Kierkegaard's Socratic Point of View

Kierkegaard s Socratic Point ofView

Paul Muench

What our age needs...is not a new contribution to the system but a subjective thinker who relates himself to existing qua Christian just as Socrates related himself to existing qua human being (CUP2 77; Pap.

VI B 98, p. 62).'

—-Johannes Climacus

N o t lo n g b efore h e d ied in 1 8 5 5 , S øren Kierkegaard c o m p o se d a b r ie f essay en titled “M y Task” (M 3 4 0 -3 4 7 ; S V 1 14, 3 5 0 - 3 5 7 ) .2 In this relatively n e g ­ lec ted w o rk h e argues that i f w e w an t to understand h im and th e activities in w h ic h h e has b e e n en gaged in C o p e n h a g e n , th en there is o n ly o n e instructive o b ject o f com parison : Socrates and th e role h e played as p h ilo ­ sophical gadfly in a n cien t A th en s. In this paper I critically discuss this te x t and con sid er in particular K ierkegaards claim that his refusal to call h im ­ s e lf a C hristian— in a c o n te x t w h er e it was th e social n o r m to d o so— is m e th o d o lo g ic a lly analogou s to S ocrates’ stance o f ignorance.

I. The Moment, 1 0 :“M y T a sk ”

W h e n Kierkegaard d ied o n N o v e m b e r 11, 1 8 5 5 , age 4 2 , h e left b eh in d a m o n g his papers th e fin ish ed m anuscript for th e ten th issue o f his serial The M oment. T h is final issue in clu d es a sec tio n , dated S ep tem b er 1, 185 5 , that is en titled “M y Task” and that turns o u t to b e in effect K ierkegaard’s last p r o n o u n c e m e n t u p o n th e various activities h e has b e e n en g a g ed in as a w riter and th ink er since th e c o m p le tio n and d efense o f his dissertation.3 It is thus also th e last in a series o f w orks w ith in K ierkegaard’s corpu s that (either en tirely or in part) are ex p licit reflections ab ou t his m e th o d o lo g y and that o ften in c lu d e remarks ab ou t h o w to understand so m e o f his oth er ind ividu al w orks or h o w to c o n c e iv e o f th e m as a part o f a larger p h ilo ­ sop hical and religiou s und ertak in g. To take an analogy from literary stud­

ies, ju st as there are w orks o f literature and w orks o f criticism , so can w e fin d w ith in K ierkegaard’s corpu s a n u m b er o f w orks that p rim arily seek to illu m in ate a certain subject m atter or existential stance w h ile also seek in g

to have an existential im p act o n th e reader; at th e sam e tim e, there exists a sec o n d , sm aller class o f w ritin gs that serves a m ore critical, m e th o d o lo g ic a l fu n ctio n , offerin g us ways in w h ic h K ierkegaard thinks w e o u g h t to approach th e first class o f w ritin gs to g e th er w ith general remarks ab ou t th e overall p o in t o f v ie w that h e claim s in form s his authorship and ab out th e basic m e th o d that h e em p lo y s.4 W h ile m o st o f th ese m e th o d o lo g ic a l texts have received a significant a m o u n t o f atten tion from scholars (especially The Point o f View), th e te x t w e are co n sid erin g , “M y Task,” rem ains relative­

ly n e g le c te d .5 H a v in g spent several years reflectin g ab ou t his authorship (and c o m p o sin g a n u m b er o f texts in th e process), K ierkegaard m akes o n e last effort in “M y Task” to draw ev ery th in g to g e th er for his reader and to present in as com pressed and distilled a m an n er as p ossib le th e essen ce o f w h a t h e takes his task to have b een . As a result, desp ite its n eg lec t, this tex t is perhaps th e best single d o c u m e n t w e have for o b ta in in g a basic picture o f h o w Kierkegaard co n ce iv es o f his o w n activities as a w r iter and thinker.

O v er th e space o f ju st a fe w pages K ierkegaard e lo q u e n tly sketches for us w h a t h e takes to b e his co n tem p o ra ry situ ation, a situ ation w h e r e th e au th en tic p ractice o f C h ristian ity has alm ost ceased to exist w h ile it n ever­

theless rem ains th e cultural n o r m for p e o p le (notably his fe llo w citizen s o f C o p en h a g e n ) to c o n tin u e to c o n c e iv e o f th em selves as C hristians. O n Kierkegaard s view , there is a striking lack o f fit b e tw e e n h o w his c o n te m ­ poraries picture th eir lives and h o w th ey actually live th ose lives: h e c o n ­ tends that th ey self-d e cep tiv ely th in k th ey are C hristians w h ile failin g to p u t in to practice th e C hristian ideal. In response to this situ ation Kierkegaard o p e n ly refuses to call h im s e lf a C h ristian and at tim es even d en ies that h e is a C hristian: “ I d o n o t call m y se lf a C hristian, d o n o t say o f m y se lf that I am a C h r istia n .. ..It is altogeth er true: I am n o t a C h ristian ” (M 3 4 0 , S V I 14, 3 5 0 , trans. m od ified ; M 3 4 2 - 3 4 3 , S V i 14, 3 5 3 ). H e real­

izes that a p erson w h o o p e n ly declares that she d oes n o t call h e r se lf a C h ris­

tian is in danger o f so u n d in g crazy in a so c ie ty w h e r e it g o es w ith o u t say­

in g that everyon e is a C hristian, especially so m e o n e like h im w h o has p rin ­ cipally d ev o ted h im se lf to w r itin g ab ou t w h a t it is to b e a Christian:

Yes, I w e ll k n o w that it alm o st so u n d s lik e a k in d o f lunacy in this C h ristia n w o rld — w h e r e ea ch and ev ery o n e is C h ristia n , w h e r e b e in g a C h ristia n is s o m e th in g that ev e r y o n e naturally is— that th ere is s o m e o n e w h o says o f h im self, “ I d o n o t call m y s e lf a C h ristian ,” an d s o m e o n e w h o m C h r istia n i­

ty o c c u p ie s to th e d eg re e to w h ic h it o c c u p ie s m e (M 3 4 0 ; S V I 14, 3 5 0 - 3 5 1 [italics m in e ]).

In response to such a claim , th ose w h o have a general fam iliarity w ith K ierkegaards w ritin g s m ay feel th e strong desire to object: Isn’t this a strange th in g for K ierkegaard o f all p e o p le to say? D o n ’t w e k n o w h e is a C hristian, an exem p lary C hristian w h o has had a significant im p act o n th e ­ ology, o n p h ilo so p h y and o n cou n tless oth er fields and w h o s e w ritin g s rem ain person ally m o v in g to som e, person ally repugnant to oth ers, pre­

cisely for th eir very C h ristian o rien ta tio n and em phasis? O n e m ig h t even feel like e x c la im in g ,“ I f h e isn ’t a C hristian w h o is?!” Yet, at least in this text, Kierkegaard declares “ I am n o t a C h ristian ” and insists that “ an yon e w h o w ants to understand [his] totally distinct task m ust train him self to b e able to fix his atten tion o n th is” very phrase and th e fact that he, Kierkegaard,

“ c o n tin u a lly ” repeats it (M 340; S V 1 1 4 ,3 5 0 [italics m in e; tran. m o d ified ]).

