CONTENTS
D. The intension and extension of “inhuman treatment” and the principle of effectiveness
35. Similarly to what I did in my concurring opinion in S.M. v. Croatia ([GC], no. 60561/14, 25 June 2020) with the term “forced or compulsory labour” under Article 4 § 2 of the Convention, in the present case, in interpreting another Convention provision, namely the term “inhuman treatment”, I wish to employ an examination of its intension (that is, its depth, consisting of its characteristics or essential qualities; the genus and unity) and its extension (that is, its breadth, consisting of the specific instances it covers; the species and variety of kinds), as used in logic. To avoid repetition, I would refer here to paragraphs 14-24 of my opinion in that case for literature on these two dimensions of logic. What I disagree with in the present judgment is that it takes the most extreme instances which fall within the extension of the term “inhuman treatment” and endeavours to determine or define the intension of this term on that basis.
This methodology suffers from serious flaws: it erroneously treats the extension and the intension of the term “inhuman treatment” as being the same thing; it does not take into account the fact that the relationship between these two dimensions of logic is an inverse relationship; in other words, when the extension diminishes, the intension increases and vice versa (see paragraph 20 of the above-mentioned concurring opinion (ibid.)).
36. The principle of effectiveness as a method of interpretation and a norm of international law inherent in the relevant Convention provision serves to make a Convention term broader, within, of course, the limits of the text and the object of the Convention provision. In doing so, it requires, in my view, the intension of the term to be as narrow as possible, and its extension to be as broad as possible. This can be achieved either by decreasing its intension or increasing its extension. By doing either, the
The most appropriate way to widen the meaning of a term is first to decrease its intension, by taking out some of its characteristics. This is because the intension is associated with the object of the Convention, which the principle of effectiveness seeks, as its primary aim, to serve. In the present case, the intension of the term “inhuman treatment” is treatment which causes suffering and has the characteristic of being cruel, thus lacking human qualities of compassion and mercy, while its extension consists of a broad variety of instances of such treatment which are considered inhuman, without being limited to very exceptional cases of inhuman treatment. What the judgment does is take extreme instances of the extension of the term
“inhuman treatment” and add them to the intension of the term as additional characteristics of the latter, with the result of making both the intension and the protection of the right narrower. With all due respect, this approach contravenes the principle of effectiveness, whereas the approach proposed here gives a broader scope to the right and makes it more practical and effective.
VII. Why should the non-refoulement duty be limited only to “very exceptional cases”? Discrimination against aliens suffering from serious illness
37. The question arises as to why the threshold for the non-refoulement duty regarding aliens suffering from serious illness should be so high as to be limited only to very exceptional cases.
38. Preceding Paposhvili, there have been other cases raising the issue of the non-refoulement duty in a medical context under Article 3 (see D. v.
the United Kingdom, 2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III) and N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565/05, ECHR 2008), in which the Court found that that duty applied in “very exceptional circumstances” or in cases concerning humanitarian law.
39. The case of Paposhvili gave a slightly more relaxed interpretation, by giving examples of what might contribute to a “very exceptional case”.
In Paposhvili (cited above, § 183), the Court indicated that a real risk of intense suffering or significant reduction in life expectancy, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment, could amount to a violation of Article 3.
40. The above-mentioned case-law, requiring the non-refoulement duty to apply to only “very exceptional circumstances” could with all due respect be criticised on the following grounds:
(a) Like every other Convention provision, Article 3 should be interpreted and applied in a coherent manner and not by using double standards depending each time on whether the case concerns the expulsion of an alien at risk of facing inhuman treatment if expelled or any other instances of inhuman treatment. In any event, such an interpretation would be contrary to the principle of equality and non-discrimination which is
reflected by the term “no one” in Article 3, as well as being enshrined in Article 14 of the Convention and Protocol No. 12 to the Convention. In my view, an interpretation cannot be considered to be in accordance with the principle of effectiveness if it does not respect the principle of equality and non-discrimination. Furthermore, as insightfully stated by Natasa Mavronicola (op. cit., at p. 182):
“There is an exclusionary dynamic to the setting apart of ‘aliens suffering from serious illness’: a heightened threshold whose rationale attaches to one’s status as
‘alien’ entails a readiness to refuse ‘aliens’ a certain degree of protection under Article 3. Such othering can be viewed as fundamentally distorting and potentially partly displacing the protection of the right, and accordingly as running counter to the right’s absolute character.”
