As described in the above, the chosen method results in a number of challenges concerning
objectivity versus subjectivity, simplicity versus complexity, and partiality versus generalizability.
First of all, actor-network theory is included in the study because it provides a number of interesting and productive perspectives on these matters. Thus, on the one hand, ANT offers an important critical voice in terms of the methodological matrix presented so far. Accordingly, ANT is applied in the study in order to question the urge to categorize, theorize, and generalize. On the other hand, ANT provides an attempt to unite relativism and objectivism and thus construct a platform upon which knowledge can be build. Further, ANT offers a way to include materiality in the study of social behavior and thus potentially bridge the gap between human and technology.
2.5.1 ANT as an alternative conceptualization of the empirical world
Often, ANT is understood as a certain ontological approach suitable for capturing how social and material phenomena are connected in networks. However, according to Latour (the main founder of ANT), ANT is first of all a method designed to explore the world, rather than an attempt to describe the world (Latour, 1999a, 2005). Nevertheless, based on Latour's main points, it is not surprising (and not unreasonable either) that ANT is sometimes applied as an alternative interpretation of the empirical world: one of Latour's main theoretical suggestions is that objects (i.e., pencils, desks, computers, hammers, etc.) play a significant role when it comes to phenomena classified as ‘social’.
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Thus, according to Latour, most sociological thinkers tend to ignore the significance and importance of objects in everyday life.
Much like sex during the Victorian period, objects are nowhere to be said and everywhere to be felt. They exist, naturally, but they are never given a thought, a social thought. Like humble servants, they live on the margins of the social doing most of the work but never allowed to be represented as such. There seems to be no way, no conduit, no entry point for them to be knitted together with the same wool as the rest of the social ties. (Latour 2005, p. 73)
From an ANT perspective, objects and humans interact in various networks and must accordingly be regarded equally as ‘actors’ (classified as ‘non-human actors’ as opposed to ‘human actors’).
Thus, ANT actually does propose an alternative version and interpretation of the world, which makes it reasonable to apply ANT not only as a method (Latour would probably disagree, Latour 2005, pp. 131 & 142). Obviously, the focus on objects offers an interesting perspective on creativity in a technological context (see e.g., Bloomfield & Vurdubakis, 1994; Ingold, 2008; Krogh, 2010).
However, the ‘symmetric’ approach to objects and humans (Latour, 2005) is not an attempt to humanise the material world. Rather, ANT suggests that human action is not isolated, but, on the contrary, connected to other human and non-human actions in complex networks. Consequently, according to ANT, a creative individual must be treated as a part of a widespread network,
constituted by friends, computers, records, software, musicians, etc., instead of being treated as an isolated island.
[T]he very word actor directs our attention to a complete dislocation of the action, warning us that it is not a coherent, controlled, well-rounded, and clean-edged affair. By definition action is dislocated. Action is borrowed, distributed, suggested, influenced, dominated, betrayed, translated. (Latour, 2005, p. 46)
In the light of the above, ANT may lead to a twofold conceptual reduction of individual autonomy.
Firstly, by suggesting that non-human actors actually are not just an extension of human will, and, secondly, by suggesting that human action is nothing more than a single link in a long chain of events. Despite this, ANT is not proposing any type of deterministic inspired disqualification of individual autonomy (see the discussion of structuralism below).
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Although ANT is not designed to address technological phenomena in particular, it seems
appropriate to apply the theory in regard to digitally-based compositional techniques and cultures:
often, contemporary music is basically constructed as a mix between different pre-produced musical fragments. As a consequence, the compositional process is most of all characterized by selection among different fragments and options of combinations. Such a description of the creative matrix differs from conventional notions of an autonomous composer, working primarily alone, producing internal emerged original ideas. Thus, ANT may offer an alternative conceptualisation of creativity as it appears in the present study (see also Hennion, 2003 & Ingold, 2008).