In fact, K ierkegaard m ig h t n o t b e all that surprised b y expressions o f p u z zlem e n t o f this sort from th ose w h o take th em selves to b e fam iliar w ith his texts. T h o u g h h e claim s in “M y Task” that his authorship was “ at th e ou tset sta m p ed ‘th e single ind ividu al— I am n o t a C hristian,’ ” this is th e first tim e h e has o p e n ly avow ed that this is his p o sitio n (M 344; S V 1 14, 3 5 4 ).6 Kierkegaard suggests that th ose w h o th in k th ey k n o w h e is a C h ristian (and w h a t is su pp osed to fo llo w from this) are alm ost certain to m isunderstand h im , for h e o p e n ly rejects th e idea that there is an yth in g an alogou s in th e entire h istory o f C h ristian ity to th e stance h e adopts and th e task h e pur­

sues. H e co n ten d s that this is “th e first tim e in ‘C h r iste n d o m ’ ” that anyone has approached things in this particular m anner:

T h e p o in t o f v ie w I h ave e x h ib ite d an d am e x h ib itin g is o f su ch a d istin c­

tive nature that in e ig h te e n h u n d red years o f C h r is te n d o m th ere is q u ite lit­

erally n o th in g a n a lo g o u s, n o th in g com p arab le that I have to ap peal to .T h u s, in th e face o f e ig h te e n h u n d red years, I stand q u ite literally a lo n e (M 3 4 4 , S V i 14, 3 5 5 ; M 3 4 0 - 3 4 1 , S V 1 14, 3 5 1 - 3 5 2 , trans. m o d ifie d ).7

As Kierkegaard clearly ca n n o t m ean by this claim that h e is th e first p erson ever to declare that h e is n o t a C hristian (since this is so m e th in g atheists and p e o p le w h o p ractice o th er religion s d o as a m atter o f co u r se ), h e m ust attach a special sign ifican ce to th e fact that h e utters this phrase in a c o n ­ te x t w h er e it has b e c o m e th e n o r m for p e o p le to declare th em selves to b e C hristians and even to c o n c e iv e o f th em selves as C hristians w h ile liv in g lives that in n o w ay reflect th ese su p p osed co m m itm e n ts.

Kierkegaard’s claim that there is n o o n e analogous to h im in eig h tee n hundred years o f C hristianity is n o t the o n ly th ing, how ever, that is extraor­

dinary about this passage. Im m ed iately after h e claim s that h e stands alone in C h risten d om , Kierkegaard m akes th e perhaps even m ore remarkable claim that there d oes exist o n e p erson p rior to h im w h o s e activity is analo­

gous: “T h e o n ly analogy I have b efore m e is Socrates; m y task is a Socratic task, to audit th e d efin ition o f w h at it is to b e a C h ristian ” (M 341; S V t 14, 35 2 ). T hat is, Kierkegaard claim s that Socrates, a n o n -C h r istia n pagan philosoph er, is his o n e true predecessor, that Socrates’ p h ilosop h ical activity is the o n ly th in g analogous to his activity as a w riter and thinker, such that w e sh ou ld c o n ce iv e o f his task— supp osed ly u n iq u e w ith in C hristianity— as a Socratic task. I th ink this is a remarkable claim . I f Socrates really provides th e o n ly analogy to Kierkegaard and i f K ierkegaard’s task truly is as th or­

o u g h ly Socratic as h e seem s to b e suggesting, th en w e m ay b e in the pres­

e n ce here o f a th o u g h t that u ltim ately has the p oten tial to revolu tion ize the very w ay w e th ink ab out Kierkegaard and h o w w e approach his texts.

II. K ierkegaard’s Socratic Stance: “ I am N o t a C hristian”

T h e idea that Kierkegaard is in so m e sense a S ocratic figure is b o u n d to strike m ost scholars o f K ierkegaard as ob viou s. A n y ran d om selec tio n o f secon d ary literature is certain to in c lu d e th e occasion al appeal to K ierkegaard’s life lo n g interest in Socrates and interp retation s ab ou n d that seek to shore up w h atever is b e in g argued for w ith th e th o u g h t that, after all, Kierkegaard m o d e le d h im s e lf o n Socrates, had a p en ch a n t for iron y and in d irection , etc., etc. B u t w h ile it w o u ld b e surprising to discover s o m e o n e w h o claim ed to b e fam iliar w ith K ierkegaard’s w ritin g s and y et w h o had n o idea that Socrates was an im p ortan t figure for h im , w e still lack a d etailed, in -d e p th treatm ent o f th e matter. T h is is n o t to say that there d o n o t exist any studies o f K ierkegaard’s c o n c e p tio n o f Socrates or any h e lp ­ ful accoun ts o f w h a t m ig h t b e called K ierkegaard’s Socratic m e th o d . B u t these are surprisingly fe w in n u m b er.8 O n e reason I th in k “M y Task” is a useful p lace to start is that this te x t is fairly com p ressed and sch em atic in nature. Kierkegaard is here n o t so m u ch tryin g to p u t a Socratic m e th o d in to practice as to in vite us to take up a p o in t o f v ie w that h e thinks m akes intelligible m an y o f th e activities h e has b e e n en g a g ed in as a w r iter and thinker since th e p u b lication o f his dissertation. T h is m eans that o n c e the p o in t o f v ie w at issue b e c o m e s clear w e w ill have to turn to o th er parts o f K ierkegaard’s corpu s i f w e w an t to ob tain a m ore d etailed grasp o f h o w his task actually gets im p le m e n te d in practice and w h a t it is m ore specifically ab out this task that h e thinks m akes it q u in tesse n tia l^ Socratic.9

L ets con sider further K ierkegaards com p arison o f h im se lf to Socrates in

“M y Task.” I w an t to m ake clear up front that in m y v ie w th e single m ost im portant text for K ierkegaards th in k in g ab out Socrates is P lato’s A pology.10 T h is is a te x t to w h ic h h e returns again and again in his w ritin g s ab out Socrates and w h ic h em b o d ies for h im th e Socratic ideal: a life that sim u l­

tan eou sly is d irected at th e cu ltivation o f th e se lf to g e th er w ith th e aim o f en g a g in g o n e ’s fe llo w citizen s and g ettin g th e m to ex a m in e th em selves m ore c lo se ly In th e case o f “M y Task,” w h er e w e fin d o n e o f K ierkegaard’s m o st m ature portraits o f Socrates, w e are in vited to com pare K ierkegaard’s situation and th e events that have u n fo ld ed in his life to th e drama o f Socrates’ life as it is re co u n ted b y h im in th e A pology.11 R e c a ll that a signif­

icant p o r tio n o f Socrates’ d efen se sp eech consists o f a m ore general a cc o u n t o f h o w h e cam e to practice p h ilo so p h y and w h y h e thinks such a life is w o r th p ursuing, to g e th er w ith his exp lan ation o f w h y so m an y p e o p le have b e e n slandering h im over th e years. L et m e b riefly rem in d y o u o f th e m ain cast o f characters w h o m ake an appearance in S ocrates’ a cc o u n t o f his life:

(1) the Sophists, professional teachers and so m etim es rivals o f Socrates w ith w h o m h e is o ften co n fu sed by th e general p u b lic;12 (2) the god, w h o m an i­

fests h im se lf th rou gh th e oracle at D e lp h i and perhaps th rou gh th e related p h e n o m e n o n o f S ocrates’ daimonion or d ivin e sign;13 (3) th e broader group o f those reputed to be wise (represented by th e p olitician s, th e p o ets and th e craftsm en) w ith w h o m Socrates converses, a lon g w ith the public at large w h ic h o ften listens to th eir discussions;14 (4) the young Athenian men w h o fo llo w Socrates around and w h o en joy listen in g to h im q u estio n th ose reputed to b e w ise ;15 and (5) Socrates h im self, w h o claim s that th e o n ly sense in w h ic h h e is w ise is that h e “do[es] n o t th in k [he] k n ow [s] w h a t [he]

do[es] n o t know ,” and w h o b elieves that th e g o d ordered h im to “live th e life o f a p h ilosop h er, to ex a m in e [him self] and others,” th ereb y servin g as a k in d o f gadfly w h o awakens p e o p le from th eir ethical slu m b ers.16 Socrates offers this a cc o u n t o f his life as a part o f th e d efense sp eech h e delivers b efore th e jury. I f w e leave aside th e character o f M e letu s and S ocrates’

oth er im m ed ia te accusers, there exist w ith in th e larger dram atic c o n te x t o f S ocrates’ d efen se tw o o th er significant characters w o r th m en tio n in g : (6) Socrates'jury, a selec tio n o f his A th en ia n peers w h ic h also serves as a k in d o f literary an alogu e for the readers o f Plato's text, w h o th em selves are in v ited to arrive at th eir o w n ju d g m e n t ab ou t Socrates’ gu ilt or in n o c e n c e ;17 and (7) Plato, w h o is represented as o n e o f th e y o u n g m e n in atten dan ce at Socrates’ trial and w h o , in turn, is also th e w riter and th ink er w h o has c o m ­ p o sed th e te x t in q u e stio n .18