(b) It would be irrelevant to the determination of the threshold of severity under Article 3 whether the inhuman treatment was inflicted directly by the authorities of the State where the applicant lives or by the State to which the applicant is expelled. After all, as explained above, it is the act of expulsion which is the cause of inhuman treatment. In this connection, the Court in Saadi v. Italy ([GC], no. 37201/06, § 138, ECHR 2008), stressed that it
“cannot accept the argument ... that a distinction must be drawn under Article 3 between treatment inflicted directly by a signatory State and treatment that might be inflicted by the authorities of another State, and that protection against this latter form of ill-treatment should be weighed against the interests of the community as a whole.”
(c) The source of the risk would not alter the level of protection guaranteed by the Convention. As the Court held in Tarakhel v. Switzerland (no. 29217/12, § 104, ECHR 2014):
“The source of the risk does nothing to alter the level of protection guaranteed by the Convention or the Convention obligations of the State ordering the person’s removal. It does not exempt that State from carrying out a thorough and individualised examination of the situation of the person concerned and from suspending enforcement of the removal order should the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment be established.”
VIII. In case of doubt as to whether the required high threshold is reached, the maxim in dubio in favorem pro jure/libertate/persona should apply
41. It has already been submitted that the high threshold required by Article 3 was reached in the present case. However, if we assume that there was some uncertainty as to whether this high threshold was indeed reached, I would apply the legal maxims in dubio in favorem pro jure/libertate/
persona and ut res magis valeat quam pereat and come to the same conclusion, thus deciding in favour of the right. These legal maxims are aspects or functions of the principle of effectiveness, to which I have already referred above, and which requires that the right concerned must be
in a theoretical or illusory or restrictive or formalistic way. In this connection, Phillimore argued that “[w]hen the same provision or sentence expresses two meanings, that one which most conduces to carry into effect the end and object of the Convention, should be adopted” (see Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, vol. II, Philadelphia, 1855, at p. 77). In the same vein, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, referring to the practice of the International Court of Justice, pertinently said that “[t]he preponderant practice of the Court itself has ... been based on principles of interpretation which render the treaty effective rather than ineffective” (see Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court, London, 1958, at p. 305).
42. This dimension of the principle of effectiveness should apply in every case, irrespective of which Convention provision is in issue and irrespective of how high a threshold is required by the provision in question.
It applies at every step of the ladder of the threshold degree of severity.
IX. Applicability or merits?
43. Since the judgment found that the threshold of Article 3 was not reached, it should have dismissed the complaint as inapplicable and, in particular, inadmissible ratione materiae, instead of finding no violation.
My view is that Article 3 is applicable and that there has been a violation of it.
X. Conclusion
44. In conclusion, there has been, in my view, a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in addition, of course, to a violation of Article 8 (as regards both the right to respect for private life and the right to respect for family life).
45. Having found that there has been a violation of both Article 3 and Article 8, I would have awarded the applicant an amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage by way of just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention. However, since I am in the minority, it is not necessary for me to determine the extent of the amount for such damage. I respectfully disagree with the majority that the finding of a violation of Article 8 constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage that might have been sustained by the applicant. Article 41 of the Convention, on “just satisfaction”, as worded, cannot be interpreted in the sense that “the finding of a violation of a Convention provision” could constitute in itself sufficient “just satisfaction to the injured party”, because the former is a prerequisite of the latter and one cannot take them to be the same. Not making an award in respect of non-pecuniary damage to the applicant for the violation of his Article 8 and Article 3 rights would amount, in my view, to rendering the protection of these rights illusory and
fictitious. And this would be contrary to the case-law of the Court to the effect that the protection of human rights must be practical and effective and not theoretical and illusory.