The body-mind dichotomy is a well-known construction within Western culture and is also
predominant within the field of research by which this thesis is inspired. Thus, Folkestad, one of the most influential researchers within the field of music, creativity and technology, writes:
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[T]he strongest argument for using computerized tools in studying creative music-making is that for an instrumentally untrained person, for whom most musical ideas would be impossible to realize using conventional instruments, the equipment makes it possible to implement most musical ideas into an auditory result, with a minimum of instrumental technical skills (Folkestad, 1996, p. 98)
The assumption suggested by Folkestad is quite typical within the literature concerned with technology and creativity, and also plays an important part in this very thesis (see also Colley, Comber & Hargreaves, 1993). However, the approach may be criticized for reinforcing the dichotomy of body and mind in the sense that the ‘musical ideas’ are detached from the bodily action. In other words, the notion indicates that the mind produces an idea which is subsequently executed by the body.
6.5.1 Reasembling the body and the mind
Merlau-Ponty is one of the main critics of the cognitivist approach presented in the above.
According to Merlau-Ponty, our perception and our behavior are founded in our body. The world is understood and experienced through our body and our body interacts with the world without the interference of an intellectual control tower.
In far as I have hands, feet, a body, I sustain around me intentions which are not dependent upon my decisions and which affect my surroundings in a way which I do not chose. (Merlau-Ponty, 1962, p. 440)
Phenomenology bases the perception of the world and the reaction to the world on the innate structures of the body, general skills, like walking, and cultural skills, like playing an instrument (see also Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1998, pp. 2-3). Hence, the world affords the body the ability to do something, e.g. the floor affords walking, and the guitar affords playing a chord (see also Gibson, 1977). In order to describe such types of affordance, Merlau-Ponty refers to the notion of
equilibrium. From this perspective the body will seek to maintain or archive equilibrium with the surrounding world.
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Whether a system of motor or perceptual powers, our body is not an object for an ‘I think’, it is a grouping of lived-through meanings which moves towards its equilibrium. (Merlau-Ponty, 1962, p. 153)
A related approach is found in Sennett’s The Craftsman. Sennett’s perspective is rooted in Polanyi’s and Merlau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment. However, he presents a philosophical
investigation explicitly concerned with art and craftsmanship. According to Sennett, craftsmanship is an indispensable part of a creative process. Thus, art without craftsmanship simply doesn’t exist (Sennett, 2008, p. 65). The point is that mind and body are combined. The artist or the craftsman
‘thinks’ with his body. Thus there are no borders between technique and expression (Sennett, 2008, p. 155). In the chapter about ‘the hand’, Sennett attempts to describe the ‘unity of head and hand’.
From a phenomenological point of departure, Sennett argues that the craftsman somehow gets absorbed in the process of creating and thus stops being self-aware; ‘we have become the thing on which we are working’ (Sennett, 2008, p. 174). However, in other parts of the book, he describes creative processes as something that includes reason, ‘it is reasoning, but not of a deductive sort’
(Sennett, 2008, p. 212). Furthermore he seems to establish a difference between intellect and body, even though he still attempts to unify them, e.g. when he describes the ‘intelligent hand’ as a kind of coordination between hand, eyes, and brain (Sennett, 2008, p. 174). Accordingly, it still seems somewhat unclear how to understand the integration and division between mind and body.
Typically for the above discussion is that the debated writers all seem to argue against some kind of superiority of the mind over the body. Needless to say, such criticism of a cognitivist approach to human behavior seems appropriate. For instance, when Sennett quotes Immanuel Kant for writing that ‘the hand is the window on to the mind’ it seems pretty obvious that such a notion is too simple. However, the question is whether Sennett’s approach becomes to ideological. For instance, when Sennett stresses that the hand is not ‘the servant’ he seemingly draws on a political discourse preoccupied by the distribution of power. Actually, in many respects, Sennett’s agenda is similar to Schön’s in the sense that they both attempt to emphasize the value of professional tacit skill and thus change the balance of power between craftsmanship and intellectualism (e.g., Sennett, 2008, pp. 144-146). In other words, by arguing that the hand is not the servant of the mind, they equally argue that the craftsman or the professional does not need to serve the intellectuals or the scientists.