2.5.2 ANT as a methodological strategy
According to Latour, ANT represents first of all a number of methodological guidelines for the purpose of studying the empirical world without drawing on simple generalizations and
predetermined models (Latour, 2005, p. 142). Among these theoretical strategies I find the following principles and discussions especially relevant.
2.5.2.1 Relativity and objectivism: constructivism and positivism
Latour is suggesting a type of balance between relativity and objectivism I find productive. In order to describe this subtle connection he has suggested an analogy between science and a building site.
According to Latour, science can be compared to a construction site in the sense that knowledge is basically a construction (Latour, 1999a, 2005). Thus, Latour indicates that knowledge is relative and not objective. However, according to Latour, a building can be well- or
inadequately-constructed. Thus, Latour indicates an objectivist’s, approach in the sense that knowledge, like buildings, can be more or less adequate. He further develops this argument by discussing the very understanding of the word ‘construction’. According to Latour, the meaning of the word is often falsely associated with something untrue. According to this view, either something is real and not constructed or it is constructed and thus ‘artificial, contrived or invented, made up and false’
(Latour, 2005, p. 90). Instead, Latour suggests that objectivity can go hand in hand with constructionism. This doesn’t mean that Latour rejects relativism. Conversely, he embraces relativity. The point is that every perspective depends on a specific standpoint, but that doesn’t mean that this standpoint can’t be improved.
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Nevertheless, the question is, how to build the building adequately. Latour’s advice is simply to
‘describe’ the world (Latour, 2005, p. 136). The problem is, of course, that from a constructivist point of view a description is not simply a ‘description’ but rather an ‘inscription’ (Denzin, 1999, p.
212-213). From this perspective, ANT may be criticized for being ‘naive empiricism’ in line with grounded theory. However, Latour still insists that a positivistic approach is not inconsistent with constructivism.
[T]here are two ways to criticize objectivity: one is by going away from the object to the subjective human viewpoint. But the other direction is the one I am talking about: back to the object. Positivists don’t own objectivity […].
Don’t believe all that crap about being ‘limited’ to one’s perspective. All of the sciences have been inventing ways to move from one standpoint to the next, from one frame of reference to the next, for God’s sake: that’s called relativity […]. If I want to be a scientist and reach objectivity, I have to be able to travel from one frame of reference to the next, from one standpoint to the next.
Without those displacements, I would be limited to my own narrow point of view for good. (Denzin, 1999, p. 146)
Consequently, Latour manages to escape from the relativistic trap by claiming that quality of knowledge can be improved throughout continuous cycles of research, an argument also suggested by scientific realists. Hence, good research is equal to ‘good descriptions’ and bad research is equal to ‘bad descriptions’. A scientist is not objective, but still their description of the world may be somewhat objective if the researcher manages to ‘travel from one standpoint to the next’.
Obviously, Latour may be criticized for underplaying the significance of subjectivity, specific interest of power, etc. However, I find the optimistic notion, that investigations of the empirical world are actual possible regardless various types of constructivist objections, quite valuable. I am not suggesting that Latour’s perspective represents a solution of the basic subject/object problem.
However, I find that Latour helps in establishing a platform, upon which the researcher might reflect upon his own approach and idiosyncratic perspective without drifting into notions of
subjectivity and rivers of deconstruction. Equally, the researcher might focus on descriptions of the world without supporting simple notions of objectivity.
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2.5.2.2 Who is the clever one?
Latour criticizes the implicitly or explicitly constructed hierarchy between the researcher and the people that are being investigated. Thus, one of Latour’s main points of critique regarding the ones he designates as ‘social scientists’ (e.g., Bourdieu and Foucault) is that they tend to brand
themselves as somewhat more reflective, wiser, and more intelligent than the people they study (Latour, 2005, p. 151). Thus, they are able to analyze and explain human behavior on a certain fundamental level that is not in general realized by the people under study. Bourdieu’s description of doxa is an example of such an approach, in the sense that, according to Bourdieu, a field’s doxa is so taken for granted by the agents in the field that it is almost impossible for the agents to acknowledge the basic rules. Quite oppositely, Latour suggests that the researcher is not more reflective than the people he studies. Rather, it is the other way around. Thus, the researcher must try to learn from the people instead of telling them who they are.
