This section assesses the robustness of the results for smaller bandwidths for the forcing vari-able, ℎ𝑧, and for different bandwidths for the baseline covariates used in the Frölich estimator. The results obtained in the previous section for out-migration effects, labour-market participation and income are quite robust to different bandwidths. Table 6.1 presents the out-migration effects for smaller bandwidths of the forcing variable. The results suggest that out-migration effects in the 2000 period are slightly lower than those obtained with longer bandwidths. However, the total out-migration effects in the 2001 period are quite similar to those obtained with ℎ𝑧=60.
Table 6.2 presents point estimates for the enforcement effects on labour outcomes for different bandwidths ℎ𝑧. The results suggest that most of the parameters are quite robust to different ℎ𝑧, with the exception of the lock-in effects regarding ATP payment. In this case, es-timated 𝜏0 for this outcome increases with bandwidth from -139 when ℎ𝑧= 40 to -127 when ℎ𝑧= 60. However, when considering that ATP payment corresponding to annual full em-ployment is DKK 2,683, we do not find this to be a major difference. The results for other pa-rameters and for income effects are much more robust, confirming the conclusions reached in the preceding section.
Table 6.3 considers the sensitivity of the results to different bandwidths for the baseline covariates used by the pooled Frölich estimator. Again estimated 𝜏0 seems to change with dif-ferent bandwidths to a major extent compared to the other parameters. However, the differ-ences still cannot be considered big enough to raise any doubt about our identification and estimation strategies.
Table 6.1 Estimates of enforcement effects on out-migration for different bandwidths 𝒉𝒛
𝑆𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝑖𝑡|𝑆𝑖𝑡−1= 1
ℎ𝑧 𝜓2000 𝜓2001 𝜓2002 𝜓2003 𝜓2004 𝜓2005 𝜓2006 𝜓2007 𝜋2000 𝜋2001 𝜋2002 𝜋2003 𝜋2004 𝜋2005 𝜋2006 𝜋2007
40 -0.030 -0.055 -0.038 -0.049 -0.036 -0.034 -0.035 -0.008 -0.030 -0.026 0.017 -0.015 0.014 0.003 -0.001 0.028 (0.030) (0.036) (0.040) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.048) (0.030) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017) 41 -0.027 -0.053 -0.031 -0.043 -0.032 -0.031 -0.035 -0.011 -0.027 -0.028 0.022 -0.016 0.012 0.002 -0.003 0.024 (0.030) (0.035) (0.039) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.047) (0.030) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.004) (0.016) (0.016) 42 -0.028 -0.060 -0.034 -0.047 -0.037 -0.031 -0.035 -0.014 -0.028 -0.034 0.027 -0.016 0.010 0.007 -0.004 0.021 (0.029) (0.035)* (0.039) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.047) (0.029) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) 43 -0.030 -0.061 -0.036 -0.048 -0.038 -0.034 -0.038 -0.018 -0.030 -0.034 0.026 -0.016 0.010 0.006 -0.004 0.020 (0.028) (0.034)* (0.038) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.028) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.007) (0.016) (0.015) 44 -0.031 -0.061 -0.037 -0.049 -0.039 -0.036 -0.045 -0.025 -0.031 -0.033 0.025 -0.016 0.010 0.004 -0.010 0.020 (0.028) (0.034)* (0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.028) (0.021) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.017) (0.015) 45 -0.030 -0.060 -0.030 -0.046 -0.039 -0.037 -0.047 -0.029 -0.030 -0.031 0.030 -0.020 0.006 0.003 -0.011 0.018 (0.027) (0.033)* (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) 46 -0.032 -0.062 -0.034 -0.054 -0.048 -0.047 -0.056 -0.042 -0.032 -0.032 0.028 -0.025 0.005 0.002 -0.010 0.013 (0.027) (0.032)* (0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.045) (0.027) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) 47 -0.038 -0.067 -0.040 -0.060 -0.053 -0.052 -0.061 -0.047 -0.033 -0.032 0.027 -0.025 0.006 0.001 -0.010 0.013 (0.027) (0.032)** (0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.045) (0.027) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.005) (0.016) (0.014) 48 -0.034 -0.061 -0.035 -0.055 -0.049 -0.050 -0.058 -0.046 -0.034 -0.028 0.026 -0.024 0.005 0.000 -0.010 0.011 (0.027) (0.033)* (0.037) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.045) (0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.005) (0.016) (0.014) 49 -0.033 -0.057 -0.032 -0.050 -0.043 -0.044 -0.053 -0.038 -0.034 -0.025 0.025 -0.022 0.007 0.000 -0.010 0.013 (0.027) (0.033)* (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044) (0.026) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.005) (0.016) (0.014) 50 -0.036 -0.059 -0.035 -0.054 -0.048 -0.050 -0.058 -0.046 -0.036 -0.024 0.023 -0.023 0.005 -0.002 -0.009 0.011 (0.026) (0.032)* (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043) (0.026) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.005) (0.016) (0.013) 51 -0.036 -0.057 -0.035 -0.052 -0.045 -0.048 -0.051 -0.039 -0.036 -0.023 0.023 -0.021 0.006 -0.003 -0.002 0.011 (0.025) (0.031)* (0.035) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.043) (0.025) (0.020) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.017) (0.013) 52 -0.036 -0.060 -0.038 -0.054 -0.047 -0.050 -0.053 -0.041 -0.036 -0.026 0.022 -0.020 0.006 -0.004 -0.002 0.011 (0.025) (0.031)** (0.034) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.042) (0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.004) (0.016) (0.013) 53 -0.037 -0.058 -0.037 -0.053 -0.047 -0.051 -0.054 -0.042 -0.037 -0.022 0.021 -0.020 0.005 -0.004 -0.003 0.011