I w an t to suggest that Kierkegaard m o d els w h a t h e is d o in g in “M y Task”— sp eak in g m ore generally ab out his m e th o d and overall approach—

o n th e a cc o u n t that Socrates d evelop s in th e Apology and that h e invites us to treat his con tem p orary situ ation as a m o d e r n an alogu e to th e o n e faced by Socrates in A th en s. A s th e te x t u nfold s and h e d evelop s his claim that Socrates provides his o n ly analogy, K ierkegaard p roceed s to single o u t a variety o f characters each o f w h o m corresp on ds to o n e o f th e m ajor char­

acters in th e Socratic drama (the Sophists, th e g o d , th o se repu ted to b e w ise a lon g w ith th e w id e r public, th e y o u n g A th en ia n m e n w h o fo llo w Socrates, Socrates h im self, Socrates’ jury, P la to ’s readers and P la to ).19 S im p lifyin g a bit, th e m ain characters discussed by K ierkegaard are th e fo llo w in g : (1) the pastors and theologians, w h o m ake a p rofession o f p roclaim in g w h a t it is to b e a C hristian and w h o m K ierkegaard calls “sop h ists” ; (2) the public, w h o c o n c e iv e o f th em selves as Christians b ut w h o d o n o t actually live in accord w ith th e C hristian ideal; (3) Kierkegaard qua Socratic figure, w h o d en ies h e is a C hristian and w h o helps to m ake his fe llo w citizen s aware o f a d eep er sense in w h ic h th ey are n o t C hristians (since th ey th in k th ey are Christians w h e n th ey are not); (4) the Christian G od o f Love, w h o m Kierkegaard b elieves has singled h im o u t to b e th e gadfly o f C o p en h a g e n ; (5) Kierkegaard's readers, ind ividu al m em b ers o f th e p u b lic w h o are isolated as individuals by K ierkegaard’s texts and w h o m h e seeks to en gage as in ter­

locu tors; and (6) Kierkegaard qua writer and critic, w h o d ecid es h o w to dram ­ atize th e Socratic en g a g em en t o f his a u d ien ce and w h o offers interpretive tools for und erstand in g his texts.

L et’s start w ith th e pastors and th eo lo g ia n s and th e larger public.

Kierkegaard argues that th e cultural p h e n o m e n o n p resen tin g itse lf as C h ristian ity— w h a t h e calls “ C h r iste n d o m ” [Christenhed]— is p erm ea ted by a k in d o f sophistry. In particular, h e com pares th e pastors and th eo lo g ia n s o f his day to th e Sophists20 battled by Socrates:

“ C h r is te n d o m ” lies in an abyss o f so p h istry that is m u c h , m u c h w o r se than w h e n th e S op h ists flo u r ish ed in G r e e c e .T h o s e le g io n s o f pastors an d C h r is­

tian assistant professors are all s o p h is ts ... .w h o b y falsifyin g th e d e fin itio n o f C h ristia n have, for th e sake o f th e b u sin ess, g a in ed m illio n s an d m illio n s o f C h ristian s ( M 3 4 1 , S V 1 14, 3 5 2 , trans. m o d ifie d ; M 3 4 0 , S V 1 14, 3 5 1 ) .21

I f th e pastors and th eo lo g ia n s corresp on d to th e professional teachers o f virtu e in S ocrates’ day, th en th e larger C hristian p u b lic corresp on ds m ore broadly to th ose in A th en s w h o th in k th ey k n o w w h a t virtu e is w h e n th ey

d o n ot. O n e o f Kierkegaard s m ain p o le m ics is against th e official D an ish ch u rch and its representatives, th e pastors and th eo lo g ia n s. H e co n ten d s that th e ch u rch has b e c o m e a business (w h o se m ain goal, th en , is to m ake m o n e y and to p erp etu ate itse lf as an in stitu tion ), and thus a b o d y that o u t o f self-in terest obscures th e true C hristian m essage, e m p lo y in g a w atered - d o w n version in order for th e sake o f profits to m a x im iz e th e total n u m b er o f C hristians.22 A t th e sam e tim e Kierkegaard also co n ce iv es o f th e p ub lic itse lf as a distinct force to b e reck o n ed w ith , as an abstract crow d or m o b w h o s e ex iste n c e is p red icated o n th e failure o f p e o p le to cultivate and m aintain th em selves qua individuals. H e invites us to im a g in e th e c o n te m ­ porary situ ation o f C h r iste n d o m to con sist o f hordes o f p eo p le , all ru n n in g around calling th em selves Christians and c o n c e iv in g o f th em selves as C hristians, o ften u n d er th e direct in flu e n c e and gu id an ce o f th e pastors and th eo lo g ia n s, w h ile n e x t to n o o n e is actually liv in g a true, au th en tic C h ris­

tian life. In this w ay h e u p h old s a d istin ction b e tw e e n th e pastors and th e ­ ologian s (sophists proper), w h o m ake a liv in g ad vocatin g w h a t it is to b e a C hristian, and th e larger p o p u la tio n , w h o m ore gen erally th in k th ey are C hristians w h e n th ey are n o t and w h o m Kierkegaard gen erically calls “th e o th ers” [de A ndre].23

Kierkegaard casts h im se lf in th e role o f Socrates and, accordingly, depicts h im se lf as so m e o n e w h o b o th seeks to reform th e larger p u b lic and w h o com bats th e co rru p tin g in flu e n c e o f th e pastors and th eo lo g ia n s. B y m ak ­ in g such p ro n o u n ce m en ts ab ou t his co n tem p o ra ry situ ation and b y pre­

sen tin g h im se lf as s o m e o n e w h o is capable o f o b serv in g su ch patterns o f b eh avior and even o f d iagn osin g w h a t can lead to su ch a state o f things, Kierkegaard is aware that h e m ig h t appear to b e settin g h im se lf up as an extraordinary C hristian. B u t h e d en ies that h e is any such th in g and sug­

gests that his refusal to call h im s e lf a C hristian at all partly helps to b lo c k such attributions:

I d o n o t call m y s e lf a C h ristian . T h a t this is v ery aw k w ard fo r th e sop h ists I u n d erstan d v er y w e ll, an d I u n d erstan d v er y w e ll that th e y w o u ld m u c h prefer that w it h k ettled ru m s and tru m p ets I p ro cla im ed m y s e lf to b e th e o n ly tru e C h ristia n (M 3 4 1 - 3 4 2 ; S V i 14, 3 5 2 , trans. m o d ifie d ).