At least, this is an obvious way to interpret the two authors.
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Accordingly, their attempt to understand expertise turns into an ideological project. This might not be a problem. However, the fusion of mind and body leads to some unanswered questions. Most importantly, Sennett, as is the case with Merlau-Ponty and Polanyi, might neglect individual accounts that support a division between mind and body: that is, people who, for instance, feel that they need to take a break from the manual process of creating in order to reflect upon the manual strategy and subsequently return to the manual process with a changed perspective (reflection-on-action, reflection-in-action). In my view, it seems unclear what constitutes such a reflective process if it is not ‘the mind’.
In the light of the above, the argument against a cognitive rational approach might lead to a perspective from which the mind is totally neglected. Rather, we need an approach that includes processes of unity between body and mind as well as division between body and mind.
Accordingly, the divergent approaches outlined might prove productive in order to understand different perspectives of creative processes in the present study.
6.5.2 Reflection and consciousness
The body-mind dichotomy is related to notions about reflection in the sense that the mind is often associated with deliberate thinking through which the body can be controlled. However, in the light of the previous sections it seems like the definition of reflection is indistinct. This epistemological problem seems to be related to the ambiguous interpretation of consciousness. Thus, the role of consciousness will be discussed briefly in the following.
During the twentieth century the privileged role of consciousness has been challenged by developments within different fields of study. In the book The User Illusion (1998) the Danish journalist of science, Tor Nørretranders, sums up and elaborates upon the many scientific contributions to the field. Primarily from a traditional positivistic and experimental point of departure he argues that consciousness must primarily be understood as a kind of secretary of the nonconscious (Nørretranders, 1998, p. 303). The argument falls in several parts. First of all, Nørretranders refers to experiments indicating that decisions we believe are made consciously are apparently made nonconsciously (Nørretranders, 1998, pp. 219-221). Second of all, Nørretranders refers to experiments indicating the limited bandwidth of consciousness compared to the amount of sensory data input (Nørretranders, 1998, p. 126). Moreover, he refers to experiments indicating the
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slow speed of consciousness compared to the relatively fast speed of nonconsciousness
(Nørretranders, 1998, p. 128). Finally, Nørretranders refers to experiments with split-brain patients, indicating that consciousness is inventing arbitrary explanations in order to explain nonconsciously initiated actions (Nørretranders, 1998, p. 283). Such evidence, apart from a substantial amount of supplementary experiments, reflections, hypotheses, and approaches, leads Nørretranders to conclude that:
Consciousness is a peculiar phenomenon. It is riddled with deceit and self-deception […]; the conscious I is happy to lie up hill and down dale to achieve a rational explanation for what the body is up to […]; when the consciousness thinks it determines to act, the brain is already working on it […]’.
(Nørretranders, 1998, p. 286)
This description of the consciousness is of course highly controversial in the sense that
consciousness is denied a privileged position and is first of all understood as a kind of slow working imposter. Accordingly, the notion has met substantial criticism for varied reasons and from different positions (see also Appendix S). However, the relatively unclear role of consciousness seems
difficult to deny.
So, what really is the role of consciousness, besides making up idiosyncratic stories about what is going on? According to Nørretranders, consciousness is a kind of secretary, manager or boss that initiates different kinds of processes. For instance, when learning a skill, the consciousness initiates the process of practice. However, when the practice starts, the nonconscious takes over
(Nørretranders, 1998, p. 303). I find such suggestions a bit problematic. According to the empirical data Nørretranders presents, one can easily suggest that all types of decisions are in fact done nonconsciously. Thus, there seems to be some inconsistency in the theory offered by Nørretranders.
