Identity as narrative – narrative as the possibility of identity

Nevertheless, Laclau & Mouffe (1985; Laclau 1990) does provide the first building stones for a conceptualization of the relation of identity to difference as something more complex than a radically threatening constitutive outside. The most notable building stones are the concept of articulation and the twin logics of equivalence and difference. Articulation in Laclau and Mouffe designates the operation of fixing a previously ambiguous element as a moment in discourse by "any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice." (1985:105)

Articulations may generally follow one of two logics contributing to each their way of structuring of discourse: The logic of equivalence describes how differences are made equivalent as they are collapsed in to one opposing other in a single antagonistic relation to Identity. Contrary to the logic of equivalence, the logic of

difference describes the production of a plethora of domesticated subject positions for others to take up in a discursive formation (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:129-144). The radically threatening other is present in both ways of structuring discourse. But under the logic of difference, the radically threatening other is relegated to the outskirts of social life – while under the logic of equivalence, antagonism runs down the middle of the social space organized.

The specific way in which the second logic – the logic of difference – works remain, however, underspecified in Laclau & Mouffe: Moments in discourse may both differ from each other and be related in an infinite number of ways. To analyse the differential inscription of elements in discourse, the conceptual apparatus of Laclau &

Mouffe remain too abstract (Thomsen 1997:124 cf. Corry 2000:17).

The theoretical apparatus of Laclau & Mouffe lacks specificity when it comes to analysing differential inscription as a way of organizing discourse. This lack of specificity seems to be the background for the call of Howarth – a most distinguished scholar in the Laclauian tradition²¹ – to explore the relationship between discourse theory and narrative theory (2005:346). And with good reason: The structure of a narrative is an effective way of organising discourse. Gottweis notes, in a review of policy analysis after the linguistic turn, that: "Th[e] power to create order is an attractive quality that makes narratives essential for the shaping of policies, the settling of conflicts, or the securing of legitimacy for political action." (Gottweis 2006:469)

21 I admit to be guilty as charged in potentially sexist partial citation (cf. Merton 1995) by slipping from "Laclau & Mouffe" to "Laclau" when referring to the discourse theory initially presented in (1985). Most of the theoretically relevant developments discussed here have, however, been published later by Laclau alone. When the dissertation – at a later stage – turns to the concept of agonism, Mouffe is of course credited.

A narrative is a specific way of structuring discourse; a specific regularity in the dispersion of utterances. More specifically, a narrative is the result of the selection and grasping together of a series of events from a beginning to a conclusion (Ricœur 1988:41; 66).²²

Figure 2.2 illustrates this narrative relation between identity and difference; the present relation between self and other is related to past and future relations between self and other. The constitutive relation – including the spatial distinction between self and other – is explained by these temporal relations to past and future relations.

We They

Temporality Spatiality

Articulating present

Figure 2.2 Narrative relation between self and other

Ricœur concurs with the poststructuralist point that logical identity, i.e. "identity understood in the sense of being the same (idem)", is impossible. The identity which may be observed and which may have effects is narrative identity, i.e. "identity understood in the sense of oneself as self-same [soi-même] (ipse)" (1988:246).

22 The 'grasping together' is an English rendition of Latin comprehendere which covers both 'to take in the meaning of something' and 'to take in something as part' (cf. Ricoeur 1988:159); connotations bringing the operation close to the Laclau&Mouffian notion of articulation (cf. above).

Ricœur explains why narrative identity – as opposed to logical identity – may exist:

"Unlike the abstract identity of the Same, this narrative identity, constitutive of self-constancy, can include change, mutability" (1988:246). Hence, both "[i]ndividual and community are constituted in their identity by taking up narratives that become for them their actual history." (1988:247)

2.1.3 Narrative identity as a structure inviting agency Narratively produced identity understood, with Ricœur, as

Self-sameness, 'self-constancy', can escape the dilemma of the Same and the Other to the extent that its identity rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text. (1988:246) This escape – narrative identity – from the dilemma of logical identity, however, prompts two questions:

The first question is: What becomes of the other which is escaped? Or rephrased:

What becomes of the difference, which Derrida claimed to be constitutive for identity? The answer is that difference has to be narrated: Difference may be narrated away so that only identity is left. Or difference may be narrated into place: The other has to be narrated into a "web of identities" (Hansen 2006:40); a cast of "characters"

(Ricœur 1988:248) related to the identity. How this is done – how narratives includes structures of relational identity – is the focus for chapter 3.

