Chapter 3) Turning the Relative into an Object of Study
3. Observing Roles and Uncertainty in Eldercare Policy
3.2 Decision Communication
With society to be studied as autopoietic social systems, and with all social systems to be studied as consisting of nothing but communication, Luhmann defines decision communication as a distinct form of communication of organization systems, where the system emerges and reproduces itself by connecting decisions to decisions in a network of past, present and future decisions.178 It is this type of communication in which I am interested in this thesis.
To communicate in decisions is a particular form of autopoietic operation that Luhmann also refers to as meaning.179 Luhmann operates with three dimensions of meaning: a factual, a temporal and a social dimension.180 The temporal dimension concerns the distinction between future/past or before/after. That is decisions regarding, for example, when something is decided and the length of time something is expected to last.181 The factual dimension concerns what the case is. This dimension is the distinction between inside/outside, and comprises decisions regarding the expected themes of communication in the system.182 Finally, the social dimension concerns the distinction between included/excluded, and comprises decisions regarding who is included in the system, that is, who is expected to partake in its decision communication.183 By connecting decisions to decisions, a self-created structure of expectations emerges in the system, guiding the selection of new communications and thus reducing and stabilizing what can be expected in the system.184 Structure is thus simply defined as expectations that limit the relations allowed in the system. Structure is nothing but expectations about future decisions, and expectations are nothing but the limitations of what is possible. Hence, structure structures the ongoing reproduction of the system by limiting the possibilities for new connections, as every meaning makes certain further connections likely and others unlikely, difficult or even temporarily impossible, although never completely excluded, thus reducing the possible expectations in the organization. By connecting decisions to decisions, the system thus constructs more and more stable structures of expectations to guide further communication of
178 Andersen & Born 2001: 14; Andersen & Pors 2017: 84, 88; Baecker 2003: 28; Borch 2011: 31, 68; Kneer & Nassehi 1997: 47, 115; Knudsen & Vogd 2015: 8; Luhmann 1994: 137; 1996: 345; 2000: 141; 2005c, 2013: 141-153; 2018: cap 2, VI; Nassehi 2005: 185; Pors & Andersen 2015: 340; Seidl 2005: 37.
179 Luhmann 2000: 238-239; 2005; 2005b; 2007; 2012: 21-22, 39.
180 Luhmann 2007: 219-220.
181 Andersen 1999: 144; Luhmann 2000: 117-118; 2007: 219.
182 Andersen 1999: 144; Luhmann 2000: 116; 2007: 219-220.
183 Andersen 1999: 144; Luhmann 2000: 120; 2007: 220.
184 Andersen 2014: 54; Andersen &Pors 2017: 89; Borch 2011: 24, 26, 83, 97-98; Knudsen 2004: 45; Luhmann 2000: 98-106, 114-122, 240-241.
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the system.185 A side effect of forming expectations is that deviations also become visible as disturbances of the expectations.186 Without decisions, there would be no forecastable future and therefore no disappointment and no planning of behaviour to deal with possible disappointments.187
If one steps back to look at what constitutes a decision in Luhmann’s systems theory, one finds that a decision is not defined as the choice of an individual, but as a particular form of communication – one regarding expectations that draws a distinction between alternatives and indicates the side it prefers. Such communication communicates that this expectation, and not any other, is selected.188 By deciding on one expectation out of the full set of possibilities, a decision absorbs uncertainty about expectations;189 stating that this was selected and as such limiting the room for manoeuvre of future decisions by setting premises for them.190 As Luhmann (2013) says: ‘The production of decisions from decisions absorbs uncertainty.’191 With decisions connecting to previous decisions, every decision increasingly reduces uncertainty and stabilizes expectations of further decisions by making some further decisions likely, and others unlikely.192
Luhmann speaks of decisions as fixations of contingency. Before a decision is made, many expectations are possible, whereas after it is made, one expectation has been fixed by the decision, although the expectation could have been different. This is framed as the transformation of open contingency into closed contingency. The contingency does not disappear with the decisions; it is just changed.193 As Luhmann puts it:
A decision is neither necessary nor impossible and is thus contingent thus otherwise there would be nothing to decide. But the point of time, when the decision is made changes the form of contingency. Before the decision, contingency is open, the choice of every possibility is still conceivable. After the decision contingency is closed, a different decision is no longer possible
