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ANALY SIS – THE PRO S AND CON S OF WE STERN VOIC ES IN AFRICAN SOCIA L DE BATES

In document GETTING TO RIGHTS (Sider 97-100)

3 THE RELIGIOUS SPHERE

4.8 ANALY SIS – THE PRO S AND CON S OF WE STERN VOIC ES IN AFRICAN SOCIA L DE BATES

278 http://www.siecus.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Feature.showFeature&featureID=2126

279 This danger exists beyond Africa. AI point out how a Sri Lankan bill in 1995 that aimed at decriminalization actually resulted in criminalization being extended to lesbians.

280 http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v27n3/Culture_Wars.html

advocated greater respect for LGBTI rights and new legislation was proposed to increase penalties for homosexual acts from one to ten years in prison. 278

4.8 ANALY SIS – THE PRO S AND CON S OF WE STERN VOIC ES IN AFRICAN SOCIA L DE BATES

Liberia shows the risk of misunderstandings and harmful effects arising from western statements that take place without a policy and communication strategy. Short term political attention and media storms are unlikely to yield a positive result. They can just as easily result in increased penalties, more prosecutions or an increase in private violence.279 There may in some circumstances be strong arguments for “letting sleeping dogs lie”, at least until a proper strategy and the means to implement it are in place.

Danish and European officials and leaders need to be well-informed as to the wishes and intentions of African political leaders. It is necessary to try to make allies of progressive African leaders on this issue, to support them in taking steps that are politically feasible rather than placing them in a position where their political credibility depends on denouncing western attempts to “impose” homosexuality. Where public and parliamentary opinion are clearly opposed to decriminalization, statements by western leaders that sound like imperial demands are unlikely to yield positive long term results and may be counterproductive. The positive steps taken by Mozambique and Botswana (discussed elsewhere in this study) in forbidding employment discrimination based on sexual orientation were taken relatively quietly and not in response to international pressure.

The intervention by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon in Zambia in favour of decriminalization was not taken up by any well-known figures in Zambia. A government spokesman rejected the recommendation, and evangelical Christian leaders seemed to fan the flames of opposition280 Nevertheless, it may be that as part of a long-term strategy, these statements help to open up a discussion that would otherwise not take place, and create space for diverging points of view.

New repressive legislation deserves a different response than colonial laws that are politically hard to get rid of. The Ugandan case, where few options remained, more obviously required international pressure than most others. While Uganda and Malawi are examples of a positive effect, many nationals of these countries will view them as showing a depressing subservience to foreign pressure. In Uganda, international pressure has (at least at times), been coordinated with an impressive campaign by Ugandan civil society organizations. The challenge though, is how to avoid more

“Ugandas” from arising rather than to use Uganda as a model for international engagement. As the Malawi case may illustrate, positive measures taken as a result of foreign pressure risk being superficial, dropped again as soon as is politically convenient.

A lack of realism about the limited possibilities for manoeuvre of African leaders on this subject will make western politicians, eager to please constituencies at home, vulnerable to an unproductive cycle of pressure followed only by backlashes or the achievement of results that are rarely more than superficial.

Foreign pressure is a poor substitute for a real debate at home. For most people, western political pressure confirms that LGBTI rights are a foreign imposed agenda. This provides ammunition for a backlash, where opposition to liberalization is a badge of African identity, an almost perfect political weapon to portray opponents as western stooges.

Western countries have rightly spent large sums of money on trying to consolidate democracy in Africa’s fragile and difficult conditions. Short-circuiting national democracy through crude conditionality does little to demonstrate Western respect for African democracy, or the real needs of the African poor. Western publics and politicians need to get used to African countries being democracies subject to the rough and tumble of electoral politics and parliamentary manoeuvring. The subject of LGBTI rights and of sexuality in the modern world has been hotly debated in western countries for decades.

We cannot expect that it will not also be in African ones.

Without stepping into stereotyped roles that religious fundamentalists and nationalists would have them play (including crude conditionality), African leaders and publics can nevertheless usefully be told that there are limits to what Danish or European publics will allow their aid to be used for; that aid is the subject of public and political debate in a democratic framework, that precisely the sections of public opinion that support foreign aid are often also those who deplore human rights violations against LGBTI persons, and that it is hardly surprising that aid will be brought into question if draconian laws against LGBTI persons are adopted or enforced.

