BOLAGSSTÄMMAN I GENOMSNITT SVERIGE (N=39)
I. INTRODUCTION
5. DISCUSSION
For the control variables, return on stock portfolio investments is the only significant variable. Opposite of what is expected investment return is positively correlated to the number of votes against both routine and non-routine proposals. Previous research reports that institutional investors might pursue a broader set of underlying objectives when monitoring firm management than what is recognized by agency theory (see Murphy and van Nuys, 1994; Nordén and Strand, 2009; Romano, 1993; Woidtke, 2002). This might explain the direction of relationship between voting patterns and investment return. Fund size and the level of stock in the overall fund portfolio are insignificant variables to explain cross-border voting.
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APPENDIX 1:1
List of U.S. state funds included in study
Alameda County Employees Retirement Association
Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago
New York State Common Retirement Fund Alaska Permanent Fund
Corporation
Florida State Board of Administration
New York State Deferred Compensation Plan California Public Employees
Retirement System
General Retirement System of the City of Detroit
North Dakota State Investment Board
California State Teachers Retirement System
Gwinnett County Board of Education Retirement System
Ohio Police and fire pension fund
City of Memphis Retirement System
Illinois Municipality Retirement Fund Master Trust
Orange County Employees Retirement System City of New York Deferred
Compensation Plan
Illinois State Board of Investments
Public Employee Retirement System of Idaho
Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association
Indiana State Teachers' Retirement System
Public Employees Retirement Association of New Mexico County Employees Annuity and
Benefit Fund of Cook County
Los Angeles City Employees' Retirement System
Public Employees retirement system of Mississippi Educational Employees
Supplementary Retirement System of Fairfax County
Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association
Public Employees retirement system of Nevada
El Paso County Retirement Plan Los Angeles Fire and Police Pension System
Public School Teachers' Pension and Retirement Fund of Chicago Employees RET of the City of
Fort Worth, Texas
Louisiana State Employees retirement system
San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Association Employees Retirement System of
Baltimore County
Massachusetts PRIM San Diego City Employees Retirement System Employees Retirement System of
the State of Hawaii
Montana Board of Investments San Diego Country Employees Retirement Association Fairfax County Uninformed
Retirement System
Municipal Employees Annuity &
Benefit Fund of Chicago
San Joaquin County RET
Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of Baltimore
Municipal Fire and Police Retirement System of Iowa
School employees retirement system of Ohio
Fire and Police Pension Association of Colorado
New Mexico State Investment State of Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds
APPENDIX 1:2
List of U.S. state funds included in study (cont’d)
State of Minnesota Retirement System
Teachers Retirement System of Texas
The State of New Jersey Common Pension Fund State of Wisconsin Investment
Board
Teachers Retirement System of the State of Illinois
The Texas Education Agency
State Teacher Retirement System of Ohio
Tennessee Retirement Plan Trust Treasurer of the State of North Carolina Equity Investment State Universities Retirement
System
Tennessee Valley Authority Retirement System
Utah State Retirement Systems
Teachers retirement system of Louisiana
The Public Education and School Employee Retirement System of Missouri
Virginia Retirement System
U.S. public investment systems cross-border voting in 2007, 2008, and 2009. The above stated 63 funds comprise all the American state pension and retirement systems that have engaged in cross-border proxy voting in Swedish large- and mid cap size firms.