Cornerstones of hermeneutical epistemology

As mentioned above, hermeneutics sees reality as humanly interpreted, referring to meaning and acquired through life experience. This understanding differs fundamentally from realism, since the latter does not search for knowledge through the human perception of reality, but it assumes that truth and knowledge about reality as it objectively is can and should be found. However, the mere insight that any reality, any knowledge, and any

”truth” that can be found is human interpretation does not make a given approach hermeneutical. What characterises a hermeneutic approach is that it not only acknowledges that any reality is human interpretation, but that it also interprets this interpretation as (an) interpretation (itself). (Jung 2001) In Thomas A. Schwandt's account (Schwandt 2000) of hermeneutic philosophy (in his text it is labelled philosophical hermeneutics, which given the content is consistent with Jung's hermeneutic philosophy³), which he mainly roots in Gadamer's scholarship, he stresses the above named insight, and elaborates on it's everyday-life implications. According to Schwandt, in hermeneutic philosophy, understanding is seen as the

very condition of being human. Understanding is interpretation. As Gadamer (1970) explains, understanding is not ”an isolated activity of human beings but a basic structure of our experience of life. We are always taking something as something. That is the primordial givenness of our world orientation, and we cannot reduce it to anything simpler or more immediate” (Schwandt, 2000, p. 194, emphasis in original).

This citation from Gadamer once again points out the specific ontological standpoint of hermeneutical philosophy very clearly. However, as Schwandt also makes clear in his text, this understanding is different from phenomenological considerations. In addition to focussing on understanding and interpretation, phenomenology (which is, like hermeneutics, a prevalent epistemological approach within qualitative research) assumes the researcher to be an uninvolved observer; this is not an option within hermeneutical ontology. The specific understanding of the relationship between understanding and interpretation and it's ontological consequences noted above are reasons for that. Thus, this hermeneutical insight constitutes one cornerstone of the epistemological footing of

3 In order to avoid confusion, I will continue using the term ”hermeneutic philosophy”.

this research project, especially as regards the treatment and analysis of the empirical core:

the qualitative interview material.

Schwandt also elaborates on the second crucial insight of hermeneutics: the treatment of fore-meaning, bias or prejudice. First of all, let us briefly reflect on issues of terminology: The Anglophone literature on hermeneutics uses the terms fore-meaning, bias, and prejudice quite synonymously, although those words do bring in quite different connotations. Fore-meaning is merely a (probably bad) direct translation of the German word Vorverständnis, used by Gadamer and others. In fact, Vorverständnis in German mainly has a neutral connotation, possibly being translatable to preconception. The words bias and prejudice, however, imply a more negative connotation. Hermeneutics, on the other hand, does not evaluate either of them as necessarily negative for the research process. In contrast to phenomenological efforts to getting rid of bias and prejudice by being an uninvolved observer, hermeneutics argues that one's biases should be utilized in the quest for understanding. In hermeneutics, trying to get rid of these fore-meanings is an impossible undertaking, as they are something internal and quintessential for every individual, including researchers. As Gadamer puts it in his main work Truth and Method:

In fact history does not belong to us; we belong to it. Long before we understand ourselves through the process of examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society and state in which we live. [...] This is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgements, constitute the historical reality of his being (Gadamer 1989, p. 278, emphasis in original).

This citation demonstrates the insuperableness of one's biases seen from a hermeneutic viewpoint; but, by the choice of words, it also points to the relevance of biases stemming from ”tradition” in my own research project. Since I am comparing the narratives of individuals from two different countries, the question of understandings shaped by

”society” and ”state” becomes highly relevant. Following Gadamer and hermeneutic thinking, it is not only my interviewees, who necessarily understand themselves in the context of ”the family, society and state, they live in”, but also myself as a researcher who is biased by my own personal upbringing and biography. However, according to

hermeneutics, this does not pose a problem per se. As noted above, the hermeneutic treatment of this problem lies in the engagement of this bias:

The point is not to free ourselves of all prejudice, but to examine our historically inherited and unreflectably held prejudices and alter those that disable our efforts to understand others, and ourselves (Garrison in Schwandt 2000, p. 195).