4 . 8 . 1 SOM E KEY P OI N T S FO R WEST ERN REPRESEN T AT I VES

Western experts and representatives can nuance positions and greater understanding of SOGI issues, and what human rights law actually demands. This is discussed in Chapter Six, but in many public debates, a few key points are all that is required:

i) Human rights law demands decriminalization, but not same sex marriage;

ii) Freedoms of expression, association and assembly can allow for some accommodation of community standards (even rather conservative ones), but not incitement to violence or hatred.

iii) Human rights law does not demand that people, communities or cultures

“like” homosexuality, but merely that they do not imprison or persecute homosexuals or deny them their rights.

iv) Religions are free to continue to advocate personal and social discipline in the area of sexuality and even to express their own disapproval of homosexuality or non-conforming gender identities.

v) All persons, including members of sexual minorities, have legal rights that

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protect them against abuse and discrimination in the public and private spheres.

Western officials addressing African publics or gatherings could do well to make a distinction between “the rights of gays” and “gay rights”. The subtle but important differences between these two provide a dividing line between the above five points, which concern the rights of all human beings and to which LGBTI people are also entitled, and legal developments in western countries that provide rights to marriage, adoption etc. It is important to make it clear that no international bodies are demanding that African countries take any of these steps.

In many sections of the public, many people may not know that international human rights bodies and even many churches have called for decriminalization. The challenge for western leaders is to communicate with African audiences on how to square respect for parliamentary decision making with the exercise of restraint and respect for the rights of unpopular minorities. Parliamentarians should be reminded of the separation of church and state as a key element of the rule of law and democracy and asked to think its consequences through. Loud” and quiet diplomacy are not alternatives. They are both necessary and appropriate in the right circumstances. The question is of getting different kinds of statements, demarches and quiet discussions to work in harmony with one another. It is trite to say that statements need to be based on a clear understanding of domestic political contexts. It is important to analyse who is using this issue in the national political context and for what purpose (Kaoma: 2012)281

4 . 8 . 2 C ON SI DERAT I ON S OF T I MI N G AN D ST RAT EGY

The timing of going public on the rights of LGBTI persons is not for western donors or organizations to decide, but for national activists. The issue may become public in a more or less deliberate and planned manner (as in Zimbabwe in the early 1990s) or it may flare up rather haphazardly as happened in Senegal in response to a magazine article. Denmark should thus be prepared for the situation of defending human rights defenders who incur risks when the issue does arise. Where intervention in national debates is more likely to strengthen stereotypes about western agendas (or “gay agendas”, “neo-colonialism” etc), and even to produce backlashes, silence may sometimes be the better course, while giving and showing support to African leadership on this issue. On the other hand, silence should not amount to complicity. Where serious protection issues arise, there may be a role for diplomatic demarches. This is discussed in relation to human rights protection below, though statements and interventions should be coordinated with national activists.

In annual bilateral meetings and other occasional discussions, concerns can be raised more openly, though of course always with respect for differences of opinion as well as political realities. Here, there should be a particular focus on any patterns of violation of

282 http://www.thepost.co.za/mbeki-slams-uganda-s-anti-gay-bill-1.1218973#.UaIeJBjU9jo

283 http://www.weekendpost.co.bw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=830:mogae-unmoved-on-homosexuality-prostitution

284 African Union, PRESS RELEASE , The Africa Union Election Observation Mission applauds preparation towards the Republic of Kenya’s 4 March 2013 General Elections

the rights of LGBTI persons or organizations, whether those concerned with physical safety and security or with rights in the areas of free expression, association and assembly.

4 . 8 . 3 PUB LI C G EST URES

Many embassies exert influence informally through (for example) establishing contacts to national LGBTI leaders, accepting invitations to participate in their events, or inviting them to public functions at embassies, where they meet senior officials of their own country and break down barriers. Diplomats and political leaders can, where they judge it to be useful, make public statements. Where national officials are slow to respect the legal rights of LGBTI activists ( to register their NGOs for example), this is a matter that can be raised by western diplomats. Grant making, study tours and dialogue forums, whether local or through mechanisms in the donor’s home country are discussed later in this study.

4.9 COMBATING PO LITIC AL HATE SPEEC H AN D PROMOTING

In document GETTING TO RIGHTS (Sider 97-100)