R e c a ll that Kierkegaard is w e ll aware that his refusal to call h im se lf a C h ris­

tian is b o u n d to strike his con tem p oraries as od d or even crazy against th e backdrop o f a so ciety w h e r e everyon e as a m atter o f cou rse calls h e r se lf a C hristian. D e sp ite this appearance o f bizarreness, K ierkegaard co n ten d s

that there are tw o significant reasons w h y h e co n tin u e s to assert this ab out him self. First, h e ties his refusal to call h im s e lf a C hristian, or in any w ay to m o d ify this statem en t, to his desire to m aintain a proper relationship w ith an o m n ip o te n t b ein g , a b e in g h e later characterizes as th e C hristian “ G o d o f L o v e” :

I n e ith e r can, n o r w ill, n o r dare ch a n g e m y statem en t: o th e r w is e perhaps a n o th er ch a n g e w o u ld take p la ce— that th e p o w er, an o m n ip o t e n c e [Alm agt] that esp ecia lly uses m y p o w erlessn ess [Afm agt], w o u ld w ash his hands o f m e and le t m e g o m y o w n w a y (M 3 4 5 , S V 1 1 4 ,3 5 6 ; M 3 4 0 , S V 1 14, 3 5 1 , trans. m o d ifie d ).24

A t th e sam e tim e, Kierkegaard ties his stance o f o n e w h o d oes n o t call h im ­ se lf a C hristian to an ability to m ake his co n tem p o ra ries (“th e o th ers”) aware o f an even d eep er sense in w h ic h h e claim s that th ey are n o t C h ris­

tians:

I am n o t a C h ristia n — and u n fo rtu n a te ly I can m a k e it m a n ifest that th e o th ers are n o t eith er— in d e e d , ev e n less than I, sin ce th e y imagine th e m ­ selves to b e that [de indbilde sig at vcere det], o r th e y falsely ascrib e to th e m ­ selves that th e y are that ( M 3 4 0 ; S V 1 1 4 ,3 5 1 [italics m in e; tran. m o d ifie d ]).25

I d o n o t call m y s e lf a C h ristia n (k e ep in g th e id eal free), b u t I can m ak e it m an ifest that th e o th ers are that ev e n less (M 3 4 1 ; S V I 14, 3 5 2 ).

H e seem s to th in k that ad op tin g a p o sitio n o f o n e w h o refuses to call h im ­ se lf a C hristian m akes h im an esp ecially ten aciou s in terlocu tor, s o m e o n e w h o m his con tem p oraries w ill n o t b e able to shake o f f very easily:

Just b eca u se I d o n o t call m y s e lf a C h ristia n it is im p o ssib le to g e t rid o f m e, h a v in g as I d o th e c o n fo u n d e d ch aracteristic that I can m a k e it m an ifest—

also by means o f n o t ca llin g m y s e lf a C h ristia n — that th e oth ers are that ev en less (M 34 2 ; S V 1 14, 3 5 2 - 3 5 3 [italics m in e; tran. m o d ifie d ]).

K ierkegaard co n c e iv e s his task, th en , to have a tw o - fo ld structure. B y d en y in g that h e is a C h ristian in th e face o f his co n te m p o r a r ie s’ w o n t to assert th e o p p o site , h e claim s to b e d e v e lo p in g and u p h o ld in g so m e k in d o f religiou s relationship to a d iv in e b e in g w h ile also a cq u irin g a p ow erfu l m eans o f aw ak en in g his co n te m p o ra ries and m a k in g th e m aware o f th e

lack o f fit b e tw e e n h o w th ey c o n c e iv e o f th eir lives and h o w th ey actual­

ly live th e m .26

III. Socratic Ignorance

In th e process o f sk etch in g his con tem p orary situ ation and ch aracterizing b o th th e S o p h ist-lik e attributes o f th e pastors and th eo lo g ia n s and th e m ore general c o n d itio n o f his con tem p oraries (w h o , h e claim s, th in k th ey are Christians w h e n th ey are n o t), Kierkegaard repeatedly invok es Socrates, especially in order to th row further ligh t o n his characterization o f h im se lf as a Socratic figure. H e suggests that S ocrates’ task in A th en s has th e sam e tw o -fo ld structure as his task: Socrates is b o th a gadfly to his c o n te m p o ­ raries and so m e o n e w h o hold s that his life as a p h ilo so p h er is an exp ression o f his d e v o tio n to th e god . L et’s con sid er th e im age o f th e gadfly first.

S ocrates’ use o f this im age in th e A pology is tied to th e idea o f his fe llo w cit­

ize n s’ b e in g in so m e sense asleep and therefore in n e e d o f b e in g aw akened.

H e com pares their c o n d itio n to that o f a sluggish b ut n o b le horse w h o can o n ly b e stirred in to life by th e sting o f a fly. B u t ju st as it is n o t u n c o m m o n for horses to kill th e flies that sting th e m (w ith th e q u ick snap o f th eir tails), Socrates also n otes that there is a certain danger in v o lv ed in his b e in g a gad - fly:

Y ou m ig h t easily b e a n n o y e d w it h m e as p e o p le are w h e n th e y are arou sed fro m a d o z e , and strike o u t at m e; i f c o n v in c e d b y A n y tu s y o u c o u ld easily k ill m e, and th e n y o u c o u ld sleep o n fo r th e rest o f y o u r days, u n less th e g o d , in his care for y o u , sen t y o u s o m e o n e else.27

K ierkegaard ties S ocrates’ ability to aw aken his fe llo w citizen s to his stance o f ig n o r a n c e,28 and in vites us to com pare this stance w ith his o w n stance o f refu sin g to call h im s e lf a C hristian . H e co n te n d s that S ocrates’ ig n o ­ rance b o th effectiv ely d istin gu ish es h im from th e Sophists (w h o profess to b e k n o w le d g e a b le ab ou t v irtu e and th e like and w h o are w illin g to teach this to oth ers for a fee) w h ile also serv in g as a m eans for m a k in g his fe l­

lo w citizen s aware o f a d ifferent k in d o f ig n o r a n c e that th ey th em selves possess:

O Socrates! I f w it h k ettled ru m s and tru m p ets y o u h ad p ro cla im ed y o u r s e lf to b e th e o n e w h o k n e w th e m o st, th e S op h ists w o u ld s o o n h ave b e e n fin ­ ish ed w it h y o u . N o , y o u w er e the ignorant one [den Uvidende]; b u t in a d d itio n y o u had th e c o n fo u n d e d ch aracteristic that y o u c o u ld m ak e it m a n ifest (also

b y m ean s o f b e in g y o u r s e lf th e ig n o ra n t o n e) that th e o th ers k n e w ev e n less than y o u — th e y d id n o t e v e n k n o w that th e y w er e ig n o ra n t (M 3 4 2 ; S V t 14, 3 5 3 , italics m in e; trans. m o d ifie d ).

B y lik e n in g his stance o f so m e o n e w h o refuses to call h im s e lf a C hristian to Socrates’ p o sitio n , Kierkegaard suggests that h e shares w ith Socrates the ability to m ake p e o p le aware o f a m ore sham eful or disgraceful fo r m o f ign oran ce (cf. A p . 29b ), an ign oran ce that can o n ly b e cou n teracted th rou gh a greater a tten tion to and cu ltivation o f th e self. T h e c h ie f result o f interactin g w ith eith er a Socrates or a K ierkegaard is that an in terlo cu to r co m es to see that she has b e e n self-co m p la cen t, th in k in g she k n o w s things she is n o t able to d efen d u nd er ex a m in a tio n or th in k in g she lives a certain w ay that d oes n o t in fact square w ith her actual life. To b e in such a c o n d i­

tio n is ch aracterized by self-n e g le ct and a lack o f true in tellectu al cu rio si­

ty, for i f o n e thinks o n e is liv in g as o n e im agin es th en n o d eep er se lf-e x a m ­ in ation is d e e m e d necessary, and i f o n e thinks o n e k n o w s all ab ou t a sub­

je c t th en o n e feels n o n e e d to lo o k in to it in a m o re searching way. W h ile Socrates’ c o n c e r n w ith w h a t a p erson k n o w s m ig h t o n th e face o f it seem to b e o f a different order than K ierkegaard’s c o n c e r n w ith w h e th e r a p er­

son lives as a C hristian, th e p rincipal focu s o f b o th o f th e m is w h a t w e m ig h t call th e practical sphere o f h u m an life, th e sphere o f ethics and reli­

g io n , w h er e an in d ivid u al’s grasp o f a g iv en ethical or religiou s c o n c e p t is in h eren tly tied to w h e th e r or n o t it plays an appropriate role in th e life she leads.29 Like Socrates, Kierkegaard focuses in particular o n th e te n d e n c y p e o p le have to lo se track o f th e fu n dam ental c o n n e c tio n b e tw e e n k n o w ­ in g w h at virtu e is or w h a t it is to b e a C hristian and actually liv in g a vir­

tu ou s life or liv in g an au th en tic C hristian life.30

T h e dangers associated w ith S ocrates’ b e in g a gadfly in c lu d e th e te n ­ d en cy o f oth er p e o p le to g ro w angry w ith h im as w e ll as an u n w illin g n ess to take h im at his w ord w h e n h e claim s that h e h im se lf is ignorant ab out w h a t h e can sh o w that th e others o n ly th in k th ey k now . In th e A pology h e says that it is n o t u n c o m m o n for his in terlocu tors to g ro w angry in response to h avin g b e e n refuted b y h im and for th e m and th e larger audi­

en c e to assum e that h e m ust k now , desp ite his claim s o f ign oran ce, w h a t h e has sh o w n that th ey d o n o t k n ow :