It is not the point of this thesis to present a complete discussion of the phenomenon of consciousness. Rather, the point is to demonstrate the problematic distinction between
consciousness and nonconsciousness. As previously indicated, it seems to be a general notion that reflection is a conscious process that contains the ability to change behavior and strategy, whereas nonconsciousness are associated with the automation of body functions as well as intuitive
processes based on former experiences, not leaving room for change in a degree similar to
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conscious processes. However, the above perspective questions such assumptions. What if
conscious reflection is just a kind of rational explanation of actions initiated nonconsciously? Then, general notions of the phenomenon of reflection seem problematic.
6.6 Tracing intuition, body, and reflection
In the light of the first part of this chapter there seem to be a number of contradicting viewpoints and unanswered questions regarding the role of reflection, consciousness, intuition, and body. In the following, I will address these issues from an empirical angle through the discussion and analysis of a case selected from the third phase of the case studies.
6.6.1 Cecilie: a case study
Cecilie is 22 years old. Cecilie began playing the piano when she was seven years old. She attended classical piano lessons on a regular basis until she began high school. After a year playing classical music at high school she started playing rhythmic music, mainly jazz. She has focused on jazz ever since and has attended several jazz courses outside the high school context. Furthermore, she has sung in several choirs, within which the repertoire has been both classical and rhythmical. During high school she participated in a school project where she composed music to be played by the Oslo Philharmonic. The students received instructions in order to write for an orchestra. At the moment she listens to jazz, soul and pop music, Bill Evans, Esperanza Spalding, Thomas Dybdahl, Jarle Bernhoft. Besides, she also listens to classical music, for instance music including choirs, e.g.
Faure’s requiem, or piano music, e.g. Debussy.
In the final interview with Cecilie, reflectivity, knowledge, and intuition become a central theme.
On the one hand Cecilie was very explicit when it came to describing the musical theory and rules that apparently work as a kind of flexible guideline in the process of composition. On the other hand, she repeatedly stressed that in order to get ideas she has to abstain from thinking. Early in the interview, Cecilie describes how knowledge of music allows her to sense what might sound good, without having to think explicitly about it. Thus, her explanation seems to fit with the notion of expert behaviour suggested by Dreyfus and Dreyfus. In other words, she might have an extensive knowledge of music, based on experiences as well as rules that she applies intuitively in the process of composition. However, there still seem to be some ambiguities in terms of reflection and
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intuition, which calls for further investigation. In the following, I will seek to explore this ambiguity (part of the interview and the process of composition can be watched on the following address, http://youtu.be/9tYKtLRA5LM)
Initially, Cecilie briefly described the process of composition as something that includes the body as well as some kind of disconnection of the brain. However, she still described the manifestation of some kind of explicit music-theoretical reasoning.
I sat by the piano all the time. I had to do so because it’s like my instrument. And it was just after I had practised something else, and I just stayed there. It was a bit like a coincidence. I tried different stuff and found some chords that I liked. I had the time, so I brought in the equipment. And then…I sat down and played with sound and stuff. And because I had the key note – or the key harmonies – then the melody was kind of the result of improvisation. You hear something inside your head. And then you try not to think. Just do something. Almost like, let the fingers…just disconnect the brain.
(Interview, 2014)
According to Cecilie, the disconnection of the brain is highly important in order to promote ideas.
Equally it seems like the creative process is based upon some kind of tacit embodied knowledge.
This is reinforced by the fact that Cecilie uses the piano, which she considers her main instrument in terms of musical expression. At other occasions in the interview she emphasized that the piano is like ‘her voice’ in music, indicating a certain embodied derived intimacy with this instrument.
However, she explains that she occasionally hears something in her head, indicating that her fingers alone are not always the point of departure when a new idea is conceived. Furthermore, she refers to musical concepts and norms of tonality, indicating that norms or rules also play a specific role in the process of creation. Thus, concepts like ‘the intelligent hand’, ‘tacit knowledge’, etc. seem
insufficient to describe the various integration and separation of mind and fingers. In other words, Cecilie’s explanation indicates that reflexivity and conscious deliberate thinking are intertwined with - as well as separated from - the body and the tacit knowledge.
