and the effect of home and work on the human subject. This link is called work-home interface (Edwards and Rothbard, 2000), work-home interface (Lewis and Cooper, 1995) or work-life balance (Saltzstein et al., 2001).
In other words, the work-home interface functions as a middle term to measure how work and home affect each other. Demands make it possible to relate work to home
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because these are results that “affect the employee in all aspects of life and are not isolated to the work domain” (Quick et al., 2004: 427). What are the demands of work and what are the demands of home, and how do the demands of work affect the demands of home? We cannot say how these spheres affect each other if they have not been mediated by the work-home interface. For example, demands of work and life are only comparable by how they are given within work-home interface, that is, by being given in terms of, for example, spillover, conflict or balance.
Demands of work and home are measured in terms of how they affect the well-being of the employees, but they are not intelligible if they do not belong to the same identical work-home interface. For example, the different demands of being committed to home and work that are determined by the degree to which they affect the human subjects’
well-being. The human subject could, for example, say that family life demands more commitment than work life. In this sense, the difference between work and home is always measured and mediated by the work-home interface and is depended upon and conditioned by individual competencies, characteristics, traits and organizational factors.
The relation between home and work is always given internally to the work-home interface. When we, for example, say that ‘home is better than work’ we measure our lives in terms that are intrinsic to the relation between work and home, i.e. the measures of the relation are given internally to what they measure. The relation of work and home is, therefore, given as questions of time, space and energy by which the work-life balance of human subjects becomes measurable and determinable. These terms as measures are internal to the relation between work and home because they are given in the way they affect the human subject’s well-being and satisfaction with home and work.
Work-life balance is hereby measured as an outcome. We live the life that we do at the cost of work-life balance that we achieve. But what are the criteria or values upon which we base this judgment? We often do this by saying that ‘I’m this kind of person’, that is, we argue by referring to our intrinsic personalities and characteristics. This implies that the relation between work and home life is internal or intrinsic to the terms upon which we judge. Work and home not only belong to the human subject, but they describe some personal characteristics about the human subject. We recognize this
because these are results that “affect the employee in all aspects of life and are not isolated to the work domain” (Quick et al., 2004: 427). What are the demands of work and what are the demands of home, and how do the demands of work affect the demands of home? We cannot say how these spheres affect each other if they have not been mediated by the work-home interface. For example, demands of work and life are only comparable by how they are given within work-home interface, that is, by being given in terms of, for example, spillover, conflict or balance.
Demands of work and home are measured in terms of how they affect the well-being of the employees, but they are not intelligible if they do not belong to the same identical work-home interface. For example, the different demands of being committed to home and work that are determined by the degree to which they affect the human subjects’
well-being. The human subject could, for example, say that family life demands more commitment than work life. In this sense, the difference between work and home is always measured and mediated by the work-home interface and is depended upon and conditioned by individual competencies, characteristics, traits and organizational factors.
The relation between home and work is always given internally to the work-home interface. When we, for example, say that ‘home is better than work’ we measure our lives in terms that are intrinsic to the relation between work and home, i.e. the measures of the relation are given internally to what they measure. The relation of work and home is, therefore, given as questions of time, space and energy by which the work-life balance of human subjects becomes measurable and determinable. These terms as measures are internal to the relation between work and home because they are given in the way they affect the human subject’s well-being and satisfaction with home and work.
Work-life balance is hereby measured as an outcome. We live the life that we do at the cost of work-life balance that we achieve. But what are the criteria or values upon which we base this judgment? We often do this by saying that ‘I’m this kind of person’, that is, we argue by referring to our intrinsic personalities and characteristics. This implies that the relation between work and home life is internal or intrinsic to the terms upon which we judge. Work and home not only belong to the human subject, but they describe some personal characteristics about the human subject. We recognize this
when work-life balance is measured in the form of the individual human being’s interest or sense of belonging to work and home (Randall, 1987: 460); meaningful interrelationships between work and life (Bielby, 1992); and a lack of fit between person and environment (Voydanoff, 2005). The opposition between work and home is a specific difference that is given according to the individual difference of the human subject (personal traits, behaviour, characteristics). The difference between work and life is seen from the perspective of the human subject, which implies that work and life resemble each other because they are seen from the same identical perspective. Hence the difference between work and life is reduced to an individual difference. This understanding of work-life balance surfaces when people say that they only have one life and they cannot separate their work life from other parts of life.
We have tried to determine the nature of work-life balance by describing the given individual and organizational factors and how they affect a given human subject. How much can the human subject stand? Traditionally, we would say that the nature of balance in the human subject is hereby expressed. For example, when we talk about the individual limit of performance in terms like laziness, fatigue, stress and not the least work-life balance we express something about the nature of balance for the individual human subject. In doing so, the human subject has become the standard and instrument for measuring work-life balance (e.g. well-being and satisfaction). Furthermore, this has implied that the limit of work-life balance has so far been the human subject.
