The logic underlying the social constructivist account

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bibliographies which contain unique life-stories. Rather than an objective quality, what count as authentic, Peterson (2003) and Fine (2003) agree, is ultimately determined by the subjective perception of the audience.

These sociological accounts are important contributions to investigating ―what strategies are used for creating and defining authenticity and how these strategies shape our understanding of what is authentic‖ (Jones et al., 2005:

894, original italics). But these accounts do not inherently challenge the concept of authenticity. Rather, they only demonstrate certain phenomena which are considered by certain groups as naturally and real are actually constituted through social processes. Hence, what seems authentic is disclosed as inauthentic. Ironically, although the social constructivist critique is supposed to reject the idea of authenticity, it operate, in a similar way as Socrates, as loyal servants of authenticity by disclosing the simulacra—for example, country music (Peterson, 2005), luxury wines (Beverland, 2005), biographies (Fine, 2003)—as a false copies.

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the portrait resembles Bill Gates. However, Guthey and Jackson‘s thesis extend beyond this claim, because they argue that CEO portrait will only appear authentic if they employ visual effects which constitute an atmosphere of authenticity. It is important, once again, to emphasize that I think this argument is important in the discussion of authenticity. Yet, I believe we need to take one more step in order to overcome the dichotomy between the authentic and the inauthentic.

The concept of authenticity relies on a binary logic between the authentic and the inauthentic. It is not possible to claim that something is authentic without presupposing the idea of the inauthentic. Conversely, it is not possible to claim that something is inauthentic without the idea of the authentic. Consequently, if CEO portraits highlight the organization‘s ―chronic lack of authenticity‖ (Ibid., 1057), then the argument rely on the idea of the authentic. In this way, Guthey and Jackson‘s argument remains within the conceptual distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic. The only difference is that what is considered authentic is now disclosed by them as inauthentic. Therefore, the CEO portraits, on Guthey and Jackson account, are Platonic simulacra: they proclaim to the authentic and original, but are dismissed as false copies.

In their discussion of organizational identity, Gioia et al. (2000) argue that identity, on the postmodern account, is not a fixed substance independent of time and place. On the contrary, identity is a social construction, produced though social interaction and discourses.

In short, the relationship between identity and image is turned upside-down when seen through a postmodern lens; instead of emerging from organizational depth and origin, identity becomes a chameleon-like imitation of images prevailing in the postmodern marketplace. Organizational identity, thus, moves from a stable and distinct origin toward a copy of images of dominating organizations. (Gioia et al., 2000: 72)

While identity on the modernist account is a fixed substance underlying the various projections of the organization, the postmodern understanding of identity emphasizes the fluxed, unstable and socially manufactured character of identity itself. With reference to Baudrillard, Gioia et al. concludes that ―image

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and identity both ends up as illusions‖ on the postmodern account (2000: 73).

But what does it mean that something is an illusion?

The emphasis on illusion in this context is only one half of the story. In a similar vein as authenticity, the concept of ‗illusion‘ relies on the binary opposition reality/illusion. If something is an illusion, as Plato believes is the case of the simulacrum, then it is, per definition, opposed to reality. While the simulacrum is an illusion, the thing resembles reality. The other side of the story, therefore, is that if we really want to overcome the dichotomy between illusion and reality, then the image can neither be illusion nor reality. It cannot be an illusion, because it fails to resemble an external model. It cannot be reality, because it resembles the model. Baudrillard (1994) has captured this point. Therefore, Gioia et al. (2000) profoundly misunderstand Baudrillard when they claim that he thinks that the image is an illusion.

Baudrillard‘s position is precisely that the image is neither illusion nor reality.

On the contrary, he argues that ―illusion is no longer possible, because the real is no longer possible‖ (1994: 19). The image has transgressed the very conceptual distinction between illusion and reality; the authentic and the inauthentic. Baudrillard draws the implication from this argument that the image does not become an illusion, but rather reality—not in the sense that it that it corresponds with an external model, but rather that the image is the very real itself.

Images are no longer mirror of reality, they invested the heart of reality and transformed it into hyperreality where, from screen to screen, the only aim of the image is the image. The image can no longer imagine the real because it is the real; it can no longer transcend reality, transfigure it or dream it, since images are virtual reality. In virtual reality, it is as if things had swallowed their mirror. (Baudrillard, 2005: 120)

If the aim is to overcome the metaphysical conception of authenticity, then the social constructivist account is not radical enough. While the social constructivist account is supposed to overcome the essentialist idea of authenticity, they continue to disclose the simulacrum as a false copy. The image is an ‗illusion‘ (Gioia et al., 2000) and CEO portraits are ‗chronic

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inauthentic‘ (Jackson & Guthey, 2005). But the idea of illusion and the inauthentic is only possible given the idea of reality and the authentic.

Therefore, the social constructivist account is caught in the very logical scheme they oppose. Hence, we need to develop a new understanding of the simulacrum in order to overcome the metaphysical idea of authenticity. Next, I will therefore discuss Deleuze‘s attempt to Reverse Platonism.

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