185 Borch 2011: 82-83, 97-98; Knudsen 2004: 45; Luhmann 2000: 332; 2007: 97; Seidl 2005.
186 Luhmann 2000: 343.
187 Luhmann 2018: 178.
188 Andersen & Pors 2017: 85; Knudsen 2014: 27; Luhmann 2000: 347; 2005c, 2018: 143, 150; Pors & Andersen 2015: 342.
189 Andersen & Pors 2017: 85; Knudsen 2005; 2014: 26-27; Luhmann 1996: 345; 2005c; 2018: 198.
190 Knudsen 2006: 82.
191 Luhmann 2013: 143.
192 Andersen & Pors 2017: 85; Kneer & Nassehi 1997: 47-48; Luhmann 2013: 141-153; 2018: 177, 198, 222; Nassehi 2005:
185.
193 Andersen & Pors 2017: 85; Knudsen 2005; Luhmann 2000: 347; 2005c; Pors & Andersen 2015: 340.
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and at best one can correct course by a new decision. But alternativity and with it contingency remain.194
Importantly, in systems theory a decision does not decide anything.195 A decision is not a decision until it is accepted as a premise of further decisions.196 A decision is the unity of the utterance of the decision and the connection to the decision by a subsequent decision.197 The likeliness that subsequent decisions connect to previous decisions and thus turn the previous decision into a decision is considered low, as the decision always informs about not only what has been selected but also that it could have been different.198 Organizations attempt to deal with the unlikeliness that subsequent decisions connect to previous decisions by deciding on decision premises, which are decisions that have been decided to influence decisions to come.
Put differently, a decision premise is a decision made in order to limit the latitude for more than one ensuing decision.199 Luhmann operates with different types of decision premises, one of which he terms programs. Programs are ‘premises that define conditions for correct decision-making’.200 Luhmann differentiates between conditioning programs and goal programs.201 Conditional programs have an if/then form. They define correct decision-making on the basis that certain conditions are given – stating that if this happens, then do that. Goal programs define correct decision-making by defining specific goals to be achieved.202 In the case of public eldercare policy, conditional programs are known, for example, as laws conditioning what support is to be provided to relatives if they take care of an elderly family member at home, whereas goal programs are, for example, policies stipulating specific imperatives of eldercare to be achieved through further decisions, such as self-determination or dignity.
Importantly, decision premises such as programs are not considered as determining. There is no logical or causal relation between premise and decision. As Luhmann puts it: ‘The decision cannot be deduced from the premise and the premise is not the cause of the decision.’203 Luhmann describes how
194 Luhmann 2018: 180.
195 Andersen & Pors 2017: 84.
196 Knudsen 2005, 2006: 82; Luhmann 2018: cap. 2, V.
197 Knudsen 2005, 2006: 82.
198 Knudsen 2006: 82; 2014: 27.
199 Andersen & Pors 2017: 88; Knudsen 2005; 2006; Luhmann 2005c; 2018: 354, 240; Seidl 2005: 40.
200 Seidl 2005: 40-41.
201 Luhmann 2000: 372-373; 2005c, 2018: 247, 355, 358.
202 Seidl 2005: 41.
203 Luhmann 2018: 240.
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decision premises serve the system only as oscillators. They do not yet determine future decisions, but they focus communication on the differences set in the premises and this makes it likely that future decisions will be observed with reference to the given premises from the point of view of compliance or noncompliance of conformity or deviation instead of once again going into the full complexity of the situation involved.204
What a premise does is thus to limit the horizon within which further decisions can be made.205 Decisions, decision premises and decision programs thus serve to absorb uncertainty of what to expect by reducing what can likely be expected of further communication.