Donald Schön’s approach to knowledge and expertise is similar to the approach of the Dreyfus brothers in several ways. First of all, he criticizes technical rationality as an appropriate notion of expertise and suggests that expert performance is much more intuitively based. Secondly, he
suggests that experts know more than it is possible to say with words. Finally, he is focused on how to incorporate and include the body in the outlined theoretical framework. However, Schön seems to grant reflection a much more central position when it comes to describing expert behavior (Schön, 1983).
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6.3.1 The theory of reflection-in-practice
Schön divides professional knowledge into three categories, ‘knowing-in-action’, ‘reflection-in-action’, and ‘reflection-on-action’. Knowing-in-action represents the kind of processes where the expert knows what to do spontaneously:
There are actions, recognitions, and judgments, which we know how to carry out spontaneously; we do not have to think about them prior to or during their performance. We are often unaware of having learned to do these things; we simply find ourselves doing them. In some cases, we were once aware of the understandings which were subsequently internalized in our feeling for the stuff of action. In other cases, we may never have been aware of them. In both cases, however, we are usually unable to describe the knowing which our action reveals. (Schön, 1983, p. 54)
Accordingly, the processes taking place are highly intuitive and unconscious, similar to the behavior of the expert in Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ taxonomy. However, according to Schön,
sometimes the processes of action involve reflective thinking, which might take place during the action (reflection-in-action) or after (reflection-on-action). Such a reflection may primarily be caused by unexpected events.
The practitioner allows himself to experience surprise, puzzlement, or
confusion in a situation which he finds uncertain or unique. He reflects on the phenomena before him, and on the prior understandings which have been implicit in his behavior. He carries out an experiment which serves to generate both a new understanding of the phenomena and the change in the situation.
When someone reflects in action, he becomes a researcher in the practice context. He is not dependent on the categories of established theory and
technique, but constructs a new theory of the unique case. (Schön, 1983, p. 68)
Thus, the expert behavior is not strictly unconscious or intuitive. Rather the expert continuously scrutinizes his own practice. Yet Schön still emphasizes that knowing-in-action might in some cases inhibit reflection (Schön, 1983, p. 58 and pp. 226-240). In particular if the expert is afraid of
uncertainty and wishes to appear as an authority (Schön, 1983, p. 67). However, in general, Schön
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is very optimistic when it comes to the expert’s ability to work intuitively and yet being able to reflect on action and develop praxis.
6.3.2 What promotes reflection-in-action
In order to examine to what degree the expert scrutinizes their own praxis, it may be productive to look a bit closer on what promotes such reflection. As mentioned in the above, reflection might be caused by a surprise or something that is not working properly. From this perspective, Schön seems to be inspired by the work of John Dewey and his way of conceptualizing the key forces in the process of learning (Dewey, 1938). Schön provides several pieces of empirical evidence of such cases in his book, The Reflective Practitioner (1983). For example, Schön demonstrates how a psychotherapist is forced to reframe a situation because it appears to be essentially different from what he has experienced before. On the other hand, Schön is applying examples that might not be understood as surprising or different. For instance, he suggests that improvisations of jazz
musicians are characterized by reflection-in-action: ‘Improvisation consists of varying, combining and recombining a set of figures within the schema which bounds and gives coherence to the
performance’ (Schön, 1983, p. 55). Now, of cause improvisation might represent a unique situation, which calls for in-action. Still, it seems unclear why improvisations promote reflection-in-action rather than other type of activities.
6.3.3 Reflection: the key to change?
One of Schön’s main agendas is to demonstrate that praxis represents a know-how that is not to be considered less valuable than formal theory or research (Schön, 1983, p. 26; Schön, 1987).
Accordingly, Schön tries to show that praxis is inventive and visionary rather than conservative and reproductive. Thus, it seems important to Schön to emphasize the expert’s reflections and abilities to examine and change perspective and performance. This matter of interest might not be a problem in the sense that all research is intertwined with intentions and represents a specific worldview.
However, Schön fails to describe what actually promotes reflection, beyond that it is something that the practitioner finds ‘uncertain or unique’ (Schön, 1983, p. 68). Hence, it seems too optimistic just to expect that reflection will arise when it is needed.
The descibed ambiguity might be further reinforced by the way Schön approaches the phenomenon of reflection. On the one hand, reflection is considered the key to change practice. Accordingly,
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actions not comprised of some kind of reflection may not change practice. On the other hand, Schön argues that humans are following rules that they can not describe (Schön, 1983, p. 55). It seems somehow unanswered, at least from a rational analytical point of departure, how humans can reflect upon something that they are not able to describe. This issue will be discussed further in the
following.