I will argue that it is not the human subject that is affected but the relation of work and life that is affecting itself. Hence, I am not interested in explaining the link between the human subjects’ experience of something and the impact that this has on the human subject. It is not interesting to explain the relation of work and life by referring to the perception of something or human nature. It is the relation itself that needs to be explained. To do so, we will focus on the effects of the relation of work and life. These are interesting if we are right to say that the relation of work and life is not given as such, but is only given in the form of its effects (i.e. expressions of types and what is expressed as conditions in these expressions) because then we can only scrutinize what the relation of work and life is, by locating how it is expressed in these effects. Modes
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of individuation are constitutive elements that are constituted by being expressed by types. Constituted modes of individuation become constitutive principles that can be found as productive rules within the expressions of work and life. This idea of thinking about the effects as constituting principles can to some extent be found in recent research that emphasises development rather than well-being (see e.g. Garofalo and Marra, 2007). By discussing the effects from the perspective of development they emphasise possibilities of changing rather than merely measuring the current situation in the form of how it affects the well-being of human subjects. In relation to this it is interesting that some companies begin to talk about work-life balance as a potential capacity of innovative power rather than a matter of lowering the impact of organizational demands on the individual employees’ well-being.
By doing so we cannot say what work-life balance is in itself, but we can trace how the relation of work and life is expressed. Types are on the one hand the effects of the relation of work and life, i.e. they are expressed, and on the other hand, where the relation of work and life is expressed. Therefore we cannot base the measurement of the relation of work and life on given conditions because these conditions are only established in the expressed. Measures therefore have to be construed or invented as individuating principles that can constitute the effects that take place within the expressions of work and life. This means what is interesting about work-life balance is not how they (whatever these measures are) affect the well-being of human subjects, but how these can be said to be ‘constituting effects’ that can be located within expressions of work and life. This is also to say that the relation of work and life does not affect human subjects (how could it?) but only produces affects. In itself the relation of work and life is a capacity to be affected that is expressed in various types.
Traditionally, we will think of these individual and organizational factors as constitutive elements of balance that are dependent on how they are constituted inside the human subject’s expression of work and life (independently variable), which means that they become dependent factors when they are determined as constitutive elements that in fact determine the balance of a particular given human subject. In this sense the factors are possible conditions, but this says nothing about how they in fact really are constituted
of individuation are constitutive elements that are constituted by being expressed by types. Constituted modes of individuation become constitutive principles that can be found as productive rules within the expressions of work and life. This idea of thinking about the effects as constituting principles can to some extent be found in recent research that emphasises development rather than well-being (see e.g. Garofalo and Marra, 2007). By discussing the effects from the perspective of development they emphasise possibilities of changing rather than merely measuring the current situation in the form of how it affects the well-being of human subjects. In relation to this it is interesting that some companies begin to talk about work-life balance as a potential capacity of innovative power rather than a matter of lowering the impact of organizational demands on the individual employees’ well-being.
By doing so we cannot say what work-life balance is in itself, but we can trace how the relation of work and life is expressed. Types are on the one hand the effects of the relation of work and life, i.e. they are expressed, and on the other hand, where the relation of work and life is expressed. Therefore we cannot base the measurement of the relation of work and life on given conditions because these conditions are only established in the expressed. Measures therefore have to be construed or invented as individuating principles that can constitute the effects that take place within the expressions of work and life. This means what is interesting about work-life balance is not how they (whatever these measures are) affect the well-being of human subjects, but how these can be said to be ‘constituting effects’ that can be located within expressions of work and life. This is also to say that the relation of work and life does not affect human subjects (how could it?) but only produces affects. In itself the relation of work and life is a capacity to be affected that is expressed in various types.
Traditionally, we will think of these individual and organizational factors as constitutive elements of balance that are dependent on how they are constituted inside the human subject’s expression of work and life (independently variable), which means that they become dependent factors when they are determined as constitutive elements that in fact determine the balance of a particular given human subject. In this sense the factors are possible conditions, but this says nothing about how they in fact really are constituted
inside the given object of the relation of work and life. They are simply given to the human subject’s perception and if they are said to constitute this perception then they are said to be dependent variables and factors. But what they constitute is a perception of the relation as balance, and not the relation in itself as an expression of the relation.
The contemporary theories of work-life balance are therefore able to account for the conditioning of balance but they fail to address the generic principle that constitutes the relation between work and life in itself. They can describe how the object of work-life balance is constituted and on which conditions this takes place, but they do not question that basic principle that they base the whole theoretical construction on, the human subject’s perception and the form of humanism that is conditioning this perception. This means that they do not take the relation of work and life in itself into consideration, but let the constitution of the relation be based on a human nature that is never questioned.
