The dilemmas of the reflexive project of the self, described above, provide a good opportunity to discuss the idea of self in Western modernity more generally. The informants were perfectly aware of the importance of presenting themselves as autonomous individuals, and that this involved the quite difficult task of balancing
between standing up to being a fan and making sure not to be too "fan-like". And usually the way in which this dilemma was resolved and the autonomy of the individual conveyed, was by referring to an inner self, essentially different from others. Often the informants emphasized that they were not typical fans, that they were not like the stereotype, that they did not arrange their lives around their idols, and that they did not obey the gaze of others. It was by referring to relations to other people – be it idols, stereotypes, Norwegians, crowds, or gazing others – that the informants presented themselves as autonomous. Just like standing out or pure relations require a background of numerous insignificant others, the construction and presentation of the self as autonomous too requires others, against whose influence, the self can be reflexively positioned as independent. Even simple choices of wearing or not wearing, doing or not doing, being or not being, evoke reflections concerning possible external sources, under whose influence the choice may have been made – or may be seen as having been made. Thus, the autonomous self is indeed a related self, as it is in relation to others that autonomy is negotiated. The self was surely negotiated intersubjectively - both because it was presented to an actual listener with a tape-recorder switched on - and because the presentations concerned a self-in-relations. It was ironically by referring relations to other people and often by positioning it against the influence of others, that the self was presented as essential and autonomous.
Yet, one relation, that somewhat escaped the contrasting use in the informants’
presentation of self, was the relation to the very idea of the autonomous self. I am not able to say whether the informants actually felt autonomous or not, nor is such an evaluation relevant to the argument. What matters is that all seemed to agree that autonomy was a desirable characteristic. When presenting the self as independent from external ideas and forces, the informants actually revealed a clear other-dependency – not only because autonomy was typically emphasized by referring to being different from someone else, but also because autonomy was taken as the unquestioned ideal to be approximated. The informants, like most other Westerners, strove eagerly to present themselves as independent. Yet, in doing so they obeyed exactly one of the basic normative ideals – that of the autonomous self. None challenged the ideal of the autonomous self, and neither could they have, since this
To be or not to be – A Question of Autonomy 78 ideal is a paradoxical and quite bulletproof cultural construction – not necessarily a bad one, but bulletproof and contradictory nonetheless.
Western norms celebrate and proscribe the autonomous self (Carrier 1999:36). But actually such a norm is a contradiction in terms. Proscribed autonomy is nonsense, since obeying a proscription is exactly surrendering one’s autonomy. But there is no way in which proscribed autonomy can be resisted: Deciding to be un-autonomous and always obey the requirements of others would be a quite autonomous action, as it goes against the normative requirements. And striving to be autonomous is actually quite un-autonomous as one simply obeys what is culturally required. Both actions are paradoxical combinations of autonomy and the opposite. The ideal of the autonomous self does simply not make sense, if it is understood as being induced upon the individual by any external source24. Autonomy as an ideal only makes sense if it is believed to spring from an inner source of self – which was also the solution that the female Cliff fan resolved to in her attempts to present herself as an inherently independent personality. Thus, when Carrier describes how the Western self is supposed to be autonomous and spontaneous (Carrier 1999:21ff), I will emphasize that these two ideal characteristics are inseparable. The autonomous self must be reflexively constructed as an inner, essential self, as all signs of other-dependency must be shunned in the narration. By ascribing autonomy to an internal and spontaneous spring of self, the contradiction of a normatively proscribed autonomy is avoided. In short: The idea of the autonomous self and the idea of an inner spontaneous self are parts of the same cultural package.
24 I can't help adding a little reference to the movie "Monthy Phython's Life of Bryan" by John Cleese. In it there is a scene that brilliantly illustrates the paradox of induced autonomy. Brian is followed by a huge crowd believing him to be the Messiah, he would however, rather be left alone. From a balcony he tries to convince the crowd-members not to follow him nor any other leaders, that each of them is an individual and different from everyone else. The whole crowd replies by repeating after him in synchrony, that they are all individuals each different from everyone else - except one, who discretely objects to being different.