[ANT] won’t try to discipline you, to make you fit into our categories; we will let you deploy your own worlds, and only later will we ask you to explain how you came about settling them.’ The task of defining and ordering the social should be left to the actors themselves, not taken up by the analyst. (Latour, 2005, p. 23)
Presumably, Latour’s objection to the self-confident social scientist is simultaneously political and methodological. On the one hand his argument is built upon a scientific ambition to reach the most appropriate description of the world. On the other hand the argument seems to be a critique of traditional relations of power between people who claim they know better and the ones who believe they know less (see also Latour, 2005, pp. 149-150). From a critical point of view, Latour’s
approach may lead to a reduction in the researcher’s privileged position. One may ask, what is really the point of research, if the produced knowledge is neither better nor different from the studied people’s own descriptions? However, the ideological and methodological attempt to respect and include the voice of the actor is valuable. In the current study, the inclusion of the participant’s voice is done mainly through interviews and the inclusion of the participants in the analytical phase, e.g. by the means of peer-to-peer evaluation of the produced music.
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2.5.2.3 No structuralism
Latour is a profound critic of structuralism in the sense that the very notion of structuralism
deprives the actor of the competence to act. According to Latour, the word ‘actor’ (in actor-network theory) is meant to imply that objects and humans are not just placeholders in a structural system, but on the contrary co-creators and therefore not exchangeable:
[A]n actor that makes no difference is not an actor at all. An actor, if words have any meaning, is exactly what is not substitutable. It’s a unique event, totally irreducible to any other […]. (Latour, 2005, p. 153)
Accordinglly, Latour stresses that humans and objects must be seen as active instead of passive.
However, the point is not that general causal relations don’t exist. Rather, the point is that a reduction of a studied object to a plain placeholder seldom is an adequate description. In regard to the current study, one of the risks is that the experimental and deductive approach results in a reductionist and standardized description of the participant’s actions. Thus, ANT might help balance the study between general casual implications on one side and unique events, people, and actions on the other.
2.5.3 Concluding remarks
I find Latour’s approach appealing in the sense that the ideological as well as the methodological implications seems appropriate. Thus, I try to adopt these strategies and intents in this thesis.
Nevertheless, as is the case with many researchers, there seems to be a conflict between Latour’s ideology and thoughts on the one side and his own research on the other. First of all, it seems a bit simplistic and contradictory, on the one hand, to suggest that every person is equally reflective and self-conscious, and on the other hand to criticize the social scientist for being neither. One of
Latour’s arguments is that descriptions of the world are like buildings that might be decently as well as badly constructed. Therefore, it seems reasonable to also suggest that people’s reflections in general on the world and their own part in it might be more or less appropriate. Evidently, Latour is caught between different positions. On the one hand he is a pure relativist who does not place some statement over another, and on the other hand he claims that the description of the world can be better or worse. On the one hand he does not accept any type of hierarchy and on the other hand he
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attacks he community of social scientists and other intellectuals. Accordingly, it seems questionable whether he actually follows the attempt to listen to actors without exception.
On a practical level, ANT equally represents a number of potential problems and dilemmas. First of all the advice just to ‘describe’ may result in an overwhelming amount of data, impossible to
comprehend without any kinds of concepts or models. Furthermore, ANT is not adequate for the current study in the sense that specific causalities, related to predetermined categories, frame the initial research question. Accordingly, ANT is applied as a methodological supplement and challenge in regard to the primary approaches chosen, as well as an analytical method to include materiality in the study of human behavior (for further discussions on Latour, see Appendix L).