A s a result o f this in v estig a tio n , g e n tle m e n o f th e jury, I acq u ired m u c h u n p op u larity, o f a k in d that is hard to d eal w ith and is a h ea v y burden; m a n y slanders ca m e fro m th ese p e o p le an d a rep u ta tio n fo r w is d o m , for in ea ch

case th e b ystanders th o u g h t that I m y s e lf p o ssessed th e w is d o m that I p roved that m y in te r lo c u to r d id n o t h ave.31

T h e characteristic ways p e o p le have o f resp on d in g to S ocrates’ p rofession o f ign oran ce have also, accord in g to Kierkegaard, applied w ith respect to his denial that h e is a C hristian. H e claim s that h e o ften faces th e sam e k in d o f anger, to g e th er w ith a co rresp o n d in g p resu m p tion ab ou t his o w n C h ris­

tian status. B u t h e is q u ick to d en y that it in any w ay fo llo w s from his hav­

in g an ability to m ake oth ers aware that th ey are n o t C hristians that h e h im se lf is a C hristian:

B u t as it w e n t w ith y o u [Socrates] (a cco rd in g to w h a t y o u say in y o u r

“d efen se,” as y o u iro n ica lly e n o u g h have called th e c r u d e s t satire o n a c o n ­ tem p o ra ry age)— n a m e ly that y o u m a d e m a n y e n e m ie s fo r y o u r s e lf b y m a k in g it m a n ifest that th e oth ers w er e ig n o ra n t and that th e o th ers h e ld a g ru d g e against y o u o u t o f en v y sin ce th e y a ssu m ed that y o u y o u r s e lf m u st b e w h a t y o u c o u ld s h o w that th e y w er e n o t— so has it also g o n e w it h m e.

T h a t I can m ak e it m a n ifest that th e o th ers are ev e n less C h ristia n th an I has g iv e n rise to in d ig n a tio n against m e; I w h o n ev erth eless am so en g a g e d w ith C h ristia n ity that I tru ly p erc eiv e and a c k n o w le d g e that I am n o t a C h ristian . S o m e w a n t to fo ist o n m e that m y sayin g that I am n o t a C h r is­

tian is o n ly a h id d e n fo r m o f p rid e, that I p resu m ab ly m u st b e w h a t I can s h o w that th e oth ers are n o t. B u t this is a m isu n d ersta n d in g ; it is a lto g e th ­ er true: I am n o t a C h ristian . A n d it is rash to c o n c lu d e fro m th e fact that I can s h o w that th e oth ers are n o t C h ristian s that th erefo re I m y s e lf m u st b e o n e , ju st as rash as to c o n c lu d e , fo r ex a m p le, that s o m e o n e w h o is o n e - fo u rth o f a fo o t taller th an o th e r p e o p le is, ergo, tw e lv e fe e t tall (M 3 4 2 - 34 3 ; S V 1 14, 3 5 3 , trans. m o d ifie d ).

Part o f th e d ifficu lty in taking seriou sly S ocrates’ ign oran ce or K ierkegaard’s denial that h e is a C hristian is an u n w illin g n ess to accep t th e idea that so m e o n e in that c o n d itio n c o u ld neverth eless b e a skilled diag­

n ostician and able con versation partner. W e fin d it hard to b eliev e that Socrates co u ld understand his in terlocu tors as w e ll as h e seem s to b e able to (seem in gly b e in g acq u ain ted w ith all th e different form s that th eir ig n o ­ rance can take) w h ile rem ain in g h im s e lf ignorant ab ou t th e subject in q u es­

tion . Similarly, co u ld Kierkegaard really b e as g o o d at d ep ic tin g th e various ways that a p erson can fall short o f b e in g a C hristian w h ile c o n tin u in g to th ink she is a C hristian i f h e w ere n o t h im s e lf that very thing? B u t this is

to und erestim ate th e p o w er o f se lf-k n o w le d g e . For Socrates and Kierkegaard to b e g o o d at d ia g n o sin g and treating different sp ecies o f that m ore disgraceful k in d o f ig n o ra n ce w h a t is required first and fo rem o st is that th ey have b e c o m e acq u ain ted in th eir o w n case w ith th e p h e n o m e n o n at issue, th e te n d e n c y o f a p erson to a k in d o f self-satisfaction w h er e she im agin es she k n o w s m ore than she d oes. T h is te n d e n c y is a c o n d itio n she is p ron e to that she n eed s to discover and— th rou gh self-ex a m in a tio n and self-scru tin y— learn to regulate and con trol. W h ile it is clearly true that a Socrates or a Kierkegaard w ill n o t m ake an effective con versation partner i f h e can n ot discuss w ith so m e p recision w h atever it is h e suspects that his in terlo cu to r o n ly thinks she k n o w s, th e c h ie f q ualification is that h e b e per­

sonally acq u ain ted w ith th e activity o f forever b e in g o n th e lo o k o u t for any such te n d e n c y in his o w n case. In fact, h e m ust h im s e lf b e an acco m p lish ed m aster o f this activity (he m ust u p h o ld th e D e lp h ic in ju n ctio n to k n o w thyself) i f h e is to b e able to help others to m ake sim ilar d iscoveries ab out th em selves and to in trod u ce th e m in to th e rigors o f a life that seeks to avoid that m ore disgraceful k in d o f ign oran ce in all its various m anifestations.

I suspect that a further reason that w e m ay fin d it difficult to take seri­

ou sly Socrates’ ig n oran ce is that it d oes n o t see m to sit w e ll w ith ou r idea o f h im as a p h ilosop h er. W h ile w e m ay certain ly applaud th e m an n er in w h ic h h e helps others to o v er co m e th eir m o re disgraceful c o n d itio n o f ign oran ce, th e fact rem ains that Socrates still seem s to fall sh ort o f a certain p h ilo so p h ica l ideal. T h e im age w e g et o f h im in m an y o f P la to ’s d ialogues is o f so m e o n e w h o is always ap proach in g k n o w le d g e , perhaps gain in g greater and greater c o n v ic tio n ab ou t w h a t h e hold s to b e th e case b u t n ever actually arriving at k n o w le d g e itself.32 T h is p ictu re o f Socrates (u p h eld b o th by P lato and A ristotle and m o st o f th e p h ilo so p h ica l tradition sin ce th em , in c lu d in g H e g e l and th e early K ierkegaard o f The Concept o f Irony) tends to co n ce p tu a lize his p h ilo so p h ica l activity as b e in g o n ly a part o f a larger en terprise, as itse lf in c o m p le te or prelim inary in nature.33 W h ile S ocrates’

m e th o d o f en g a g in g his in terlocu tors m ay h elp cleanse th e m o f m isc o n ­ cep tion s or rem ove a certain k in d o f self-satisfaction that stands in th e w ay o f a proper p h ilo so p h ica l e n g a g em en t o f a g iv en to p ic, o n c e Socrates has d o n e w h a t h e d oes w e ll (so th e story goes) th en o th er m e th o d s are required i f w e are actually to gain w h a t h e has sh o w n his in terlocu tors to lack.

