In the Republic, Plato discusses the problem of separating paintings from the material objects in which they imitate. Socrates provides the following example in order to demonstrate that artistic expressions and craftsmen products are
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merely copies of perfect ideas: Suppose that God, a jointer and a painter each produce their own version of a bed (Plato, 1993: 597b). God would first create the perfect idea of a bed; then the jointer would manufacture a material bed based on God‘s idea; while the painter would merely draw an imitation of the jointer‘s product. After agreeing that only God has produced a genuine real bed, Socrates asks Glaucon (597d-e):
―What about the jointer? Shall we call him a manufacturer of beds?‖
―Yes.‖
―And shall we also call a painter a manufacturer and maker of beds and so on?‖
―No, definitely not.‖
―What do you think that he does with beds, then?‖
―I think the most suitable thing to call him would be a representer of other‘s creations.‖
―Well, in that case‖, I said, ―you‘re using the term ‗representer‘ for someone who deals with things which are, in fact, two generations away from reality, aren‘t you?‖
While the jointer‘s product is authentic, because it corresponds with God‘s perfect idea, the painter‘s picture is inauthentic because it only corresponds with the material bed. The material bed resembles the idea; the painting resembles the material bed. Consequently, the painter‘s product—and art in general—is nothing but a copy of a copy. But this implies, Plato concludes, that paintings are inauthentic copies. For Plato, paintings are nothing but simulacra—that is, ―rebellious images which lack resemblance‖ to the idea (Deleuze, 2004a: 342). No wonder Gadamer considered Plato to be the harshest critic of art throughout Western philosophy (2004: 112).
In this example, Plato introduces his most central concept, the concept of the idea. According to Deleuze and Guattari, a concept is always the function of a problem (1994: 16). If this is right, then the concept of the idea is introduced in order to solve the problem of rivalry. By appealing to the idea of the bed, Plato manages to distinguish the material bed from the painted picture of the bed; the authentic from the inauthentic; the thing from its simulacrum.
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However, if material objects derive meaning from resembling ideas, while simulacra lack such resemblance, how do simulacra acquire meaning at all?
Why does not the painting of the bed bear a direct resemblance to the idea of the bed? The problem confronting Plato is to justify the assertion that the jointer produces an authentic bed while the painter merely produces an inauthentic imitation. Thus, the crucial question to determine, therefore, is whether the painter‘s artwork manages to represent the real bed or the appearance of beds.
Socrates further inquires with Glaucon into the nature of art (2003: 598a-b):
―Here‘s another distinction you‘d better make: do [painters‘] try to represent [beds] as they are, or as they appear to be?‖
―What do you mean?‖ he asked.
―I‘ll tell you. Whether you look at a bed from the side or straight on or whatever, it‘s still just as much a bed as it ever was, isn‘t it? I mean, it doesn‘t actually alter it at all:
just appears to be different, doesn‘t it? And the same goes for anything you can mention.
Yes?‖
―Yes‖, he agreed. ―It seems different, but isn‘t actually.‖
―So I want you to consider carefully which of these two alternatives painting is designed for in any every instance. Is it designed to represent the facts of the real world or appearance? Does it represent appearance or truth?‖
―Appearance,‖ he said.
This part of the argument is of immense importance for Plato. If, similarly to the material object, art was endorsed with resemblance to the idea, then there would be no ontological difference between the thing and its simulacrum;
material objects and art; the authentic and the inauthentic. The original and the copy would be completely indistinguishable. However, since painting only captures a certain aspect of the bed, Socrates argues that artworks are always incomplete compared to the material objects in which they try to imitate. What renders poetry and artistic expressions inauthentic, therefore, is they only bear secondary resemblance to the idea. This is the case due to the fact that the connection between the idea and the simulacrum is mediated through the material object. Art only captures appearance. Based on this line of argument, Plato concludes that art is ―two generations away from the throne of truth‖
(2003: 597e).
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We can here see that Plato constructs a three step hierarchy of being. On top of the hierarchy is the perfect idea, created by God and situated in the realm of ideas. On the next level is the thing—that is, the material object—which is endorsed with resemblance to the idea but nevertheless is lower ranked. On the lowest stair of the ladder is the simulacrum. The simulacrum is a false copy: it proclaims to bear resemblance to the perfect idea, but is fortunately exposed by Socrates as a false pretender. Rather than corresponding to the idea, the simulacrum is a copy of the thing. The simulacrum resembles appearance but not the actual being. Consequently, the simulacrum is a secondary copy. This hierarchy of being provides the basis for conducting normative evaluations.
Because the thing connects with the idea, it qualifies as the good. The simulacrum, however, is dismissed as bad, because it deceives us with illusions (Plato, 1993: 600e).