We will therefore not speak about the independent variable as the experienced or perceived work-life balance of the human subject, which is typically the case within work-life balance. Instead, we have to locate how the undetermined relation between work and life becomes determined in the human subject’s expression of it. There are so to speak not independent variables that can constitute the relation of work and life, because there is no privileged position outside of the relation (i.e. the human subject) that can cause and be caused by the relation (there is no beyond). Instead, we have to think about this from a relational view (as opposed to a positional view), which means that we should think about the relation from within itself.
There are an unlimited number of variations of work and life. Variations are in themselves chaotic and undetermined relations of work and life. The aim of this thesis is not to found the relation of work and life on the independent variable of the perceived balance of the human subject; rather, it is to show and create conceptual dependencies between variations of work and life. In this sense it is to replace the scientific observer with conceptual persona or conceptual types that “undergo the variations themselves”
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2003: 132; see also 227n14). Therefore variations take place on a single plane of immanence, which in itself is pure variation (Deleuze and Guattari,
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2003: 39). What are traced are therefore variations of the relation of work and life rather than the dependent variables of the independent variable.
So what is mediating the relation cannot be separated from what is mediated, or what is measuring cannot be separated from what is measured, because what is caused and what causing it is not separated. The consequence of this is that we cannot make a distinction between the ‘independent variable’ and ‘dependent variable’ of work-life balance. The reason for this is that they are both cause and caused that have to be located as effects.
This implies that the relation between work and life and where this relation has its effect is the same expression.
Thus, the effects of the relation of work and life are impersonal effects, which are not grounded in the nature of or perceived by the human subject, but grounded in the relation of work and life in itself. The impersonal expression of the relation of work and life is caused by the relation of work and life in itself, but whereas the actual effects pre-exist the cause in the potential experience of work-life balance, the cause only pre-exists in its effects in the real expression of the relation of work and life. If relation in itself is said to be real, then it is the real expression that is expressed in and by the impersonal expressions of work and life.
The Univocity of Work and Life
My aim with this chapter has not been to say what the human nature that constitutes the relation of work and life is, but to show how the relation of work and life is constituted in various ways and which conditions can be found in these various constitutions if we do not base the relations upon human nature.
The focus on (the univocal) relation that is set forward in this thesis implies a radical shift of focus from human subjects that perceive balance towards the relation of work and life in itself. This implies a reversal of the whole way of thinking about the relation of work and life. It is important how the relation between work and life is constituted and on which conditions, i.e. how the relation is constituted inside the given. The reason for this is that the relation is not given to the human experience; expressions of the
2003: 39). What are traced are therefore variations of the relation of work and life rather than the dependent variables of the independent variable.
So what is mediating the relation cannot be separated from what is mediated, or what is measuring cannot be separated from what is measured, because what is caused and what causing it is not separated. The consequence of this is that we cannot make a distinction between the ‘independent variable’ and ‘dependent variable’ of work-life balance. The reason for this is that they are both cause and caused that have to be located as effects.
This implies that the relation between work and life and where this relation has its effect is the same expression.
Thus, the effects of the relation of work and life are impersonal effects, which are not grounded in the nature of or perceived by the human subject, but grounded in the relation of work and life in itself. The impersonal expression of the relation of work and life is caused by the relation of work and life in itself, but whereas the actual effects pre-exist the cause in the potential experience of work-life balance, the cause only pre-exists in its effects in the real expression of the relation of work and life. If relation in itself is said to be real, then it is the real expression that is expressed in and by the impersonal expressions of work and life.
The Univocity of Work and Life
My aim with this chapter has not been to say what the human nature that constitutes the relation of work and life is, but to show how the relation of work and life is constituted in various ways and which conditions can be found in these various constitutions if we do not base the relations upon human nature.
The focus on (the univocal) relation that is set forward in this thesis implies a radical shift of focus from human subjects that perceive balance towards the relation of work and life in itself. This implies a reversal of the whole way of thinking about the relation of work and life. It is important how the relation between work and life is constituted and on which conditions, i.e. how the relation is constituted inside the given. The reason for this is that the relation is not given to the human experience; expressions of the
relation of work and life are given inside the relation of work and life. We therefore have to locate how the given is given and under which conditions this takes place.
The given is given as problems. These problems are not given to human subjects but are given inside the expressions of work and life. What are traced in the empirical interviews are therefore not the personal perceptions of work-life balance but how certain problematic forms transcend the expressions of work and life and are conditioned inside these as modes of individuation that are expressed. This means that problems are not determining the relation between work and life but are making the relation determinable, and conditions are not determining the relation but are determined inside the problematic relation of work and life. Problems are constitutive for the relation of work and life but do not constitute this relation in itself; they are constitutive forms that can be determined in relation to the constitutive elements that can be found in the various modes of individuation expressed by types. Constitutive elements are not something given to experience but something expressed in our expressions of work and life. It can be summarized in a table like this.