Notes
VI. Norm and Reality
W hen is a legal system, i.e. considered as system, fundam entally changed?, or, as form ulated in the theory: W hen is the »basic norm « changed? is of course a practically im p o rtan t question. It is, as Kelsen em phasized, especially revol
utions which all at once change the basis of the »validity« of the legal system by virtue of the change of the political system w hen the revolution has conquered, with the result th at the population obeys the new governm ent voluntarily or in
voluntarily. In recent times the developm ent in R hodesia has d em onstrated th at this problem as well has an internal and an external perspective.25)
After the secession of Rhodesia from the B ritish Em pire the legislation of the new governm ent was internally regarded as »valid« as the R hodesian Suprem e C ourt adopted the statutes though two judges of the Suprem e C ourt resigned;
whereas externally it was regarded as invalid by the B ritish E m pire.26) By re
fusing to recognize the secession of R hodesia in spite of the success of the revol
ution E ngland m ade use of a legal or quasilegal argum entation in a political struggle which, however, ended successfully at the final change to m ajority rule through English agency.
T he question is of course of great political, social and cultural im portance, b ut it is ju s t as clear th at from a legal and legal-theoretical point of view it is a ques
tion of lim ited im portance. T he question of the validity of the legal system is a question of the existence of the system. W hen, why, and how the system was established is in this respect w ithout im portance since the grounds of the system can only be found w ithin the system itself.
A nother question of great practical interest for the »validity« of the legal sys
tem is its »efficiency«. As we know, K elsen claim ed th at together with the formal validity of the legal system another claim on the rules of law m ust be m ade, nam ely th at they m ust be »effective«, sanctioned obligations.2^
Especially A lf Ross has criticized this confusion of a »purely« norm ative con
ception of law w ith an idea of efficiency which is connected w ith (or is identical with) the conception of the State. Ross operates with a dualistic legal idea, op
erating on the one hand with a form al idea o f validity which involves the existence of legal duties and on the other w ith a real idea o f being valid which assum es th at the rules of law are actually used. But Ross is in a way consistently a realist as he identifies »validity« w ith the norm ative ideology of the ju d g es.28)
But again we have to say th at the question of the »efficiency« of its actual exist
ence (»Geltung«) is a problem of another category than the »validity« of law.
And the ideas and the experiences of obligation of the citizens and the a u th o ri
ties or their behaviour in accordance with these are also irrelevant com pared to the »existence« of law. I shall not take a decision on the ontological question about the status of »existence« and about »validity« and »existence« which in Kelsen m ay be of the sam e sta tu s.29) O n the other hand, a condition of a posi- tivistic conception of law is to be able to regard at the same tim e the rules of law as »existing« positive phenom ena which can be m ade the subject of an external description and as a norm ative obligation which from w ithin m ay be m ade the subject of a dogm atic-exegetic in te rp re ta tio n .30)
Notes
1) General Theory of Law and State (1945) p. 117, 396, 437.
2) Allgemeine Theorie der Normen (1979) p. 216.
3) Cf. note 19, 21, and 23 below.
4) »Tu-Tu«, 70 Harvard Law Review (1956-57) p. 812 ff., On Law and Justice (1958) Ch. 6.
5) Ludvig Holberg, Introduktion til Natur- og Folkeretten (1716).
6) See Stig Jørgensen, Entwicklung und Methode des Privatrechts, Vertrag und Recht (1968) p. 57 f.
7) See J. C. Hicks, The Liar Paradox in Legal Reasoning, Cambridge Law Journal (1971) p. 275 fT.
8) Stig Jørgensen, Ideology and Science, Values in Law (1978) p. 9 ff.
9) Stig Jørgensen, Values in Law (1978) p. 151 ff., and same, Die rechtliche Entscheidung und ihre Begründung, Rhetorische Rechtstheorie (Festschrift für Theodor Viehweg) (1981) p. 337, see also same, Recht und Gesellschaft (1971) p. 13 ff and 89 ff, same, Typologie und Realismus, Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göt
tingen, I. Philologisch-historische Klasse (1971) Nr. 3, same, Norm und Wirklichkeit, Rechtstheorie (1971) 1 ff
10) At any rate this is the solution Bertrand Russell looked for, Mathematical Logic as based on the Theory ofTypes, 30 American Journal of Mathematic 222 (here is quoted from: J. C. Hicks, The Liar Paradox in Legal Reasoning, l.c. (note 7) p. 275 ff; see also N .J . Jamieson, Status to Contract, Cambridge Law Journal (1980) p. 357 f.
11) A lf Ross, »On Self-Reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law« (1969) p. 78, vol. 1, Dansk Statsforfatningsret I, 2nd ed. (1966) p. 176 ff., Hicks, l.c. (note 7) p. 280.
12) Niels Egmont Christensen, Er Grundlovens § 88 en del afgrundloven, Juristen (1960) p.
231 ff; see also Torstein Eckhoff and Nils Kristian Sundby, Om selvrefererende lover, Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap (1974) p. 34 ff.
