Normative cosmopolitanism

3.2.2 Normative cosmopolitanism

Normative cosmopolitanism builds on a notion of globalisation as a fact and the responsibilities of governments, especially northern and western governments, and global organisations to exhibit humanitarianism by helping less fortunate nations and by redistribution of wealth. As relayed above, within normative cosmopolitanism there are many disagreements as to how to practice the preaching and indeed if it is possible at all. David Held, among others, has called these differences for thin and thick cosmopolitanism. Thin cosmopolitanism refers to a more cultural approach

61 Thank you to Rebecka Letteval and her insightful paper presented at the symposium

‘Cosmopolitanism and the Media’, held at Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, April 12-13, 2007.

62 This should of course not be understood as a fixed disciplinary division, but as a preliminary categorisation. I will develop the specifics in the following.

encompassing sociological projects of difference and critiques of globalisation (Waldron 1992, Scheffler 2002). The thick version is normatively strong and stands for a political project of global governance (Beck 2002, Held 2003).

Historically cosmopolitanism is traditionally seen as having developed in three eras (Held 2003). First, the Stoics saw themselves as cosmopolitans in a universally moral vein, which placed human beings in a moral relationship to each other as fellow human beings first and foremost. Secondly, Immanuel Kant used the concept as a vantage point to criticise civil society. Cheah (2006) argues that Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism can be seen as interchangeable with his notion of hospitality – that it is every person’s right to not be treated with hostility by others. However, Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism is highly bound up with the idea of connections between sovereign nations and does not encompass an option of citizenship in the sense of a right to settle anywhere in the world (Cheah 2006). Derrida also points to that very dilemma at the root of the concept, as I shall discuss under the heading of analytical cosmopolitanism. The third era of cosmopolitanism is recent and goes beyond the nation-states in as much as the emphasis is on the individual human being’s moral relation to other human beings. It is the ‘principle of individualist moral egalitarianism’ (Held 2003: 310-11). Moreover, this idea of cosmopolitanism

‘emphasizes that the status of equal worth should be acknowledged by everyone’

through ‘reciprocal recognition’ (Held 2003: 311). It is emblematic of the ideas of normative cosmopolitanism that it is followed up by an institutional structure to support and sustain it. Political systems and states are therefore important to this kind of cosmopolitanism and are seen as possible ‘vehicles to aid the delivery of effective public regulation, equal liberty and social justice’ (Held 2008: 164) along with other political agents and forces.

Immediately, however, there are two issues which need addressing in this notion of normative cosmopolitanism. Firstly, it would seem that the principle of egalitarian individualism is assumed always already to be desirable to all of the world’s citizens.

How else would it function? This kind of cosmopolitanism does not take into account the one person or group of persons, the states or religions, who do not subscribe to this world view and who would not take part in reciprocal recognition, and because of this it assumes a liberal individual subject. Reciprocal relations are, for instance, not

required as moral objectives by thinkers such as Derrida, who believes that hospitality, justice and forgiveness can only be given when it is not received as such and so not returned. Simone de Beauvoir’s use of the term reciprocity encompassed the assumption of asymmetrical power relations between subjects and thus not a similar or assimilated reciprocal exchange. The idea of egalitarian individualism already implicitly assumes a preferred and thus more highly valued conceptualisation of the individual. Secondly, and related, it would seem obvious that the political interactions between today’s nations do not always correspond according to ideas of mutual recognition of equal worth – the never-ending parades of wars, conquests and genocides attest all too vividly to this. It is thus a concept which is impossible to realise. Cosmopolitanism on these terms seems too easily to slide towards imperialism and the quest to ‘liberate’ ‘illiberal’ nations in the name of democracy (Douzinas 2007) and journalism follows as political propaganda.

Philosopher and political theorist Jürgen Habermas knows very well that much of (what I call) normative cosmopolitanism does not find itself represented in the real world of politics and interactions. He theorises instead an ‘ideal speech situation’

(Borradori 2003) to guide what he sees as the unfinished project of modernity. In Borradori’s (2003) interview with Habermas, she asserts that in contrast with Kant’s notion of the public sphere, which is characterised by its emphasis on the solitary ‘I’, Habermas insists on the plural ‘we’. The public sphere in this conception is a dialogical space functioning through rational argumentation. Habermas’s public sphere is founded through this inter-subjective interest and involvement. Combined with the possibility of rationally justified consensus, Habermas argues for communicative action framed in the public sphere of dialogical interaction in which individual moral principles and beliefs emerge in response to a community of fellow speakers (Borradori 2003). The validity of an opinion as well as moral norms is guaranteed through rational argumentation and the ruling structure of this community is based on the strength of these arguments. Habermas believes in our natural ability to seek rational solutions in the event of disagreements. The fact that in Habermas’s conception of the public sphere there is more than one speaker, ‘propel[s] us to seek rational solutions that will be evident to everyone who is not under the spell of manipulation or distortion’ (Borradori 2003: 62). In this way validated ‘universal’

consensus can – and will – be reached, Habermas argues. In the introduction to this

chapter I have already questioned the stance of Habermas when I contended that the networked and social information flow on the internet, for instance, allows equally racist communities as well as sites for human rights organisations to flourish. It cannot be assumed that ‘rational’ thinking or consensus will prevail, because the internet as well as other mediated networks of cosmopolitan potential is social – founded in social communities in which difference is not always readily accepted.

