Rhetoric is meaningful – meaning is rhetorical

Rhetoric, some argue, is the practical art of persuasion, and should be distinguished from the hermeneutic endeavour of interpreting meaning (Gaonkar, 1997). This argument appears to find support in the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355b). Aristotle recognises that rhetoric cannot be defined by its subject matter (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355b and 1359b), but he also asserts that the rhetorical activity is productive of a specific kind of knowledge and thereby creates

boundaries that are perhaps not very clearly defined but still limit the range of rhetoric. Rhetoric is not defined by the specific topics with which rhetors deal, but by the things that the speakers do to and with these topics, by the nature of the rhetorical endeavour. To Aristotle, rhetoric is an ability that has to do with doxae – the probabilities that are the means and ends of arguments conducted in circumstances of contingency (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1357a). The rhetor argues the plausibility of his or her claims to knowledge and advocates the desirability of his or her preferred courses of action;

the aim is to win the argument here and now, but the truth and rightness of a claim is only

established until further notice. Rhetoric is, on the one hand, the specific acts of persuasion, on the other hand, a set of normative guidelines concerning the rhetorical practice.

In the Aristotelian conception, the rhetorician is either a practitioner or a teacher, and this understanding prevailed in the classical Latin understanding of rhetoric as either rhetorica utens

or rhetorica docens (Gaonkar, 1997, p. 27). Given the definition of rhetoric as a practical art confined to the domain of doxa, how is the introduction of the third category of rhetorical criticism justified? And how may the end of such rhetorical criticism come to be seen as the explanation of meaning?

The basic argument for the suspension of the distinction between the interpretive¹ or hermeneutic and the practical rhetorical task is one of reciprocity (Black, 1978, p. 10). The

practitioner’s rhetorical act of formulating and uttering a statement intended to fulfil some function in a given social setting calls for the equally rhetorical investigation of how that statement is made and what purposes it serves. This argument is based on the close connection between theory and practice that has been rhetoric’s hallmark since antiquity, but the emphasis has shifted from

effectiveness to understanding (Gaonkar, 1997, p. 27).² The preoccupation with understanding leads the critic to investigate how utterances become meaningful for speakers and audiences. However, this investigation is still guided by the basic rhetorical question: “…why is the author doing this and what is the intended effect on readers?” (Booth, 2001, p. 187).³

The interpretive turn in rhetorical studies is premised upon a specific understanding of meaning according to which the rhetorical practitioner’s formulation of the utterance cannot be separated from his or her own interpretation of the world. In their pioneering article on the

relationship between hermeneutics and rhetoric Michael Hyde and Craig Smith argue that “meaning is derived by a human being in and through the interpretive understanding of reality. Rhetoric is the process of making-known that meaning” (Hyde & Smith, 1998, p. 66, emphasis removed). Only in their articulation do understandings and opinions become truly meaningful. Such an understanding of the rhetorical endeavour as an expository process leads to the conclusion that “hermeneutics and rhetoric form a symbiotic relationship with each other. The relationship defines the process of interpretive understanding and meaning formation that lies at the heart of our temporal existence”

(Hyde, 2001, p. 336). Or, as Hans-Georg Gadamer, the exponent of modern philosophical hermeneutics par excellence, puts it, “the rhetorical and the hermeneutical aspects of human

1 I understand interpretive as a technical term designating the practice of studying and explaining the meaning formation of texts (for an introduction to this usage see for instance Gross & Keith, 1997, p. 11).

2 Gaonkar is himself sceptical of the interpretive turn, but that does not make his presentation of it any less illuminating.

3 Such a definition of the rhetorical critical task, of course, begs the question of how we gain access to the speaker’s intentions. As will be seen shortly I advocate the study of rhetorical action in its pure textuality as a way of side-stepping this difficult issue. The leading analytical question, then, becomes not what the author meant to say, but what meanings are articulated in the text.

linguisticality interpenetrate each other at every point” (Gadamer, 1985, p. 280).⁴ The individual’s understanding of the world and his or her expression of it are intimately connected, and the creation of meaning can thus be understood as an inherently rhetorical process.

By pointing out that the rhetorical practice is always already interpretive, Hyde and Smith establish the link between rhetoric and meaning. What has happened is that the rhetorical intention of persuading a particular audience of some specific point has been equated with the more general aims of discovering and communicating how one understands a given issue. This equation is performed through a reconsideration of what it means to be rhetorical. The redefinition not only marks a turn to interpretation in rhetorical studies, but also a move away from the instrumental understanding of rhetoric that is often implied in the singular focus on how the rhetor’s persuasive endeavour becomes most effective. In this movement the scope of the rhetorical is broadened considerably; the term is no longer used as a label for a certain category of utterances, but is instead regarded as a constitutive element of all communication. Rhetoric, as Kenneth Burke famously puts it, “…is rooted in an essential function of language itself […]; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols” (Burke, 1969, p. 43, emphasis removed).

The language-functional understanding of rhetoric provides the basis for viewing rhetoric as meaningful, but in order for the connection between rhetoric and interpretation to be fully established, the rhetoricity of meaning must also be recognised; a definition of meaning as a communicative and dynamic process must be substantiated. Although it cannot be denied that words have some degree of stable intentional and conventional meaning, there is an equally undeniable actional or communicative dimension of meaning formation. Words only become fully meaningful when used in utterances whose meanings, in turn, are never simply the sum of the employed units. Meaning is use, as Wittgenstein would have it (Wittgenstein, 2001, § 43), and only emerges in the act of usage. When the dynamic, communicative dimension of meaning is

highlighted, it becomes possible to see meaning formation as being subject to the urgency and contingency that is characteristic of the rhetorical endeavour (Farrell & Frentz, 1979). Meaningful expressions are only created through adaptation of the articulations to the specific situations in which they are made. Hence, the articulation of meaning becomes a rhetorical act, the result of the meeting between a certain speaker and a particular audience, expressed in a specific way and

4 This understanding is echoed in the Danish rhetorical scholar Jørgen Fafner’s dictum that rhetoric and hermeneutics are connected like Siamese twins (Fafner, 1997, p. 15).

influenced by various factors of the given situation and the broader societal context. The speaker’s interpretive skills are prerequisite to his or her rhetorical act, and the audience’s rhetorical

capabilities are in turn inherent to the interpretation of the utterance; meaning is constituted in this dual rhetorical-hermeneutical process.

The interdependency of speaking and interpreting forms the basis of the constitutionist approach to meaning formation. In the constitutionist view social knowledge arises in situations that are always already constrained by prior knowledge and expectations as well as other contextual factors. While the constraints limit the range of possibilities available to the actors, these very limits are also what facilitates choice and as such makes action possible. When given a constitutionist foundation rhetoric is inherently interpretive, and the aim of rhetorical criticism is to understand the communicative constitution of meaning on its own terms.