In this thesis, I will be studying Dorthe and Ditte and their ontologically existing paid public-sector work and volunteer third-sector work. In other words, they along with their work belong to the intransitive dimension, whereas my knowl-edge and understanding of them and their work belong to the transitive dimen-sion (see table 1). The ontologically existing way Ditte understands her volunteer work will not necessarily change because this thesis epistemologically finds a new way to describe and interpret this work. It could, if she reads the thesis and finds new meaning to her volunteering, or if she gains new insights from being interviewed about her work, but this will not necessarily be the case. Similarly, the organisational structure of Dorthe’s local scout group will not automatically change as a result of the words written on this page. Another way to put it is that different theories could provide different understandings of something Ditte does during her paid work, but this would again not change how the work is done. If Ditte, hypothetically, told a co-worker that she did not like something that person had written, Goffman’s (1955) theory on facework could be used to argue that this threatened the co-worker’s social value (her face). This would make Ditte appear, to use Goffman’s term, heartless. The very same action could, using Carl Rogers’s theory on what constitutes quality in interpersonal encounters be seen as congruent; this would lead us to understand Ditte as being genuine and without
2 TD = transitive dimension; ID = intransitive dimension
façade in her relationship with her co-worker (Rogers, 1962) These opposing epistemological interpretations of Ditte’s comment will not change anything about the ontological reality of what Ditte actually said, did, or thought.
Dimension In this thesis
Transitive dimension
The things we study with – theory and resources of science.
The researcher
The knowledge about the intran-sitive dimension obtained by the researcher through this thesis.
Intransitive dimension
The things we study – physical or social.
The people studied
The paid public-sector work and volunteer third-sector work con-ducted by Ditte and Dorthe re-spectively.
Table 1. Transitive and intransitive dimensions and their relation to the researcher and the people studied.
Equally, Ditte’s ontologically existing understanding of her work, or the organi-sational structure of Dorthe’s local group, could change over time, or this study could fail to grasp them properly, such that though these things would exist on-tologically and intransitively, they would not be reflected epistemologically and transitively in the findings. Although the latter is naturally not a desirable out-come for this thesis, critical realism tells us that it could be the case. It also tells us that ontologically there can be things that research does not epistemologically have access to. In a sense, critical realism instils a certain amount of humility into the researcher in regards to how certain they can be of their conclusions. As I shall explain further later on, one way of seeking likely explanations matching the ontologically existing reality is by using a case-study approach where different data sources and perspectives are triangulated.
Differences between physical and social phenomena
There are, however, differences between the shape of the earth – a physical ob-ject – and the understanding of doing volunteer and paid work, a less tangible and more psychological or social phenomenon. While the distinction between the transitive and intransitive dimension seems to focus on research, the same
basic idea of distinguishing between the world and our understanding of it must also apply to the people being studied as part of the research process. For exam-ple, in the case of a conflict between two peoexam-ple, it becomes difficult to say that a conflict exists unless at least one of the involved participants understands their relation to each other as being in conflict. Hence, a social collision of people is more concept-dependent than the collision of two asteroids in outer space (Outhwaite, 1987, p. 46). This means that for researchers to study, for example, conflicts between people, they must study something partially concept-depend-ent, but looking at it as part of the intransitive dimension.
What are the consequences of distinguishing between a transitive and an intran-sitive dimension? On the one hand, this distinction tells us that Ditte’s two types of work exist, regardless of whether I as a researcher write or think anything about them. Ditte will do her work regardless of whether I as a researcher do my work, although the research process itself could, as mentioned, influence what Ditte thinks about her work. This distinction also tells us that we cannot reduce what volunteer work is to, for example, the simple, somewhat observable fact that it is unpaid.
On the other hand, this distinction tells us that because Dorthe and Ditte’s work is, at least in part, a social phenomenon, it is not completely independent from concepts, understandings, and descriptions of the transitive dimension. While building a fire requires physical objects like wood, an axe, paper, and some matches - the reasons for building a fire will most likely be dependent on the understanding of this activity that the people doing it have. Thus we cannot ar-gue that the idea of volunteering or being a member of a scout association exists completely independent of our concepts and understandings of it; this idea is made up in part of people’s concepts and understandings thereof. Ditte’s actions take place in a world that in part exists regardless of what she thinks of it, and in part is made up of what she and others think about it. All of this is the intransi-tive dimension: it is things we study, and ontologically, some of these things are concept-dependent while others are not.
On an epistemological level, I am studying the ontologically existing world, both the parts that are concept-dependent and the ones that are concept-independent.
In table 1 I have outlined how the relationship between the intransitive and tran-sitive changes when looking at these dimensions from the perspective of the people studied versus that of the researchers doing the studying. In both cases, physical objects are concept-independent, while social phenomena can be linked with concepts describing them.
People studied Researchers Physical objects,
like the Earth will not change shape just because people (studied by re-searchers) think or write something about them.
Physical objects,
like the Earth will not change shape just because researchers think or write something about them.
Social phenomena,
like a conflict between two people, can only exist if at least one of them sees themselves as in conflict; in that sense, a conflict is concept-de-pendent (Outhwaite, 1987, p. 46).
Thus, in this case, there has to be a connection between the world and this person’s understanding of it in order for part of the world to be what it is here – in conflict.
Researchers can think and write whatever they want without chang-ing the nature of this conflict.
Social phenomena,
like a conflict between two people, can be studied as part of the intran-sitive dimension. While one of the two people in conflict must think they have a conflict, this conflict will not necessarily change based on what the researcher thinks or writes about it. In this case, it is still part of the intransitive dimension in relation to the researcher’s under-standing of it.
Table 2. Relationship between the transitive and intransitive dimensions for people studied and the researchers studying them
In other words, social phenomena can be studied as part of the intransitive di-mension, because although they are partially dependent on the concepts and ideas of the people being studied, they are not automatically dependent on the concepts and ideas of the researcher doing the studying.
Looking back
Studying things which have already happened, does not rule out the intransitivity of social phenomena. As an example, World War I happened the way it did inde-pendently of how it is described today (Outhwaite, 1987, p. 46), just as the work done by Ditte and Dorthe and the conversations they have had with colleagues happened the way they did, regardless of anything written in this thesis at this point.
However, as the case-study approach (see chapter 4) used in this thesis entails studying present-day social phenomena as they unfold, the critical realist re-searcher must be aware of the influence he has on the reality he is studying.
However, this influence should not, according to Sayer, be overestimated:
Things are a little more complicated regarding the social world, for it is socially constructed and includes knowledge itself, and it therefore cannot be said to exist independently of at least some knowledge, though it is more likely to be past knowledge than that of contemporary researchers.
When researchers change their minds it is unlikely to produce a significant change in the phenomena they study. For the most part, social scientists are cast in the modest role of construing rather than ‘constructing’ the social world. (Sayer, 2000, p. 11)
I will also argue that regardless of my presence during participant observation, Ditte still has to welcome the young people to her weekly scout meeting and explain to them the plan for the meeting. When there is a conflict in one of the groups, she still has to handle this problem. When she is attending a meeting at work about designing a questionnaire, she still needs to find the information re-quired, regardless of my presence and any transitive dimension thoughts I might have. In this sense, the participating observer could overestimate his impact on the ontologically existing world.