13) Niels Egmont Christensen, Logik, ulogisk logik og ontologi, Philosophia 7 (1978) p. 33 ff 14) Besides he agreed with limar Tammelo and Hans Kelsen that in principle there is no dif
ference between the logic of truth and normative logic that there is a need for some special deontic logic. - L.c. (note 12) p. 237. - Ilmar Tammelo, I. Tammelo/Helmut Schreiner, Grundzüge und Grundverfahren der Rechtslogik 1 (1974) p. 131 f. and Preface to Modern Logic in the Service of Law (1978); see more carefully Christiane
& Ota Weinberger, Logik, Semantik, Hermeneutik (1979) p. 96 ff, Gerhard Otte, Zum Problem der Rechtsgeltung der juristischen Logik, Rechtstheorie (1979) p. 261 f.
Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, l.c. (note 2) p. 216 ff
15) Stig Jørgensen, Legal Positivism and Natural Law, Values in Law, l.c. (note 8) p. 103 ff. and 29 ff
16) General Theory of Law and State, l.c. (note 1) p. 117, 396, 437.
17) Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, l.c. (note 14) p. 206 f.
18) Ideological ideas and the actual existence (»Geltung«) respectively, On Law and Justice (1958) p. 70 ff.
19) The Concept of Law (1961) p. 97 f.
20) Thus it is wrong when Nils Kristian Sundby and Tor stein Eckhoff in The Notion of Basic Norms in Jurisprudence, Scandinavian Studies in Law (1975) p. 123 ff, want to interpret the »basic norm« as the general accept of the population of the legal sys
tem. The category »duty« is here confused with its »reasons« or »genesis«.
21) See also A. Wilson, The Imperative Fallacy in Kelsen’s Theory, in The Modern Law Review, vol. 44, 1981, 270 ff Wilson also draws attention to the fact that Kelsen does not always maintain that the »basic norm« is a necessary« condition of the validity of the legal system, and so the theory collapses.
22) Concept of Law, l.c. (note 19) p. 97.
23) Stig Jørgensen, Recht und Gesellschaft, 1 .c. (note 8) p. 111 if., same, Vertrag und Recht, l.c. (note 6) p. 118 ff., same, Values in Law, l.c. (note 8) p. 174 f.
24) Stig Jørgensen, Kontraktsret I (1971) p. 118 if., same, Kontraktsret II (1972) p. 6 f., same, Erstatningsret, 2nd ed. (1972) p. 45 fT. It is Herbert Hart who has framed the idea of »defeasibility« as a part of his theory about the open character of the language.
According to this conception the ideas have a general meaning, but they are subject to limitations of various kinds and in various situations, see H. L. A. Harts, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights. Logic and Language, 1st Series, Oxford 1952, Ed. A. Flew. Hart has later on (the preface of Punishment and Responsibility, 1968) dissociated himself from the other idea (»ascription«) which is used in the article, but apparently not from »defeasibility«; see also Stig Jørgensen, Typologie und Rea
lismus, l.c. (note 9) about the relationship between the universal and the idea of type.
The former is clearly defined by means of a definite number of elements in a definite structure whereas the latter is characterized by an indefinite number of elements in a not clearly defined structure; as an example of the universal the idea of »square«
may be mentioned, and as an example of the latter, the idea of »forest«. The univer
sal may therefore form the basis of deductive conclusions on the basis of »identity«
whereas the idea of type forms the basis of conclusions by analogy on the basis of
»similarity«.
25) Hans Kelsen, General Theory, l.c. (note 1) p. 118). See J. W. Harris, When and Why does the Grundnorm Change?, Cambridge Law Journal 29 (1971) p. 103 ff., see also Ojo Abiola, The Search for a Grundnorm in Nigeria, International and Comparative Law Quaterly (1971) p. 117 ff.
26) Privy Council in Madzimbamuto, D. W. Lardner-Burke (1969) A.C. p. 645; see also A. M. Honoré, Reflections on Revolutions, Irish Jurist (1967) p. 268, R. W. A. Dias, Legal Politics. Norms behind the Grundnorm, Cambridge Law Journal 26 (1968) p.
233.
27) Hans Kelsen, General Theory, l.c. (note 1) p. 15 ff., same, The Pure Theory of Law (1967) p. 33ff.,50ff, 108 ff.
28) Law and Justice, 1 .c. (note 4) p. 70 ff., 34 ff., 53 ff., see also Stanley Paulson, Material and Formal Authorisation in Kelsen’s Pure Theory, Cambridge Law Journal 39 (1980) p. 172 ff and Åke Frändberg, Die Skandinavische Reaktion auf Hans Kelsens Reine Rechtslehre. Der Einfluss der Reine Rechtslehre auf die Rechtstheorie in verschie
denen Ländern (1978) p. 86 f.
29) Stig Jørgensen, Norm und Wirklichkeit, Rechtstheorie 2 (1971), p. 1 ff., and P. M. S.
Hacker, in H art’s Philosophy of Law, in: Law, Morality and Society, Essays in Hon
our of H. L. A. Hart, Eds. P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz (1977) p. 6 and 11.
30) See S tig Jørgensen, Norm und Wirklichkeit, l.c. (note 9) p. 1 ff. (2-3), Ota Weinberger, Rechtstheorie (1980) p. 427 ff.