The second question comes, as phrased by Ricœur, in two versions: "'Who did this?';

'Who is the agent, the author?'" of the narratives constituting identity-as-ipse (1988:246). The answer which Ricœur provides is that it is the narrated self which narrates: "The subject then appears both as a reader and the writer of its own life"

(1988:246). Or in other words:

The relation is circular – the historical community [in the case of collective identity]... has drawn its identity from the reception of those texts that it had

produced. The ... relation between what we may call a 'character' – which may be that of an individual as well as that of a people – and the narratives that both express and shape this character [is circular] (1988:248).

The reconstruction of the basis for your own agency is an important element in any kind of interaction.

The observation that identities narrate their own identity does not mean that we cannot listen to the stories which the discursively constituted agents tell about themselves and each others. Quite the contrary; all we can do is to take our point of departure in the subjectivities constructed in these narratives and the narratives the subjectivities construct. The implications of the answer to this second question – that the narrated self is simultaneously the one which narrates – are developed in section 2.2 as it investigates the conditions and modalities of the articulation of identity by discursive agency.²³

From this discussion of Derridean philosophy and Ricœurian narratology, the dissertation brings with it two basic points on the concept of identity: Logical identity is impossible in social life – therefore narrative identity becomes evermore necessary:

The discursive structure of identity is – as a necessary supplement to its foundational structure of impossibility – a narrative structure. Or in other words: Identity discourse is structured as a narrative; the regularity in the dispersion of utterances which is identity discourse includes a regularity in the construction of the relation between a series of events setting the stage for a subject in relation to a cast of other characters.

The narration of this narrative identity is put in the hand of the narrated identities themselves; hence, narrative identity is a discursive structure inviting agency.

23 Furthermore, Ricoeur grants that "narrative identity is not a stable and seamless identity"

(1988:248). Therefore "[n]arrative identity ... becomes the name of a problem at least as much as it is that of a solution" (1988:249). In that sense, Ricoeur would agree when the dissertation finds a need to develop (in section 2.3) a concept of identity politics as discursive interaction.

The two structures of the double structure of identity – the void and the narrative – are equal in the sense that the one needs the other. But they are unequal in the sense that the narrative is a more elaborate structure than the void. The void is a neat and simple philosophical figure: a distinction is made – prompting an explanation. The explanation – the narrative – is a more complicated structure even in the abstract.

Furthermore it may take an infinite number of paths. But most importantly: if you describe the narrative, your description will include the description of the distinction producing the void. And, more pertinently, this is the only way the void may be described – apart from the naked description of the philosophical figure: As soon as you start asking questions like 'What is the difference excluded?', 'Why?' and 'To what effect?', the only possible answers are narratives.²⁴

Therefore, when preparing for an analysis of identity as a discursive structure, the focus must be on the narrative form. But when the analysis of identity as a discursive structure should serve the wider aim of analysing identity politics, the focus should not just be on any narrative form. A standard narrative "claim[s] to relate in the present a 'past-now'" (Ricœur as rendered by McQuillan 2000c:323; italics inserted).

Politics, however, is – to be a meaningful concept – directed to the future in ways which other uses of narratives are not necessarily. Subsection 2.1.4 explores how this orientation makes policy narratives – a central tool in politics – a special form of narrative, and how this special form makes the analytical focus on the present articulation of the past and the future important.

24 Compare how Kølvrå (2009:47) needs to map the 'semantic field' to find the lead concept organizing discourse. That operation, which includes the observation of causal relations constructed between the lead concept and other concepts, already includes narrative analysis in the sense developed in subsection 2.1.4.