𝑆𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝑖𝑡|𝑆𝑖𝑡−1= 1
ℎ𝑧 𝜓2000 𝜓2001 𝜓2002 𝜓2003 𝜓2004 𝜓2005 𝜓2006 𝜓2007 𝜋2000 𝜋2001 𝜋2002 𝜋2003 𝜋2004 𝜋2005 𝜋2006 𝜋2007
(0.024) (0.030)** (0.034) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.024) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.004) (0.016) (0.013) 54 -0.038 -0.057 -0.037 -0.053 -0.047 -0.051 -0.054 -0.043 -0.038 -0.020 0.020 -0.019 0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.010 (0.024) (0.030)* (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.024) (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.004) (0.016) (0.013) 55 -0.039 -0.058 -0.039 -0.050 -0.044 -0.049 -0.053 -0.042 -0.039 -0.021 0.019 -0.014 0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.010 (0.024)* (0.030)** (0.033) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.023)* (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.004) (0.016) (0.013) 56 -0.038 -0.057 -0.038 -0.050 -0.047 -0.052 -0.055 -0.045 -0.039 -0.020 0.019 -0.014 0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.009 (0.023)* (0.029)* (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.023)* (0.020) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.004) (0.015) (0.013) 57 -0.039 -0.061 -0.043 -0.054 -0.052 -0.057 -0.061 -0.051 -0.039 -0.024 0.018 -0.015 0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.009 (0.023)* (0.029)** (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.023)* (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.005) (0.015) (0.012) 58 -0.034 -0.056 -0.039 -0.050 -0.047 -0.055 -0.059 -0.050 -0.034 -0.024 0.018 -0.014 0.002 -0.009 -0.003 0.008 (0.023) (0.029)* (0.033) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.023) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.005)* (0.015) (0.012) 59 -0.034 -0.060 -0.042 -0.053 -0.051 -0.059 -0.059 -0.050 -0.034 -0.027 0.017 -0.014 0.002 -0.009 0.001 0.008 (0.023) (0.029)** (0.032) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.023) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.005)* (0.016) (0.012) 60 -0.038 -0.063 -0.046 -0.057 -0.054 -0.063 -0.061 -0.053 -0.038 -0.026 0.016 -0.014 0.001 -0.009 0.002 0.006 (0.023)* (0.029)** (0.032) (0.034)* (0.036) (0.036)* (0.038) (0.039) (0.023)* (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005)* (0.015) (0.012)
Table 6.2 Point estimates of enforcement effects on labour outcomes for different bandwidths 𝒉𝒛
ATP contribution Taxable income (DKK 2010)
ℎ𝑧 𝜏0 𝜏1 𝜏2 𝜏0 𝜏1 𝜏2
Table 6.3 Point estimates of enforcement effects for different bandwidths 𝒉𝒙
ATP contribution Taxable income (DKK 2010)
ℎ𝑧 ℎ𝑥 𝜏0 𝜏1 𝜏2 𝜏0 𝜏1 𝜏2
7 Conclusion
In 1999 Denmark implemented a very comprehensive introduction programme for all non-western immigrants, where one of the key ingredients was enforced participation in a language programme. Similar integration policies have been adopted in other European countries. Our findings show that the enforcement element of language training has no effect on participation. From an integration policy perspective, this is a rather negative outcome for such an important intervention towards enhancing self-sufficiency of family reunited migrants.
At the same time, enforcement has positive effects on income of family reunited mi-grants. In this case, 8-9 years after migration the cohort that was forced to learn the Danish language had on average an annual taxable income of about DKK 12,000-19,000 higher than the cohort that voluntarily participated in the same programme. These results suggest that family reunited migrants have incentives to adapt to the Danish labour market in order to find a job, but do not expend enough effort to language training, since enforcement increases their long-run earnings.
The fact that enforcement increases out-migration during the last years of the introduc-tion programme and the lower income effects for those individuals who stay in the country suggests that the enforcement mechanism “scares” those individuals who are more likely to obtain higher returns from language acquisition.
The paper has also proposed a panel regression discontinuity design approach that al-lows to estimate more precisely the effects of reduced samples and that alal-lows to control for selective out-migration, two important problems that plague empirical migration studies.
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