DELETING THE ORGANISATION, FOREGROUNDING THE PROFESSION

This is also connected to fourth theme, namely the scientists’ idea about science’s role in society as one of several stable, demarcated institutions that work on improving life for mankind.

After these sections I will explicitly look at the differences in how the mode is performed in the two laboratories. Here, I assert that the mode of Vocation is quite strong, as the differences between the laboratories are few, despite the fact that they are situated on two different continents and do not work with the same scientific questions. Finally, I will demonstrate the mode of Vocation is not ‘pure’, as the related conducts and justifications are negotiated with other concerns in the daily work of the two laboratories.

7.3.1 DELETING THE ORGANISATION, FOREGROUNDING THE PROFESSION

Law asserts that orders ‘may embody and perform relatively consistent patterns of deletion’ (Law 1994: 111, original emphasis). That means that the performance of a

particular order tends to put some objects, entities or ways of thinking in the foreground, while other ways are more in the background. In relation to the mode of Vocation, I did experience that some aspects of scientific life were in the foreground, while others were almost absent. Most striking was that the relation between the individual and the scientific community seemed of great importance, while entities such as the local lab, the exact university or national state seemed unimportant and were seldom mentioned. In my interpretation, it is this relationship that is considered vital if the responsibility for the truth is to be maintained.

I base this interpretation on several factors. First, the fear of shame, of which the juniors are especially aware (see 7.1.3 and 7.2.1). They are worried by the idea of not living up to the responsibility and thereby being exposed as sloppy or – even worse – cheating scientists. My impression is that this fear is very individual. It is something they fear for themselves, but not for their colleagues. And the fear is seldom articulated other places than in the one-to-one interviews with them. They fear being shamed as individual scientists; it is not something they fear on behalf of their research group or organisation. They consider neglecting the responsibility for the truth to be something between them and the scientific community. As one of them says, then he would be afraid of what his family, colleagues and bosses would say if he had committed fraud – even by accident. So closer relations are seen as specific embodiments of all those who would judge his character, but in his opinion, they would not share in his guilt. Fraud and bad work are solely considered his responsibility and a lapse in his moral character. While ‘the Penkowa Case’ did expose some considerations about both the University of Copenhagen’s role and the role of Milena Penkowa’s closest colleagues, this has not seemed to affect the belief among the scientists that not living up to the standards is a matter between them and the community.

The foregrounding of the individual and the community on the one hand and the deletion of the organisation on the other also appear in other situations. As shown in earlier sections, the scientists often mention the ‘community’ as their stakeholders, and they say ‘we’ when they talk or write about their results and research rather than naming single authors or a specific position. The ‘we’ does not refer to their own lab or their group as the ‘we’ I will discuss in the next chapter. Instead, they are speaking on behalf of science. In that way, there is the single individual who speaks (writes) and then the community backing up the statement. They also make clear the connections between their professional identity as ‘scientists’ and their responsibility for the truth, while the membership of a particular organisation or group is of no importance in that matter. As one of the scientists put it: ‘To be a scientist, that is to be critical.’ And a large part of the learning process in academia is about learning to understand and embody this responsibility in practice. This is what separates them from other professions, notably, those of ‘politicians’ and ‘managers’. Other identities than that of the professional are again ‘deleted’, using Law’s term; it is not about their organisation, their university, their nationality or their research group. The profession stands out, while the lab disappears. This point will be further elaborated on in the next two chapters. In those, I will illustrate how the professional community fades into the background and entities such as the research organisation and shared citizenship become visible instead.

The point about professional identity is a clue to explaining how the responsibility for the truth becomes a way of regulating science. The responsibility for the truth and the conduct that supports it are seen as the most central part of the scientific profession.

Compared with the other two modes, I would argue that this is ‘the strongest’ mode, and it is so in two senses. First, it is a very strong institution; I have already mentioned how it performs across time and space. Second, it is also the most persistent mode within the two organisations. The struggles of adapting to it for the

juniors create some of the most serious personal crises I have witnessed. The seniors also confirm that this responsibility is the foremost value to teach the juniors. The other responsibilities, which I describe in the next chapters, are seen second to this and considered ‘political’ conditions that they should learn to ‘navigate’ in. From the perspective of Vocation, these are seen more as annoying work conditions that they unfortunately need to adapt to, not as something that defines or is the core of their profession.

In a way, it seems almost commonsensical: The responsibility for the truth is performed through meticulous work with materials and text, where checking, repeating and being critical is vital. Basically, the scientists consider this their job:

This is what they do and are supposed to do – otherwise they would not even be

‘scientists’. But the other responsibilities, that for the organisation and that for the public, are a little different; they could (if they were free to do so) choose not to be responsible for those parts of their work, but they would still be scientists. However, it does not work the other way around. They cannot quit the responsibility for the truth but still be responsible for, say, the organisation’s economy or for their findings being turned into products and still call themselves scientists. Doing that would make them administrators or innovation consultants or a third category, but they would not be scientists anymore. Without the responsibility for the truth, the profession disappears as well. This may seem almost trivial; of course, scientists are not scientists if they do not research something. But as I will describe in the next chapters, it is not necessarily so in everyday work, when a multitude of other responsibilities start to pile up and the time to perform the responsibility for the truth becomes limited. The responsibility for the ‘truth’ is thus closely related with the aspects for the job, that the scientists consider as their core tasks. Therefore it is also the most stable.