THE ROLE OF THE BODY

The body cannot be separated from the experience of living with a disability and/or HIV/AIDS. It is via the body that people make information available to others in both focused and unfocused interaction. Although Goffman do not explicitly present his work as an analysis of the body in interaction, nonetheless his work explicitly draws attention to shared patterns and ways of using the body as integral to human agency.

He is interested in how the body enables people to intervene in, and make a difference to, the flow of daily life (Shilling 1993: 72). Goffman uses the term body idiom to denote physical gestures, positions and conduct that are recognizable as conventional aspects of everyday life, especially public life, such as handshakes, smiles, forms of dress, and so on (Howson 2004: 20). However, Goffman does not only use the term body idiom to highlight bodily conduct as an important part of self-presentation, he also draws attention to the way the body enters into and is used as a means of categorizing people and grading them according to their social position (ibid: 20). A statement from my fieldwork; “a crippled person is a gone case in Africa” illustrates

29 experiences of the ways in which an impaired body is valued and categorized. This statement will be explored further in the following chapters. According to Goffman, the body is defined as significant and meaningful by society, but he also argues that bodies are the property of individuals, since we usually have the ability to control and monitor our bodily performances in order to facilitate social interaction: thus human bodies have a dual location (Shilling 1993: 72). This means that in Goffman’s approach, the body plays an important role in mediating the relationship between people’s self-identity and their social self-identity. The social meanings which are attached to particular bodily forms and performances tend to become internalized and exert a powerful influence on an individual’s sense of self and feelings of inner worth (ibid: 73). The vocabularies of bodily idiom used by people to classify others are also used for the purpose of self-classification. It is generally the case that if a person’s bodily appearance and management categorize them as a “failed” member of society by others, they will internalize that label and incorporate it into what becomes a “spoiled”

identity. According to Goffman, we tend to perceive our bodies as if looking into a mirror which offers a reflection framed in terms of society’s views and prejudices (ibid:

75). Thus Goffman draws a distinction between virtual social identity and actual social identity. The first concept expresses normative expectations of who and what a person ought to be in a given social context or encounter. For instance, we might expect a nurse to present herself as courteous and friendly, but if the nurse is not smiling or she is acting unfriendly, then this tells us something about her actual social identity. The latter refers to the social, cultural and physical attributes actually possessed by a person (Goffman 1990 [1963]: 12). In situations in which a gap or discrepancy develops between virtual and actual social identity there is a potential of stigma, but the likelihood of such a discrepancy arising depends on the visibility of the stigma. Goffman makes a distinction between a discredited person, which refers to whether a stigmatized individual assumes that his/her differentness is already known or visible on the spot, and the discreditable, which refers to a person who assumes that his differentness is neither known about by those present nor immediately perceivable by them (ibid: 14). Hence it is necessary to make decisions about whether or not others need to know about certain attributes and to weigh up the costs that may be incurred by making certain kinds of disclosures that have the potential to discredit. In these

30 situations, we may experience the ever-present anxiety of “passing” as normal and live with the fear that the information we conceal from others may be disclosed at any moment. Most PWDs in this study are discredited persons in Goffman’s terms, since their impairments were visible on the spot. A visible impairment attracts attention wherever you go; “people stare and you can feel their eyes, it is annoying”. This is a common statement from my informants, and even though they tell that they get used to it, they feel annoyed and sad about it. The feeling of people starring and pointing will always be there, but they learn to handle it as years go by. A male informant formulates it this way: “Even though I am 49 years old I get this indisposed feeling, when I go public, sometimes I feel okay, just fight it since I am used to it, but it does not prevent the feeling to pop up. This leads to questions about “self” and “identity”.

3.3 “IDENTITY”– Goffman and Jenkins

Goffman has developed a theory of face-to-face interactions, but even though he was primarily interested in the “interaction order” (which will be examined further in chapter 5), there is a more or less explicit understanding of the human self in all of his work. This understanding of the human self will be the object of discussion in this section. Jacobsen and Kristiansen have suggested that two apparent contradictions can be identified concerning the “self” in the work of Goffman: (1) the self is viewed as an exclusive social product without a real personal core, (2) the self can to a certain degree free itself from social limitations and strategically manipulate the social situation in a direction where the self appears more favourable (Jacobsen & Kristiansen 2002: 188).

Even though Goffman in Stigma makes a distinction between “virtual identity” and

“actual identity”, as mentioned earlier, he does not reveal what he really means by the

“self”, if this “self” exists at all. He also makes a distinction between social, personal and ego identity⁸. According to Jenkins, though, these distinctions, including the virtual and actual identity …”are less rather than more helpful” (Jenkins 2004: 73). The human self in Goffman’s work should be viewed as a function of society, it is over-socialized and it is worth noticing that the phenomenologically inspired ego identity plays a less conspicuous role in Stigma (Rasmussen 1975: 100). Simply put, Goffman’s

8 Social identity: Our appearance, including personal and structural attributes (like ’honesty’ and ’occupation’).

Personal identity: Biographical facts, positive marks and identity pigs make all humans unique.

Ego Identity: Refers to our subjective experience of our own situation and our personal continuity.

31 understanding of the “self” can be compared with the peeling of an onion; you peel and peel but never get to the core or point, only to the mask behind the mask (Jacobsen &

Kristansen 2002: 193). I agree with this critique of Goffman’s somehow vague understanding of the “self”, and since the understanding of “self” and “identity” are very important issues related to concepts of stigma, I will complement them with Jenkins’s theory of “social identity”. The ideas of Goffman and others have been influential in shaping this theory (Jenkins 2004: 18).

Jenkins proposes a definition of the “self”…”as an individual’s reflexive sense of her or his own particular identity, constituted vis-à-vis others in terms of similarity and difference, without which she or he wouldn’t know who they are and hence wouldn’t be able to act” (ibid: 27). Jenkins argues that Goffman’s distinction between social and personal identity does not reflect a reflexive selfhood. The “self” is certainly viewed as reflexive by Jenkins, but according to Goffman…“Social and personal identity are part, first of all, of other person’s concerns and definitions regarding the individual whose identity is in question” (Goffman 1990 [1963)]: 129). The self, according to Jenkins, is both individual and intrinsically interactional (Jenkins 2004: 49). Selfhood should be understood as an ongoing and in practice simultaneous synthesis of the (internal) self-definition and the (external) self-definitions of oneself offered by others. This internal-external dialectic of identification should be seen as the process whereby all identities – individual and collective – are constituted (ibid: 18). This discussion reflects an important perspective in this thesis, and since Jenkins is offering a broader understanding of the internals–external dialectic and the “self”, I will draw upon his analytical framework in chapter 4, where I will examine what it means to be disabled in Uganda and how it affects your identity. However, Goffman’s “interaction order”

offers a good understanding of what goes on in the social interaction between

“stigmatized” and “normal” persons in society, and therefore I will draw upon his work in chapter 5, where I will explore obligations and expectations related to sex and marriage in Uganda and the significance of these perceptions for PWDs. It will be explored how social norms are interpreted by PWDs and other social actors in social interaction. Coping mechanisms like covering and passing will be central. However,

32 here I will continue to analyse stigma related to disability and HIV/AIDS and its consequences.