Parameters of intentionality: agency, posture, dialogicality

Finally comes the whole point of placing the self/other relation within a narrative.

The point is that placing self and other within the parameters of spatiality and temporality makes it possible to observe the relation between self and other as a grammatical relation; as a grammar for interaction. As discussed (in chapter 2 and in subsection 3.1.6.1 and 3.1.6.2), spatial constitution and temporal narration makes it

possible to conceive of self and other as intentional agents posed in relation to each others. Spatial constitution and temporal narration makes three parameters of intentionality possible: agency, posture, and dialogicality.

What is discussed in this subsection as three parameters of intentionality has been conceptualized in numerous analytical configurations. Foucault's archaeology of knowledge (1972) all but discards with any meaningful form of agency by distributing its content to two other categories: Firstly, the category of 'enunciative modality' denotes the place in discourse from which an utterance is uttered (1972:50ff).¹⁰⁸ Secondly, the category of 'strategy' accounts for a broad sense of directedness (1972:64ff). In Foucault, neither enunciative modality nor strategy imply agency as such – except from the 'agency', so to say, performed by the structure determined by its 'strategies'. Such a 'directedness' or 'will' of structure could perhaps better be termed 'intentionality'. Both agents and structure may, in that sense, be endowed with intentionality (cf. Nelson 2003:§19).

In Ricœur's theory of the narrative, spatiality and temporality is organized to facilitate a specific form of intentionality: agency. The question could, with Andersen (1994:28-33), be phrased: Is the entity in question described as a subject capable of manipulating other entities – or solely as a manipulable object? Is an independent subjectivity of some sort ascribed – or is the relation between self and other an attempt at objectification; a reduction of the other to a structural effect bereft of any independent subjectivity? Where the macro-perspective of Foucault's archaeology of knowledge democratically cancels out all agency, the post-colonial problematique par

108 Others have taken up this conceptualization under the label 'subject position'.

excellance is, after Saïd (1978) exactly how it may take a specific configuration of the self/other relation to cancel the agency of the other.¹⁰⁹

So 'intentionality' as a concept including the directedness of both structure and agency seems, on the one hand, to be somewhat more directed than Foucault's enunciative modality. On the other hand, it is somewhat less specific regarding the direction of the intentions than Hansen's concept of responsibility (cf. subsection 3.1.1). Responsibility is directed towards someone – towards self or towards some other. Intentions do not need to be directed at someone; it may be directed at an object. Furthermore, even intentions which happen to involve an other need not be grounded in an intention measurable on a scale ranging from responsibility towards the other to lack of responsibility towards the other. The intensions may be directed elsewhere and merely coincidentally be involving the other in question. In that situation, 'posture' may be a better metaphor: An other may be posed aggressively, affirmatively or indifferently towards me without the posture involving any intentions – the posture may be a structural effect or it may be an un-intentional side-effect of intentions directed at someone or something else.

A positive posture may, however, be ascribed to the other as the result of a deliberate choice of the other to assume a positive attitude towards the self. This would amount

109 Or when viewed bottom up: the possibility of subjectivity under near-total hegemony.

Saïd (1978) investigates what might be counted as one extreme case: the near-to completely successful objectification of the colonial subject. On the one hand, the position of the colonial subject in the hierarchy of subjects and objects is so, that it is almost impossible for it to speak (cf. Saïd, 1978:34f). On the other hand Saïd – in an explicit polemics against Foucault (1978:22f; cf. Neumann 1999:15) – insists that the individual author may make a difference. The individual author, that is, who is from the outset empowered by discourse.

Spivak (1988) lays out just how difficult it is for the colonial subject to get post- objectification – without leaving the identification with the co-colonized behind. The subaltern may not speak – as subaltern. By acquiring a voice – i.a. by entering academia – the subaltern enters the hegemonic discourse and loses its status as subaltern. Hence, the subaltern remains without voice. As discussed in fn. 79, Bhabha is more optimistic when it comes to possible subaltern agency.

to the role of a helper or even a friend. In parallel, a deliberately negative posture would be that of an opponent or an enemy.¹¹⁰ The other may, however, "pose a challenge" (Triandafyllidou 2002:34) without any bad intentions. The other may be described as causally influencing the self by its mere existence – or by its actions or intentions directed elsewhere: Positively, its existence as source of inspiration may pose a challenge. Negatively, its mere existence as a huge power concentration may (even if inattentive to the self) be presented as a threat (Triandafyllidou 2002:34).¹¹¹ Whether a challenge from an other is positive or negative – and whether it occurs as a structural effect or from deliberate agency – it may be constructed to trigger a specific distribution of responsibility for dealing with the challenge on behalf of the Self.