T h o u g h Kierkegaard seem s to en d orse a version o f this p ictu re in his dis­

sertation, as his c o n c e p tio n o f Socrates d evelop s in his later w ritin g s h e m ore and m ore v e h e m e n tly co m e s to reject this p ictu re and instead m ain ­ tains that Socrates’ p h ilo so p h ica l activity is n o t a m ere p recursor to so m e ­

th in g else b ut itse lf th e h u m an ideal (the best ethical and religiou s life avail­

able o u tsid e o f C hristian ity). Socrates’ life as a p h ilo so p h er is thus h eld by Kierkegaard to b e h u m an ly co m p lete, and o u g h t in his v ie w to m ake a claim o n us and to serve as a m o d e l that w e can em ulate in ou r o w n lives.

S ocrates’ activity o f ex a m in in g and refuting, forever o n the lo o k o u t for fur­

ther instances o f a p erso n ’s th in k in g she k n o w s w h a t she d oes n o t, b e c o m e s a life -lo n g , ever vigilan t task that h e invites each o f us to take part in; a task that a p erson w ill n ever finish, for th e m o m e n t she b eg in s to im a g in e that she has fin ish ed w ith such self-ex a m in a tio n and self-scru tin y is th e very m o m e n t w h e n she m ay b e g in to th in k she k n o w s so m e th in g she d oes n o t.34 To m otivate this pictu re o f Socrates, Kierkegaard appeals to th e religiou s significance that Socrates attaches to his activity as a gadfly in A th en s. In th e face o f th e repu tation for w isd o m that h e has acquired over th e years, Socrates u p h old s his stance o f ign oran ce and insists that it really is th e case that h e lacks k n o w le d g e o f th e very things h e tests others about. B u t this w o u ld th en see m to leave us exactly w h er e Socrates fo u n d h im s e lf u p o n first h earin g o f th e oracle’s claim that n o o n e was w iser.35 H o w can it truly b e the case that Socrates is b o th ignorant (as h e insists) and th e w isest a m o n g h u m an beings? R e c a ll that in th e A pology Socrates offers us a w ay o u t o f this apparent b in d and, in th e process, exh ibits th e very m o d esty that is o ften associated w ith his stance o f ignorance:

W h a t is prob able, g e n tle m e n , is that in fact th e g o d is w is e an d that his o rac­

ular resp on se m ea n t that h u m a n w is d o m is w o r th little o r n o th in g , and that w h e n h e says this m a n , Socrates, h e is u sin g m y n a m e as an ex a m p le, as i f h e said: “ T h is m a n a m o n g y o u , m ortals, is w ise st w h o , lik e Socrates, u n d er­

stands that his w is d o m is w o rth less.”36

T h e claim that h u m an w is d o m is w o r th “little or n o th in g ” can strike p e o ­ ple in q uite different ways. In th e traditional pictu re o f Socrates (in w h ic h h e battles th e Sophists, destroyin g sophistry to m ake r o o m for p hilosoph y, th o u g h h im se lf rem ain in g o n ly a p relim inary step in its d e v e lo p m e n t), o n e m ig h t b e in c lin ed to restrict this claim ab out h u m an w isd o m to p r e -p h ilo - sophical form s o f w isd o m . As p h ilo so p h y d evelop s and b e c o m e s ever m ore sophisticated, a w isd o m b e c o m e s p ossible that n o lo n g e r is “little or n o th ­ in g ” b ut rather approaches th e w isd o m Socrates reserves for th e g o d . In his later w ritin gs o n Socrates Kierkegaard rejects this reading and instead takes it to b e th e case that Socrates m eans to draw a strict lin e between th e h u m an and th e d ivin e, and to grou n d claim s o f h u m an w isd o m in an in d ivid u al’s

ability to rem ain aware o f that d istin ctio n .37 O n this p ictu re th e differen ce b e tw e e n a w ise h u m an b e in g and an ign oran t o n e is that th e w ise p erson rem ains aware o f her ign oran ce in relation to th e w is d o m o f th e god; the task is to d evelop o n e s e lf w h ile m ain tain in g this awareness, thereby at the sam e tim e d ev elo p in g a proper relationship to th e g o d . For Kierkegaard, th en , Socrates is to b e taken at his w o rd w h e n h e says that h u m an w isd o m is w o r th little or n o th in g . H e d oes n o t th in k that S ocrates’ p ractice o f p h i­

lo so p h y is m ean t to b e g in w ith this little or n o th in g and in crem en tally try to b rin g it as clo se as p ossible to w h a t o n ly th e g o d truly possesses. R ath er, it is to en gage in a task o f self-ex a m in a tio n and self-scru tin y o f th e sort that helps a p erson to fortify h erse lf against th e ever prevalent te n d e n c y to th in k she k n o w s things she d oes not; that is, against th e te n d e n c y to lo se track o f th e differen ce b e tw e e n th e h u m an and th e d ivin e. For K ierkegaard, Socrates’life as a p h ilo so p h er em b o d ies a rigorous task o f ethical self-e x a m ­ in ation that expresses in its h u m an m o d esty a d eep ly religiou s c o m m it­

m en t. Socrates’ ign oran ce is th e p o in t from w h ic h a p erson shall n o t b e m o v e d , n o t th e p o in t from w h ic h a better, m o re d e v e lo p e d p h ilo so p h y can b e g in to em erg e .38

As Kierkegaard d evelop s th e parallel b e tw e e n h im s e lf and Socrates, it b e c o m e s clear ju st h o w significant Socrates is for h im personally. O n e o f th e ways this m anifests itse lf stem s from his claim that h e stands alone w ith ­ in th e C hristian tradition. W h ile u n d erlin in g y et again that h e thinks that

“in C h r iste n d o m ’s e ig h te e n h u n d red years there is ab solu tely n o th in g com parable, n o th in g an alogou s to [his] task,” h e n o tes that there are certain burdens associated w ith o c c u p y in g such a u n iq u e p osition :

I k n o w w h a t it has co st, w h a t I h ave suffered, w h ic h can b e ex p ressed b y a sin g le line: I w as n ev er lik e th e o th ers [de Andre]. A h , o f all th e to r m e n ts in y o u th fu l days, th e m o st dreadful, th e m o st in ten se: n o t to b e lik e th e o th ­ ers, n ev er to liv e any day w it h o u t p a in fu lly b e in g r e m in d e d that o n e is n o t lik e th e o th ers, n ev er to b e able to ru n w it h th e cro w d , th e d esire and th e j o y o f y o u th , n ev er free to b e able to a b a n d o n o n e se lf, alw ays, as s o o n as o n e w o u ld risk it, to b e p a in fu lly r e m in d ed o f th e ch a in , th e se g re g a tio n o f sin ­ gu la rity that, to th e p o in t o f despair, p a in fu lly separates a p ers o n fro m e v e r y th in g that is called h u m a n life an d ch eerfu ln ess an d g la d n e ss__ W ith th e years, this p ain d o es d ecrease m o r e and m ore; for as o n e b e c o m e s m o re an d m o re sp iritu ally d e v e lo p e d [Aand], it is n o lo n g e r p ain fu l that o n e is n o t lik e th e oth ers. T o b e sp iritu ally d e v e lo p e d is p recisely: n o t to b e lik e th e o th ers (M 3 4 4 ; S V t 14, 3 5 5 , trans. m o d ifie d ).

