Another question is how the incorporation of a human security approach would affect Denmark’s ability to work in coalitions. This demands a closer look at the issues of legal interoperability. Denmark’s increased inclusion of human rights obligations in its
international operations could complicate cooperation with coalition partners, because it often varies a lot which human rights treaties the participating states are parties to, as well as how they interpret their scope of application.342 Multinational operations does not form a common set of legal obligations, and all participating states are still bound by both their individual national and international obligations. In, for example, NATO operations, different
interpretations of extraterritorial applicability of human rights obligations are evident among the alliance partners, and especially between the US and the European states. This affects the legal interoperability, and therefore, also the corporation on the ground.343 Therefore, future research could look into cooperation challenges posed by legal differences between Denmark and its allies, and thereby, add to a deeper understanding of Denmark’s incorporation of a human security approach.
A third question arising in regards to the application of international law to new wars is how to engage non-state actors. Given that much violence in new wars is committed by non-state actors, it is crucial that a human security approach also somehow manages to engage them, if there is to be any serious attempt to protect civilians and end new wars. The examples of armed conflicts, in which non-state actors have or still hold control over large groups of people are many: Boko Haram in Nigeria; ISIS in Syria and Iraq; and the Taliban or Al- Qaeda in Pakistan to Afghanistan.344 However, the lack of compliance with both IHL and HRL by non-state actors is one of the most fundamental problems of international law.
International law is premised on states, and non-state actors cannot accede treaties, why they have they little to no influence on the law-making process, and therefore, might not feel a strong incentive to adhere to the law. The above mentioned actors are actually notoriously known for massive violations of HRL and IHL. Concerning the compliance with IHL, it
342 Marten Zwanenburg, “International humanitarian law interoperability in multinational operations”, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 95, no. 891/892, (2013), 683.
343 Kirby Abbott, “A brief overview of legal interoperability challenges for NATO arising from the interrelationship between IHL and IHRL in light of the European Convention on Human Rights”, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 96, no. 893 (2014), 114.
344 Andrew MacLeod, “Engaging Non-state Armed Groups for Humanitarian Purposes”, Chatham House, 2016, 7 (available at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-04-29-NSAG.pdf).
could be argued that the only remedy is to give non-state actors an incentive to follow the rules, by granting them the same status as states’ armed forces under IHL, i.e. the
combatant’s privilege to fight. The point is that as long as non-state actors are fighting illegally, they might as well use illegal methods. When “organized armed groups face legal liability whether they target soldiers or civilians, they are not provided with incentive to refrain from targeting civilians.”345 For political reasons, the acceptance of non-state actors legitimate right to armed conflict seems unlikely, and other ways to include them in
international law might be more feasible. Organisations like the ‘Geneva Call’ have for the last two decades tried to reach out to non-state actors via their ‘Deed of Commitments’, a pledge non-state actors can make to respect IHL: “the Deed of Commitment process gives armed non-state actors the opportunity to formally express their agreement to abide by humanitarian norms and take ownership of these rule.”346 Such initiatives might help expand knowledge of IHL and raise compliance among non-state actors. Therefore, future research might look into possible ways to address non-state actors’ lack of compliance with
international law, as well as how this could be incorporated in a human security approach.
A fourth question arising is what consequences the application of a human security approach in the Danish military manual would have in regard to cyber warfare. The Danish military manual is only sporadically concerned with cyber warfare, but given that it is an area of armed conflicts that will continue to demand attention from both politicians, scholars and the military, it would be extremely relevant to discuss what role human rights have in relation to cyber operations. The manual introduce cyber warfare in Chapter 3, section 10 as ‘Computer Network Operations’ (CNO), and writes that it can be discussed whether these operations belong to a whole new domain in armed conflicts or if they are just a new method of warfare.347 The manual concludes that CNO is merely a new method, and this is important, because then CNO is also regulated through the existing international law regime. The manual, therefore, does not have a separate section on CNO, but addresses CNO-aspects of the general rules when relevant throughout the manual.348 The Danish military manual also refers to the Tallinn manual, an academic non-binding study on how international law applies
345 David Kretzmer, supra note 88, 44.
346 Geneva Call, “Deed of Commitment” (available at: https://genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of- commitment/).
347 Knudsen (ed.), supra note 12, 80.
348 Ibid.
to cyber operations.349 Further research could, thereby, discuss the application of international law to cyber operations in a human security perspective, including the interplay between IHL and HRL, and how this should be addressed in the Danish military manual.
349 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, Tallin Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, Cambridge University Press, 2013.