Habermas’s cosmopolitanism rests on the idea of the world being constituted through this sphere of communicative action, which could be one of the reasons why the link with journalism and media analyses is so tight. In light of the previous two chapters, however, two objections cannot be overlooked. Firstly, the one-dimensional vision of rational non-emotional communication does not recognise the politics of perception or the power of embodied experience which informs human interaction. Secondly, Habermas’ insistence upon reciprocal power relations seems outdated. Reciprocity, for one, limits the interaction to a dual relation. As the introduction above clearly states, today’s relations are always already multiple. Nevertheless, Habermas goes on, power relations between nation-states and international relations are not helpful if we want to avoid manipulation and distortion (Borradori 2003). Thus it is not only theoretical obstacles that Habermas sees in the way of reaching a cosmopolitan consensus of rationally validated agreements. Practical challenges present themselves in the disrespect shown to international forces such as the UN, Habermas asserts in the interview with Borradori (2003: 39-40). Clearly, the cosmopolitan community based on this version of the Habermasian public sphere (Habermas 2001) creates the media – defined as a technologically mediated information flow – in a pivotal and powerful role. The media in this conception is in the powerful position to manipulate and distort information leading to reciprocal mistrust and breakdown in communication, but as many journalists see it the media could also take the honourable place as ‘watchdog’ of the rational argument and advance democracy and liberation. All the same, the media in the Habermasian conception remains a macro-structural entity unattached to sensory and embodied experiences and subjectivities.

The blogosphere and social networks present yet another aspect of the struggle for a global public sphere. Normative cosmopolitanism and Habermas’ public sphere do not tell the whole story when it comes to doing journalism and mediating between

people, cultures and distant parts of the world. My project differs from that of normative cosmopolitanism. In comparison with what I would like to assert, normative cosmopolitanism leaves little room for ambivalences and embodied contingencies, because of its dependence on political structures and the idea of rational argumentation. In chapter 2 I introduced de Beauvoir’s ethics of ambiguity, which states that the freedom of the subject is contingent on the freedom of the other.

In order to achieve freedom the subject has to will the freedom of the other. Coupling this idea with Braidotti’s notion of the subject as not-one ethical self-other relation is thought of in terms of singular relations that are always already implicated with the other. I want to allow for this constantly re-negotiating relation of the journalist-subject rather than basing journalistic relation to the other on rationality alone. The embodied and embedded notion of relation I am arguing for in this dissertation rests on an assumption of the importance of experience and sensuous sensibilities as a major component in social and cultural as well as political lives. As in the earlier discussion of the concept of journalistic objectivity and the role of journalism in democratic processes, normative cosmopolitanism seems to transcend the individuals’

cultural, religious, ethnic, gendered, physical ability and many other layers of personal experience of the world and others. Politics is presented almost purely on a macro-level of global governance and military oppression and resistance. However, real life journalistic practice seems to have room for negotiation when it comes to the universality of ‘objectivity’. The USVI journalists in the category of the professional journalist did not see the concept of ‘objectivity’ as the universal aspect of journalism, but rather the structural practice and craftsmanship – the journalistic training – that leads to ‘objectivity’ or ‘fairness’ in reporting was seen as that which would vouch for the applicability of journalistic practice in all contexts. My project here continues to be a return of the ethical accountability of the situated self-other relation in journalistic practice to a journalistic subjectivity. Normative cosmopolitanism cannot sustain this relation because of its emphasis on institutional power and global governance. In a crude comparison, Habermas’ public sphere relies on the so-called

‘old’ media (defined in note 55 above) alone and a journalism with strong unifying powers, whereas the aim of decentring journalistic practice in personal ways (in terms of ethnic and gendered differences) and practical ways (in terms of technological changes and developments) is already challenging this assumed reciprocal ideal and the relation of hegemony versus resistance. If I was to develop an approach to

journalistic practice based on journalism’s institutional power and importance for political decision-making and with an emphasis on journalism as the fourth estate the normative cosmopolitanism would be highly relevant. However, as I have made clear in the preceding chapters, my focus is on the journalist-subject and therefore I need to turn my attention to analytical cosmopolitanism.

Analytical cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, aims at moving beyond the political project of a global governance structure and so leaves room for theorising about the power relations beyond resistance and hegemony or political governance. I will proceed to discuss versions of analytical cosmopolitanism with an emphasis on the work by Jacques Derrida.