Finally, given the constitution of self and other as distinct entities each endowed with some sort of agency, a third parameter of intentionality becomes possible:

Dialogicality. This parameter concerns the capability to engage in a two way interaction with a view to possible wilful modification of the relation – and thereby the identities. Is the other engagable or unreachable? Is the self willing to engage in self-reflection? Does it make any sense to try to communicate with the aim of achieving a joint reflexive process concerning the relationship?

110 Cf. Andersen (1994:28-33) referring to Greimas (1974) and Bauman (1991:143-169).

111 Rumelili's third dimension of the self/other relation concerns, as described in subsection 3.1.1, "how the other responds to the construction of its identity" on a spectrum from recognition to resistance (2004:37f). The effects on the self of the 'response' of the other are not dependent on the 'response' being deliberate or intentional. An (inadvertently) challenging posture may have the same effect as a deliberate negative response worthy of the label 'resistance' – just as an inadvertently reaffirming posture may have the same effect as the deliberate positive response of 'recognition'.

The concept of dialogicality employed in the dissertation obviously owes to Bakhtin.

In Bakhtin, dialogicality is the name for the relationality of every identity.¹¹² The dissertation moves the quality of dialogicality from the identity to the relation.

Dialogicality is a way for the self to construct the relation between the self and the other. To construct a dialogical relation the self must describe both self and other as capable of receiving input. Implied in such a construction is a willingness to (at least reflect on whether self or other should) engage in the self-reform necessary for transformation of the relation. Dialogicality, hence, needs to be founded on agentiality and both sides of a relation between distinct entities.

In sum: The distribution of agency is a crucial parameter of intentionality in the description of the relation between self and other. In its extreme, the distribution of agency sets out two radically different positions from which to protest the construction of the relation: In the position of an object you have no legitimate voice.

In the very different position of a subject you have a voice (necessarily limited but nevertheless, you do have a voice). Being crucial, the distribution of agency and subjectivity is – intimately related to identity – fought over in identity politics.

Posture is another parameter of intentionality. Especially when configured negatively – as a threat, or even an existential threat – the ascription of a posture to the other

112 Bakhtin's critique of Hegel is that the relation between self and other in Hegelian dialectics is actually monological as the end point is one of synthesis; of unity: There is, finally, only one voice unfolding (cf. Neumann 1999:14 quoting Kristeva 1986:58). In contrast to dialectics, Bakhtin's position is that every utterance is always dialogical in the sense that more than one voice is present. Even if there is not more than one voice explicitly present, then more voices are at least present as the implicit context (past and future) which the speaker is inadvertently orienting himself to. Nevertheless, an utterance may "postulate"

to perform "a simple and unmediated relation of speaker to his unitary and singular 'own' language … as well as a simple realization of this language in the monologic utterance of the individual" (Bakhtin 1981:269). In that sense, according to Bakhtin, 'centripetal forces' postulating monologue and 'centrifugal forces' revealing dialogicality meet in every utterance (1981:270-2).

may serve as an effective means for installing necessity in the self/other narrative.

Necessities installed are, as mentioned, generally potential points of conflict. But necessities installed by the means of pointing out existential threats, however, are especially tricky points of conflict: When the posture of an other is described as existentially threatening to the self, it is (as may be recalled from subsection 3.1.3) next to impossible to construct the relation along the third parameter of intentionality:

dialogicality. This third parameter of intentionality in the construction of the relational policy – dialogicality – is potentially decisive for the dynamics of interaction as it opens the possibility of a joint self-reflexive management of the relation. (This line of reasoning is pursued in section 3.3).

First, however, the analytical lenses focused on identity as a discursive structure constructed in this section need to be summed up (in subsection 3.1.7) and the analytical lenses to focus on the articulation of identity as discursive action needs to be constructed (in section 3.2).

3.1.7 Self/Other policy narratives inviting or averting the agency of