In December 2009, the DEA presented a report to the Offshore Safety Council on the health and safety observations made during inspections on offshore installations dur-ing the period from 2005 up to and includdur-ing the third quarter of 2009.
The report “Review of observations from offshore inspections during the period 2005 – 2009” was prepared to assess the supervision strategy and identify whether there are any general health and safety issues common to all installations, the criticality of these issues and what should be given special emphasis in the future. In addition, the DEA wished to clarify whether there is a need to revise the method of supervision that is used, including in particular the relationship between offshore and onshore inspections and the frequency of unannounced inspections. The DEA identified the following points in the analysis underlying the report:
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The types of observations made on fixed offshore installations and mobile offshore units overlap.•
The majority of observations concern the physical conditions on the platform (layout of the workplace, accommodation facilities, etc.).•
A number of these observations have been assessed as safety-critical, i.e. conditions that influence the risk of major accidents or personal injury.•
A relatively high proportion of the observations can be attributed to a lack of con-trol over health and safety risks, i.e. failures in the management systems.•
There have been relatively few observations concerning ergonomic, psychological or biological circumstances, possibly as a result of the focus of the supervision.•
No circumstances have been observed in unannounced inspections that deviate significantly from the observations in announced inspections.•
The number of reportable unintentional hydrocarbon gas releases fell from 22 releases in 2005 to three releases in 2009.The analysis shows that in certain areas it would be appropriate to alter the method of supervision. The work associated with the analysis resulted in the following conclu-sions, which have been endorsed by the Offshore Safety Council:
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The inspections should focus more on the companies’ health and safety manage-ment systems in audits of the onshore organization where the systems are estab-lished and maintained. In addition, the inspections should follow up on the use of the systems offshore.•
For a predetermined period, the supervision should focus on ergonomic, psychologi-cal and biologipsychologi-cal conditions to assess whether the current low number of observa-tions within these areas is representative of the offshore condiobserva-tions.•
The inspections should continue to focus on the companies’ follow-up of unin-tended hydrocarbon gas releases on fixed installations with the aim of preventing such releases.•
The current number of between two and five unannounced inspections per year will be retained, partly in order to document that the conditions observed during an -noun ced inspections are representative, and partly to prevent any myths arising that circumstances only need to be addressed when an inspection has been announced.INSPECTIONS IN 2009
In 2009, the DEA carried out 29 offshore inspections, distributed on 15 inspections of manned production installations, four inspections of unmanned production installa-tions and ten inspecinstalla-tions of mobile units, i.e. drilling rigs and accommodation units.
Five of the inspections of manned production installations were unannounced and were carried out on the Dan B, Halfdan B, Harald, Tyra East and Siri platforms; see box 4.6. The majority of the inspections did not result in the identification of any highly safety-critical conditions.
Box 4.6
Inspection of the Siri platform
During the annual inspection of the Siri platform’s subsurface structure in 2009, cracks were identified in a console supporting a well caisson with a height of around 90 metres, a diameter of 5.3 metres and a weight of 950 tons.
The Siri platform is supported by three legs, which stand on a subsea tank used to store the oil production from the Siri, Nini and Cecilie Fields prior to collection by tanker. The subsea storage tank has a console that acts as an equalization tank and supports a caisson, which contains the wells and risers, among other things. It was in this console that the cracks arose.
Due to the risk of the caisson support structure collapsing, production from Siri, Nini and Cecilie was suspended and the storage tank emptied. In addition, the number of employees on the platform, normally up to 60 people, was reduced to 12 and restrictions were imposed on work in the wellhead area in which the cais-son is located. Furthermore, special emergency procedures were established.
Following a number of further investigations of the structure, DONG E&P was granted a permit to man the platform again, up to the normal manning level. The DEA made the permit subject to the conditions that the risks associated with working and residing on the platform should correspond to those associated with normal operations, and that the evacuation analysis should show that the platform could be evacuated in the event of the caisson support failing.