W ith such real isolation and heartfelt lon elin ess in view , Kierkegaard s claim that Socrates o c c u p ie d an analogous p o sitio n b e c o m e s all th e m ore p o ig n a n t since this in effect ensures that there is at least o n e p erson w h o w o u ld b e in a p o sitio n to understand th e difficulties o f his task. Early o n in

“M y Task,” ju st after h e claim s that Socrates provides his o n ly analogy, Kierkegaard turns and o p e n ly addresses him :

Y ou , a n tiq u ity ’s n o b le sim p le so u l, y o u th e o n ly human being I a d m ir in g ly a c k n o w le d g e as a thin ker: th ere is o n ly a little p reserved a b o u t y o u , o f all p e o p le th e o n ly tru e m artyr o f in tellectu a lity , ju st as great qua ch aracter as qua thin ker; b u t h o w e x c e e d in g ly m u c h this little is! H o w I lo n g , far fro m th o se b attalion s o f th in k ers that “ C h r is te n d o m ” p laces in th e field u n d er th e n a m e o f C h ristia n th in k e r s ... h o w I lo n g to b e able to speak— i f o n ly for h a lf an h o u r — w it h you ! (M 3 4 1 ; S V t 14, 3 5 2 , trans. m o d ifie d )

In this w ay Socrates b e c o m e s a k in d o f in n er co m p a n io n for K ierkegaard, s o m e o n e to w h o m h e can co n fid e and w h o s e exam p le h e can draw u p o n in his darker, lo n e lie r m o m en ts, or in th ose m o m en ts perhaps w h e n h e feels least u n d er sto o d b y his co n tem p o ra ries.39

IV. Kierkegaard as W riter and T h in ker

In ad d ition to ch aracterizing his con tem p orary situ ation and his response to that situ ation in term s o f th e fou r m ain figures w e have b e e n discussing thus far (the pastors and th eo lo g ia n s, th e public, th e C h ristian G o d o f Love, and h im se lf qua Socratic figure), Kierkegaard m akes clear in “M y Task” that h e also co n ce iv es o f h im se lf as p layin g a role an alogou s to that o f Plato th e w riter and thinker. Just as Kierkegaard often d epicts (and takes part in) Socratic exch an ges w ith in his texts, so also in his capacity as a w r iter d oes h e freq uently en gage in a con versation w ith th e ind ividu al readers o f th ese texts, usually addressing th e m in th e singular as “m y dear reader” (M 345;

S V t 14, 3 5 6 ). T h o u g h th e ind ividu al reader is freq uently in v ited by Kierkegaard to apply w h a t has b e e n en acted in a g iv en w o r k to her o w n life (as a reader o f o n e o f P lato s dialogues m ig h t c o m e to ex a m in e h erse lf m ore closely in th e lig h t o f certain exch an ges that P lato has portrayed b e tw e e n Socrates and a g iv en in terlocu tor), there are also cases w ith in K ierkegaards corpu s w h er e h e engages th e reader qua reader, see k in g to instruct her o n h o w to read his texts. K ierkegaard’s activity in this case is akin to Socrates’ attem p t to in fo rm his ju r y ab out his p ractice as a p h ilo so ­

pher, and seeks to p rovide his reader w ith a m ore general u n d erstand in g o f his overall p o in t o f v ie w and h o w he, th e w r iter and thinker, thinks that his b o o k s sh ou ld b e read. O b v io u sly th e m ere fact that K ierkegaard claim s that his b o o k s m ean thus and so, or that th ey o u g h t to b e read in th e lig h t o f such and su ch , etc., d oes n o t guarantee that h e is rig h t.40 T h e p r o o f lies in h o w illu m in a tin g w e find such o r ie n tin g remarks to be. D o th ey reveal to us ways o f approaching his texts that m ake th o se texts in terestin g to read, and d o th ey h elp us to discern patterns o f argu m ent and literary n u an ce that w e oth er w ise m ig h t n o t properly appreciate?

T h e m ain aim o f “M y Task” is to p rovid e us w ith a p o in t o f v ie w from w h ic h , acco rd in g to K ierkegaard, his activities as a w r ite r and th ink er b e c o m e in tellig ib le. As sh o u ld have b e c o m e clear b y n o w that p o in t o f v ie w m ig h t b e called a Socratic p o in t o f view , and it rem ains K ierkegaard’s c h ie f c o n te n tio n that Socrates is th e o n e in d ivid u al p rior to h im w h o s e activity sheds any lig h t o n his task. B y m a k in g su ch p r o n o u n c e m e n ts K ierkegaard in effect presents h im s e lf as th e b est q u alified p erso n to offer a critical a c c o u n t o f his authorship, and suggests that i f y o u w an t to b e c o m e a g o o d reader o f his texts th en y o u sh o u ld lo o k to h im and remarks o f this sort for h elp .41 H is claim to b e th e “ o n e sin gle p erso n w h o is q ualified to g iv e a true critiq u e o f [his] w o r k ” partly rests o n his b e lie f that n o n e o f his co n tem p o ra ries has p rop erly appreciated his en d eavor (M 343; S V 1 14, 3 5 3 ). H e co n te n d s that “ there is n o t o n e sin gle c o n te m p o ­ rary w h o is q ualified to r e v iew [his] w o r k ” and argues that ev en th o se w h o sit d o w n and try to offer a m o re d etailed analysis o n ly arrive at th e m o st superficial o f readings:

E v e n i f s o m e o n e co n sid era b ly b ette r in fo r m e d takes it u p o n h im s e lf to w a n t to say s o m e th in g a b o u t m e an d m y task, it actu ally d o es n o t a m o u n t to a n y th in g m o r e than that h e, after a su p erficial g la n ce at m y w o r k , q u ic k ­ ly find s s o m e earlier s o m e th in g or o th e r that h e declares to b e com p arab le.

In this w a y it still d o es n o t a m o u n t to a n y th in g . S o m e th in g o n w h ic h a p ers o n w it h m y leisu re, m y d ilig e n c e , m y talen ts, m y e d u c a t io n .. .has sp en t n o t o n ly fo u r te e n years b u t essen tially his en tire life, th e o n ly th in g for w h ic h h e has liv ed and b reath ed — th e n that s o m e pastor, at m o st a p ro fes­

sor, w o u ld n o t n e e d m o re th an a su perficial g la n ce at it in o rd er to evalu ­ ate it, that is su rely absurd (M 3 4 3 - 3 4 4 ; S V t 14, 3 5 4 , trans. m o d ifie d ).

In th e face o f all th e pastors and th eo lo g ia n s w h o claim to fin d all sorts o f things that are an alogou s to his task, K ierkegaard declares that “ a m o re care-

fui in sp e c tio n ” b y th e m w o u ld reveal that there is n o th in g analogou s w ith ­ in C h ristian ity— and th en adds, “b u t this is w h a t [they do] n o t fin d w o r th th e trou b le”

(Af

K ierkegaard w ants us to b e b etter readers than h e thinks his c o n te m ­ poraries have b e e n , to take th e troub le to giv e his w o r k that “ m o re care­

ful in s p e c tio n ” h e claim s it requires; and h e en cou rages us to carry o u t this activity in th e lig h t o f his su g g estio n that his task is a S ocratic task. B u t this is n o t to say that w e sh o u ld e x p e c t su ch an in sp e c tio n to b e an easy o n e.

I f K ierkegaard is rig h t and n o n e o f his co n tem p o ra ries has u n d er sto o d h im and his task, w h y sh o u ld w e th in k that it w ill necessarily fare any b etter in ou r o w n case? K ierkegaard is a strange, so m e w h a t h yb rid figure. H e pres­

ents h im s e lf as a Socrates, s o m e o n e sk illed in th e art o f in d ir e c tio n and so see m in g ly forever elusive; and y et h e dem an d s that w e try to understand h im and offers us to o ls to assist us in ou r attem pt. A n y o n e w h o em barks o n su ch an en terp rise sh o u ld b e w a rn ed up front that she is repeated ly lik ely to e n c o u n te r m o m e n ts o f se e m in g clarity and a k in d o f shared in tim a cy w ith K ierkegaard (this m o st p erson al o f p h ilo so p h er s), fo llo w e d by m o m e n ts o f utter in c o m p r e h e n sio n and th e a n x ie ty that h e is far to o p ro fo u n d a character for ou r m o re lim ite d sen sibilities. T ryin g to b rin g K ierkegaard in to focu s can o ften see m akin to w h a t it is like w h e n o n e en co u n ter s iron y in a te x t or m eets face to face w ith an ironist h er­

self:

Just as iro n y has s o m e th in g d e ter rin g a b o u t it, it lik e w ise has s o m e th in g extraord in arily se d u ctiv e an d fa scin a tin g a b o u t it. Its m a sq u era d in g and m y sterio u sn ess, th e teleg ra p h ic c o m m u n ic a tio n it p rom p ts b eca u se an iro ­ nist always has to b e u n d e r s to o d at a d istan ce, th e in fin ite sy m p a th y it p re­

su p p oses, th e fle e tin g b u t in d escrib a b le in stant o f u n d ersta n d in g that is im m e d ia te ly su p ersed ed b y th e a n x ie ty o f m isu n d ersta n d in g — all this h o ld s o n e p riso n er in in ex trica b le b o n d s ( C l 4 8 -4 9 ; S K S 1 , 1 0 9 ) . 42

S o m etim es w e w ill feel certain w e have g o tte n h o ld o f Kierkegaard, o n ly in the n e x t m o m e n t to have th e fam iliar e x p e r ie n c e o f h avin g h im slip away y et again. D e sp ite th ese difficulties, I rem ain c o n v in c e d that there is m u ch to b e gain ed from taking Kierkegaard up o n his su g g estio n that w e v ie w his activity as a w r iter and thinker as a Socratic task. R ead ers o f “M y Task” w h o share m y c o n v ic tio n w ill b e aware, h ow ever, that I have b e e n op eratin g at a fairly general level o f d escrip tion in this paper. Kierkegaard s m ain claim is that th e refusal to call h im se lf a C h ristian is an alogou s to

Socrates’ stance o f ign oran ce. H e claim s that so ad op ted , this stance gives h im th e ability to m ake his fe llo w citizen s aware o f a d eep er sense in w h ic h th ey are n o t C hristians, w h ile also a llo w in g h im at th e sam e tim e to pur­

sue an au th en tic ethical and religiou s life.

W ith K ierkegaard’s Socratic p o in t o f v ie w n o w h o p e fu lly b efore us, the n e x t natural step w o u ld b e to turn to o th er texts in th e corpu s in order to con sid er further h o w Kierkegaard c o n ce iv es o f w h a t h e calls his Socratic m e th o d and w h er e in th e corpu s w e sh o u ld lo o k i f w e w a n t to discover co n crete exam ples o f this m e th o d actually at w ork . B u t that w ill have to w ait for an oth er o c c a sio n .43 L et m e clo se by n o tin g that there is perhaps a to u c h o f irony in K ierkegaard’s su g g estio n that it is o n ly th e activity o f Socrates that sheds any m ean in gfu l lig h t o n his o w n activity. For Socrates, o f all p eo p le , is ab out as en igm atic and elusive a character as w e can find w ith in philosoph y, and is th e very p erson w h o m A lcib iades claim s is utter­

ly unlike any o th er h u m an being:

[Socrates] is u n iq u e; h e is lik e n o o n e else in th e past an d n o o n e in th e p res­

en t— this is b y far th e m o st a m a zin g th in g a b o u t h i m ... .[ H e ] is so bizarre, his w ays and his ideas are so u n u su al, that, search as y o u m ig h t, y o u ’ll n ev er fin d a n y o n e else, alive o r d ead , w h o ’s ev e n r e m o te ly lik e h im .T h e b est y o u can d o is n o t to co m p a re h im to a n y th in g h u m a n , b u t to lik e n h im , as I do, to S ilen u s and th e satyrs__ 44

I f K ierkegaard’s claim bears o u t, th en a proper investigation o f his w ritin gs w ill reveal that A lcib iades was m istaken in his claim ab ou t S ocrates’ u n iq u e ­ ness by o n e person . W h e n investigatin g further K ierkegaard’s claim that Socrates provides his o n ly analogy and that his task is a Socratic task, it ’s w o r th k eep in g in m in d that Kierkegaard d ev o te d th e b ulk o f his first m ature w ork , The Concept o f Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates, to d ev elo p in g an a cc o u n t o f w h o h e thinks Socrates is. D e sp ite th e p ro m i­

n e n c e g iv en in th e title to th e c o n c e p t o f irony, K ierkegaard spends nearly three quarters o f his discussion ex a m in in g th e very in d ivid u al h e w ill later m o d e l h im se lf u p o n and tow ard w h o m h e n o w p oin ts u s.45 In this w ay Kierkegaard brings us full circle from his last w ords in “M y Task” to th e first w ords o f his dissertation. H is first true act as a w r iter and th ink er was to stake his claim as th e best interpreter o f Socrates; in th e en d o f his life h e m aintains that i f w e w an t to b e c o m e interpreters o f h im w h o avoid th e superficial readings h e attributes to his con tem p oraries, th en w e sh ou ld take his su ggestion and ex a m in e his w ritin g s in th e lig h t o f Socrates. In

effect Kierkegaard suggests that o n e riddle, th e riddle o f Socrates (w h ic h h e o n c e th o u g h t h e had solved in his dissertation and w h ic h c o n tin u e d to o c c u p y h im th ro u g h o u t his life), is th e k ey to ou r tryin g to solve a se c o n d riddle, th e rid dle o f S øren K ierkegaard.46

N o te s

1. Concluding Unscientific Postscript [CUP], 2 volumes, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992; Søren Kierkegaards Papirer [Pap.], second edition, 16 volumes, ed., Niels Thulstrup and Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Copenhagen, Gyldendal For­

lag, 1968-1978. Cf. JP, 2:1962 (p. 386); Pap. X.4 A 553. All references to Kierkegaard’s published writings are to Kierkegaard’s Writings, 26 volumes, ed., HowardV. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Prince­

ton, Princeton University Press, 1978-2000; all references to Kierkegaards unpublished writings are to Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers [JP], 7 volumes, edited and translated by HowardV. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1967-1978. Citations of the English translation in question are then followed (where available) by the new scholarly edition of Kierkegaard’s writings, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter [SiCS], 55 volumes, ed., Niels Jørgen Cappelørn and others, Copenhagen, Gads Forlag, 1997-; otherwise I cite either Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Værker [SVI], first edition, 14 volumes, ed., A. B. Drachmann and others, Copenhagen, Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag, 1901-1906 or Søren Kierkegaards Papirer.

2. The Moment and Late Writings [M], edited and translated by HowardV. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998.

3. Kierkegaard defended his magister dissertation on September 29,1841. In general, when Kierkegaard discusses his activities as a writer and thinker he excludes from consideration his dissertation and the juvenilia that preceded it (including his first published book, From the Papers of One Still Living, a cri­

tique of Hans Christian Andersen’s Only a Fiddler). While scholars generally mark the beginning of his authorship proper with the publication of Either/Or (February 15, 1843), Kierkegaard makes clear in the text we are considering here that he conceives of what he is calling his task as some­

thing upon which he “has spent not only fourteen years but essentially his entire life” (M 343-344;

SV1 14, 354). If we focus on the first half of this quotation, it appears that Kierkegaard thinks that what he is describing in the fall of 1855 has been going on for fourteen years (which would take us back to the fall of 1841 and to the time when he defended his dissertation). For Kierkegaard, as with many graduate students, the completion and defense of his dissertation marks both the end of his apprenticeship and the beginning of his mature work.

4. Excluding the many reflections of a critical nature that can be found in Kierkegaard’s journals, the chief examples in Kierkegaard’s corpus of this sort of critical, methodological text include (1) An appendix (entitled “A Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature”) found in the middle of the 1846 pseudonymous work Concluding Unscientific Postscript (CUP 251-300; SKS 7, 228-273), in which the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus discusses all of the previous works that have been published (those by the other pseudonymous authors, his own earlier book Philosophical Frag­

ments, and works that appeared under Kierkegaard’s own name) and that Kierkegaard calls “a section with which [he] would ask the reader to become familiar” (The Point of Viewfor My Work as An Author [PV], edited and translated by HowardV. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton, Princeton Universi­

ty Press, 1998, 31; S VI 13, 523); (2) a short document entitled “A First and Last Explanation” that Kierkegaard attached without page numbers to the end of the Postscript, where he acknowledged for the first time that he was the creator of the various pseudonymous authors and their respective books (CUP 625-630; SKS 7 ,569-573); (3) The Point of View, written in 1848 but not published until after Kierkegaard’s death, and the most substantial of this group of texts; (4) On My Work as an Author (PV