First round of analysis
5.5. From institutionalisation to ratification – further developments of the debate 136
On the 28th of February 2002 the Convention on the Future of Europe, or the European Convention as it was soon officially dubbed, held its inaugural session. On this occasion the chairman,137 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, presented the Convention’s agenda and working methods to the convened
participants.138 Giscard d’Estaing also discussed the nature of the Convention’s end-result. He
136 This section is a strictly referential account of the events succeeding the Laeken summit. While my conclusions are based exclusively on the analyses of the first two stages of the debate on the future of Europe, I felt subsequent
developments could not be entirely ignored. Therefore, I provide the following overview of major events that took place between December 2001 and September 2004. The articles quoted in the following are listed in appendix 9 along with the rest of the studied newspaper coverage; however, they were not collected in the same systematic manner as the coverage of the speeches and the declarations. A number of other contributions to the debate are also referred to in the following; the complete references to these can be found in the bibliography.
137 In the course of the Convention’s working period the title of president was employed more and more frequently (Norman, 2003, p. 43). This shift possibly reflects the lack of a distinction between a chairman and a president in the French language, but it may also be a sign of growing recognition and acceptance of Giscard d’Estaing’s authority.
Since the term chairman was preferred in the early stages of the debate on which I focus, I have chosen to maintain this term in my presentation of later events in order to avoid any confusion as to which post I am speaking of.
138 This introductory speech as well as all the other oral and written statements that were presented to the Convention can be found on the Convention’s website (http://european-convention.eu.int).
recognised that the Laeken Declaration allows the Convention to either submit one or several final recommendations, but stated:
…there is no doubt that, in the eyes of the public, our recommendation would carry considerable weight and authority if we could manage to achieve broad consensus on a single proposal which we could all present. If we were to reach consensus on this point, we would thus open the way towards a Constitution for Europe. In order to avoid any disagreement over semantics, let us agree now to call it: a ‘constitutional treaty for Europe’ (d’Estaing, 28/02/02).
Thus, the chairman from the very outset of the Convention sought to make consensus the commonly assumed goal, and he also attempted to create the common presupposition that the eventual proposal should be constitutional in nature. Giscard d’Estaing then went on to talk about how the desired results could be achieved, stating that: “This Convention cannot succeed if it is only a place for expressing divergent opinions. […] the members of the Convention will have to turn towards each other and gradually foster a ‘Convention spirit.’” “So,” he urged the members of the Convention, “let us dream of Europe!” “And,” he concluded, “persuade others to share that dream!”
During the course of the Convention’s work there were lively discussions of both the substantial issues on the agenda and of the various procedural matters, not least Giscard’s somewhat autocratic style. As the work drew towards its conclusion the members of the Convention still disagreed on a number of central issues, but the vast majority now shared the belief that the process should culminate in the presentation of one and only one proposal. Therefore, they proved willing to compromise and to accept elements that did not correspond exactly with their own views and interests. Moreover, the proposal’s constitutional character had become part of the common understanding of the members of the Convention, and on the 18th of July 2003 the chairman could hand over the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe to the Italian Presidency of the European Council. The Convention succeeded in taking on a dynamic of its own, and its final proposal went well beyond the explicitly stated suggestions of the Laeken Declaration. The declaration only posed the question “…whether this simplification and reorganisation [of the treaties] might not in the long run lead to the adoption of a constitutional text in the Union” (ll. 162-163); the Convention ended up proposing a fully fledged constitution.
On the 4th of October 2003 the Italian Presidency of the European Council convened the Intergovernmental Conference that, taking the Convention’s proposal as its starting point, was
to endow the EU with a new foundational treaty.139 The IGC set to work amidst calls for a swift agreement on a Treaty that would be as close to the Convention’s proposal as possible. However, it soon became clear that all of the heads of state and government had particular concerns and specific objections to the Convention’s draft, and the Italian presidency received more than a hundred proposals for changes, which the various actors wanted incorporated into the final text.140 By the time the IGC reached its scheduled culmination at the European Council meeting in Brussels on the 12th and 13th of December 2003 the leaders had come a long way towards a final agreement.
Consensus had been created on the general structure of the new Treaty, it would indeed be
constitutional, and most of the main issues had been resolved to everyone’s satisfaction. However, a couple of major stumbling-blocks remained – disagreements so severe they caused Silvio
Berlusconi to state that it would take a miracle to reach agreement.141
The leaders of the old and new Member States, the ten incoming members were allowed full participation in the negotiations, opened the discussions with echoes of the prelude to the Nice summit: rather no agreement than a bad agreement.142 But contrary to what was the case at Nice, the politicians now stuck to their warnings at the moment of truth. When it became apparent that no common position on the thorny issue of the individual countries’ voting weights in the European Council could be found, the leaders decided to end the discussions rather than to negotiate a complicated compromise solution. The Council simply concluded that: “…it was not possible for the Intergovernmental Conference to reach overall agreement on a draft constitutional treaty at this stage. The Irish Presidency is requested on the basis of consultations to make an assessment of the prospect for progress and to report to the European Council in March” (IGC, 12/12/03).143
In accordance with the Council conclusions of the December summit the Irish government, which took over Council presidency in January 2004, took on the task of sorting out the various positions and creating new compromises. In March the presidency was able to announce that enough progress had been made for the official talks to be continued; the resumed IGC now aimed at a final agreement at the June European Council marking the end of the Irish presidency
139 Thus, the opening of the IGC was pushed forward; in the schedule originally laid down in the Nice Declaration it was set for 2004.
140 As reported by Politiken (28/10/03).
141 Quoted in Le Monde (13/12/03).
142 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (12/12/03A) quotes Joschka Fischer for taking this stance. According to El País (11/12/03) this was also the Polish and the Spanish Prime Ministers positions, and even Berlusconi who reportedly wanted agreement more than anyone said he would not accept it at any price (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12/12/03B).
(IGC, 24/03/04). And on the 18th of June the European heads of state and government experienced a moment of sweet relief, as they were able to announce their agreement on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The agreement was reached on the basis of specific changes in the highly contentious institutional matters as well as compromises concerning the decision-making
procedures in a number of specific policy areas (IGC, 18/06/04). These details apart, the agreed text was identical with the proposal that was also on the table in December, and thus the main thrust and central ideas of the Convention’s proposal were officially accepted.
Following the leaders’ agreement the constitutional treaty is to be officially signed; a solemn ceremony, which is scheduled to take place in Rome on the 29th of October 2004.144 The process then turns from creation of the new treaty to ratification of it. The treaty must be ratified in each of the 25 member states before it can come into effect; in some states ratification is left to the national parliaments while others will hold national referenda on the issue. Ratification can be quite a lengthy process, and it is not expected that the treaty will be ratified in all countries any earlier than 2006 – if it is indeed ratified in all of the member states as is by no means certain.
5.6. Concluding the first round of analysis: from personal thoughts to official action