The DEA also granted a permit for work in the wellhead area, consisting of the installation of further monitoring equipment and preliminary work to secure the caisson. This permit was made conditional on continuous monitoring of the cracks.
The DEA made an unannounced inspection of the Siri platform on 17 November 2009. This inspection was particularly aimed at the monitoring of the caisson, the administration of restrictions on work in the wellhead area and the functionality of the platform emergency procedures.
The inspection identified no critical points in regard to the monitoring and admi-nistration of the guidelines for work in the area or the established emergency procedures.
At the beginning of January 2010, DONG E&P installed temporary support for the console to take the weight of the caisson in the event of the console failing, and production was then resumed. The support structure has a lifespan of between two and 12 years, depending on the load. DONG E&P is continuing its efforts to find a permanent solution for supporting the caisson.
In addition, the DEA made three inspections on shore in connection with development projects, as well as five inspections of the onshore bases of operators and operating companies (see box 4.4) to follow up on the psychological working environment.
Finally, the DEA carried out three inspections of drilling rigs in the Netherlands and Denmark before granting them a permit to operate in the Danish area.
The DEA made three immediate inspections to follow up on work-related accidents in 2009, one on the Energy Endeavour drilling rig and the other two on the Mærsk Resolute drilling rig; see also the section Work-related injuries.
An outline of all inspections in 2009 is available at the DEA’s website, www.ens.dk.
As in previous years, supervision in 2009 focused on work-related accidents, near-miss occurrences, hydrocarbon gas releases, the maintenance of safety-critical equipment and the companies’ management systems. Moreover, the DEA continuously supervises the emergency response system offshore. In this connection, the DEA checks that the persons forming part of the emergency response system have the requisite training for the emergency functions to be performed by them; see box 4.7.
Box 4.7
Emergency training
Persons on board offshore installations must have completed a basic safety train-ing course. The purpose of the course is to enable the participants to attend to their personal safety in case of evacuation or other emergencies, render assistance and first aid, and conduct themselves safely on board an offshore installation in observance of the work and safety culture prevailing at the workplace.
Supplementary training courses are required for certain special emergency func-tions. This applies to:
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Fire team members•
Fire team leaders•
Lifeboat captains, who must be able to launch and navigate the lifeboats in a situation where evacuation by sea is necessary.•
Helicopter Landing Officers (HLOs), who must assist during helicopter takeoff and landing on board the installationAll persons on board installations where there is potential danger or presence of hydrogen sulphide (H2S) must undergo a special H2S course. In the case of the fixed installations, this applies to Gorm, Dagmar and Skjold. Where mobile units are concerned, the course is mandatory for those on board if the drilling rig is operating in, say, an area where there is danger or known presence of H2S.
The North Sea nations are working to harmonize the legal requirements for basic safety training courses and have agreed on mutual recognition of training certi-ficates. Some nations impose further requirements that necessitate taking, say, one or two additional training modules. A Danish basic safety training certificate acquired under Executive Order No. 688 on Emergency Response pursuant to the Offshore Safety Act can therefore also be used in the other North Sea countries.
Maintenance of safety-critical equipment
One of the DEA’s focus areas in connection with inspections is the companies’ main-tenance of safety-critical equipment. The DEA’s supervision aims to ensure that the operating companies (see box 4.4) prioritize their preventive maintenance initiatives.
Therefore, in connection with its offshore inspections in 2009, the DEA checked whether the operators adhere to their plans for maintaining installations and equip-ment, including safety-critical equipment.
Safety-critical equipment is equipment where a single failure would involve a serious risk of major accidents. It includes equipment used in systems for fire and gas detec-tion, for the shutdown and depressurization of processing plants and for fire-fighting and evacuation.
Inspections in 2009 revealed that not all companies had observed the time schedule for maintaining safety-critical equipment. The DEA cautioned the relevant company and will follow up on the company’s maintenance at the next inspection.
The DEA’s inspections in 2010 will continue to focus on the maintenance of safety-critical equipment on manned fixed installations.