When studying the video recordings, it seems clear that the connection between hand and mind vary throughout the process of composition. Thus, sometimes Cecilie listened to the music that she had
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composed by the use of computer. In these situations, she often closed her eyes. On other occasions, she simply sat down with her eyes closed without listening to music (watch the movie on the
following address, http://youtu.be/9tYKtLRA5LM). In the interview she often referred to a kind of reflective moment. In these moments, the fingers are apparently not part of the process. On other occasions, she played at the piano, apparently improvising, presumably relaying on her fingers to do the job.
Cecilie: And next it is ‘Listening’ as I wrote – that’s a stage, which is both – how to put it –
technical – because you think chords, and this has to be a minor third, etc., and so on, but you just listen [she is closing her eyes], also trying not to think, but just listen for something, for instance counter-movements, if the melody goes up, I hear something going down, or answers or…something like that.
Interviewer: When you say that, I think; it sounds as if some kind of musical thinking is lying behind, you know, something to do with musical counterpoint. When something goes up something goes down. But you describe it more like it is something that you sense. Previously, you have told me that you have a theoretical as well as an intuitive approach. And now you say that when something goes up and something goes down then it is based on intuition. Is it understood correctly?
Cecilie: Yes, in some situations it is.
Interviewer: Because to me it sounds like a musical…
Cecilie: But of course it is. It might be a conscious thought. But when I listen, I try not to think, e.g.
this melody is going up and then I have to find something that goes down, you know, du du du [Cecilie sings a descending figure]
Interviewer: Okay, I understand…
Interviewer: Can I ask you, Cecilie, why even think about the minor third? As I understand you, you would like to, say, put in a minor third in the bass or…you know, like that, right? Why do you need to think that? If you can just do it by intuition? Do you understand what I mean? What’s the point, even thinking about it?
Cecilie: Well, to ensure the overall consistency… In order to…If I just played a lot of melodies going in different directions [she is pointing her fingers in different directions]. I must have the entire work [she holds her hands as she is holding a ball] – well the ‘entire work’, it is not that big [she is laughing].
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Interviewer: I think I understand you, I am just trying to search a bit deeper. It sounds as if your intuition could manage to secure the wholeness in the piece. You know, when something goes up something might need to go down. So the question could be. In what way do you think the theoretical approach has contributed to the composition?
Cecilie: Well, the progression of the chords was there. But given that I newer recorded a complete chord. Then the chord is divided in different instruments. Accordingly, several instruments create the chord together. But at the same time it is not meant to be…I want the single instrument to move forward.
Interviewer: Okay – now I understand. When you think a melody you do it intuitively…you think, where does the melodic line lead me…?
Cecilie: Yes – compared to the other melodies
Interviewer: Yes – in relation to the other melodies, but if we for instance remember to include the minor third in the overall sound scape. It might be forgotten.
Cecilie: Yes – no [looking a bit hesitant]
Interviewer: So the risk is – I am only trying to understand it – I work intuitively with some melodies – they develop in different directions – they might move in a satisfying way in terms of each other. But in the end I might have forgotten to include the minor third.
Cecilie: Yes
Interviewer: This is where the theoretical approach…
Cecilie: [interrupting] But the minor third doesn’t have to be included if the music sounds good.
In the interview the interviewer, that is, me, might establish an unfortunate contrast between deliberate thinking and intuition. Anyway, it seems like Cecilie is somehow driven into some kind of dilemma. First of all, she holds that musical rules and norms do not determine or influence directly or consciously the creation of the music. Rather, the music is based on intuition that might of course, according to Cecilie, be based on explicit musical rules as well as musical experiences, but is not the result of rational thinking. However, she still emphasizes that explicit conscious knowledge helps coordinate the musical integration and consistency. In the interview I present this as a paradox. What is the point in applying rules explicitly, if the fingers or the ears can easily do the job without reflctive interference?
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Cecilie’s answers might be understood in various ways. First, knowing something is not necessarily the same as being determined or controlled or even guided by such knowledge. This seems to be the
Cecilie’s answers might be understood in various ways. First, knowing something is not necessarily the same as being determined or controlled or even guided by such knowledge. This seems to be the