• Ingen resultater fundet

First round of analysis

5.1. Trajectory one: deepening and widening

5.1.3. Personae offered in and responses given to Fischer’s speech

of Europe that was languishing” (EP 16/05/00).30 Fischer’s attempt at igniting a debate on the future of Europe is recorded by the Spanish newspapers but the issue is not explored at any length.

differently in the various settings. The German and the French coverage by and large accept the role of the second persona that Fischer offers to these nations, and the presented reactions generally take on the agency ascribed to this persona. The English newspapers focus on the role of the third persona Fischer ascribes to them, but are not content with keeping quiet. Rather, they bring out the big headlines and warning signs, thus, speaking squarely against Fischer’s request. The Danish and the Spanish reports do not relate directly to any of the positions offered in Fischer’s speech. The Spanish coverage stays loyal to the terms of engagement set out by Fischer and reports on the reactions of those that are in the offered positions without identifying with these. The Danish reporting recontextualises the debate in terms of the pending national referendum on the euro, thereby endowing the speech with a meaning and assuming an agency that is decidedly outside the proposals and positions forwarded by Fischer. Figure 10 illustrates the relationships between the personae offered in Fischer’s speech and the reactions of the national press coverage.

Figure 10: The personae offered in and responses given to Fischer’s speech 1st persona:

Fischer, German parliamentarian and convinced European

2nd persona:

German, French and other pro-Europeans

3rd persona:

British and other Euro-sceptics

Germany:

Survey of reactions

France:

Applause of the initiative

England:

Reactions against the federalist agenda Denmark:

Insertion of speech into national context of debate on the euro Spain:

Presentation of a primarily Franco-German issue

5.1.4. “I am ready to share new and greater responsibilities” – Aznar in Paris Presentation of the speech

On the 26th of September 2000 José María Aznar, the Spanish president of government at the time,31 spoke at the French Institute of International Relations on the topic of the future of Europe.

Aznar was in Paris at the invitation of the Institute; during the visit he also held unofficial meetings with Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin and was interviewed by Le Figaro.32

In the speech Aznar sets his visions for Europe within the context of simultaneous geographical enlargement and political deepening of the Union. The purpose of the speech is to present solutions to the “deepening-widening dilemma” (l. 50). Throughout the speech Aznar presents himself as a pragmatic integrationist. His goal, he says, is to create a political entity that is as capable of action and as responsive to the citizens’ demands as possible – an efficient, flexible, and dynamic European Union.

Constitution of personae

At the opening of the speech Aznar announces that he will be setting out the Spanish orientation in the ongoing debate on the future of Europe (l. 13). He introduces himself to the audience by stating that he is “…a clear participant in a profound integration process and […] ready to share new and greater responsibilities” (ll. 6-7). Aznar speaks in the name of “his government” (l. 19), “being Spanish” (l. 37 and 134), and his proposals are said to comply with “Spanish interests” (ll. 19-20).

The speech presents “the principles that form the Spanish position” (l. 49), setting forth that which

“Spain aspires to” (l. 68) and which “Spain desires” (l. 96). In sum, Aznar speaks as the Spanish head of state, and in doing so he identifies his own position with an official Spanish persona; it is the relationship between this official national persona and the European Union that is developed in the speech.

Aznar initially takes a positive and active stance towards Europe, and he presents Spain and all other member states as being subjected to the common European interest saying that the EU is constituted on the basis of a “deeply rooted will of belonging” (l.

38). In elaborating on the tension between the national and European levels of governance

31 Before the parliamentary elections of the 14th of March 2004 Aznar had announced that he would step down from office. However, he had surely not planned that his conservative Partido Popular would have to concede the incumbency to José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and his socialist party.

32 According to the coverage by El País and Le Figaro (EP 26/09/00, EP 28/09/00, LF 27/09/00). Aznar spoke in French, albeit “with a strong Spanish accent” (EP 27/09/00); however, I have only been able to locate the speech in a Spanish translation, wherefore the following analysis is based on the Spanish text.

Aznar also seems to opt for the European side of the scale. He maintains that the formation of a “Europe a la Carte” is an undesirable development and concludes: “We have to guarantee the common stem and avoid the birth of various Europes” (ll. 78-79).

Aznar presents his own persona as being decidedly pro-European and also offers a pro-European stance to his audience. Yet he recognises that European integration has its limits: “The European states are very jealous of their national and international identities, and the modification in the competencies of the Union should continue to be submitted to the agreement of all” (ll. 114-116). Although Aznar repeatedly calls for their resolution, the tensions between diverse national interests and the common European position run through the entirety of the speech. The question of how European commonality may arise remains unanswered, meaning that both the first and second personae that Aznar creates are ridden with tension. Aznar may speak of European unity as the goal, but the nation is positioned as the main actor, who either demonstrates European sentiment or performs on the European stage (ll. 247-256).

The speech is directed to the immediate audience at the French Institute of International Relations, to which reference is made at both the beginning and the end of the intervention (ll. 3-4 and l. 255). Also, the speech directs itself to other heads of state; Aznar makes explicit reference to a recent intervention by French President Jacques Chirac (ll. 4-5 and ll. 90-93), and his discussion of the terminology of federation and constitution implicitly refers to Fischer’s proposals (l. 106). Towards the end of the speech it becomes quite clear that Aznar sees his primary audience as the political elite rather than a larger public. He states:

“With this [the proposals set forth] I am sure that we can generate the respect and adhesion of our citizens, and it is up to us, the European politicians, not to disappoint this new favourable predisposition” (ll. 245-246).

There is very little address outside the narrow circle of academics and politicians. Although Aznar identifies himself with Spain, the speech does not contain any explicit appeal to the Spanish – they are neither asked to identify with Aznar personally or with the vision of Spain in Europe he sets out.33 Furthermore, Aznar identifies Spain with Europe, and presents his speech as an intervention in an ongoing European debate, but he does not specify what it means to be European, nor does he align himself clearly within the

33 Aznar is speaking on behalf of the Spanish not to them. The lack of invitation to active identification also means that the speech offers no concrete points of contestation.

debate. References to “the European idea” (l. 40), “the common European interest” (l. 141) and the like do not add up to any clear sense of Europeanness.

Aznar’s self-avowed pragmatism means the position on specific matters may be perfectly clear, but it provides no overall sense of direction to guide the proposals for the future. The pragmatism makes it possible for Aznar to manoeuvre freely, but it also means that no stable audience persona is established in the context of the broader public debate on the future of Europe. There is, however, a quite clear sense of who is excluded from European co-operation and from participating in the debate. The first excluded group, who all EU-members define themselves against and actively oppose, is defined explicitly as “…the enemies of democracy and freedom called nationalist exclusivity, ethnic tyranny and terrorism” (ll. 237-238). The second silenced group is cut off from the debate through the strong emphasis on the co-ordination of national and European interests. Neither total rejection nor total embracement of Europe is an option, and uncompromising scepticism as well as fervent federalism is relegated to the third persona. In Aznar’s conception of the debate all tenable proposals must aim at balancing the national and the European.