Gadamer states that this bias should be examined and analysed in the engagement process:

[...] it is quite right for the interpreter not to approach the text, relying solely on the fore-meaning already available to him, but rather explicitly to examine the legitimacy – i.e., the origin and validity – of fore-meanings dwelling within him (Gadamer 1989, p. 270).

However, the fact that we cannot free ourselves and our quest for understanding from such bias and prejudice does not mean we would necessarily only reproduce them: on the contrary, hermeneutics seeks an understanding with the help of a critical reflection of such bias and prejudice. The hermeneutical research process entails that ”the interpreter risks those prejudices in the encounter with what is to be interpreted” (Schwandt 2000, p. 195).

Schwandt stresses the dialogical dimension of understanding: prejudices and biases are risked in the confrontation with the alien or unknown, and this happens in a dialogical and interactive manner - this is the third relevant point in this chapter. This focus on interaction, which ascribes action to the interpreter as well⁴, challenges the classical (i.e.

phenomenological) view that interpretation aims towards the reproduction of meaning that is immanent to the given object of interpretation. In hermeneutics, on the other hand (at least amongst those who follow the scholarship of hermeneutical philosophy), interpretation is seen as the production of meaning; which means that this meaning is produced through the involvement of the interpreter in the aforementioned dialogue. This thought has historically been brought to hermeneutics by Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger (see Schwandt 2000, Jung 2001).

Thus, meaning is produced in a mutual negotiation between the interpreter and the object to be interpreted, and thereby the notion of searching for the (right) meaning of the

”thing itself ”, which phenomenology is engaged in, becomes irrelevant. This leads to the

4 Which, in Jung's view, transforms ”philosophical hermeneutics” into ”hermeneutical philosophy”.

conclusion that there is no such thing as an ultimately right interpretation. Indeed, hermeneutic interpretation is always an unfinished thing. In a sense, at this point, hermeneutics shares the ontological opinions of constructivists.

The Gadamerian hermeneutic circle (hermeneutical circle 1) illustrates the relationship between bias (”Vorverständnis”) and understanding, but also that the business of understanding is never terminal; there is no finality to interpretation:

Figure 2: Hermeneutical circle 1

However, this non-objectivist stance raises questions concerning validity: If we take the assumption that there is no immanent meaning to the ”things themselves” then how can we then judge which interpretation is adequate and valid in a given context? Does hermeneutics' non-objectivist understanding of meaning lead, in the end, to relativism?

Bernstein's account of Gadamer's view invalidates (at least to a certain extent) a relativistic

”anything goes” stance:

We are always understanding and interpreting in light of anticipatory prejudgements and prejudices, which are themselves changing in the course of history. That is why Gadamer tells us to understand is always to understand differently. But this does not mean that our interpretations are arbitrary and distortive. We should always aim at a correct understanding of what the ”things themselves” [the objects of our interpretation] say. But what the things themselves say will be different in the light of our changing horizons and the different questions we learn to ask (Bernstein in Schwandt 2000, p. 195).

This quote once again demonstrates the open, unfinished process of hermeneutical interpretation. It also reminds us to look for correct understandings and shows that

Gadamer was far from saying that every interpretation is as good as the other. And although Gadamer argues that any final correct interpretation is impossible, he sees a normative dimension in understanding as a ”kind of practical-moral knowledge”

(Schwandt 2000, p. 202). This insight constitutes the fourth epistemological cornerstone of this project.

Following this line of argumentation, Richard J. Bernstein offers us a possible way for finding out about the quality of an interpretation on the basis of a certain understanding of rationality. He suggests ”practical reasoning” (Schwandt 2000, p. 202) as a means to find out which interpretations are appropriate.

We can and do make comparative judgements and seek to support them with arguments and the appeal to good reasons (Bernstein in Schwandt 2000, p. 202).

The realms in which Bernstein finds legitimation for distinguishing between more and less appropriate interpretations are practices, discourse, and practical truth. In Bernstein's conceptualisation, justifications for knowledge are to be found in practical rationality within dialogical communities. Within the discourses of those communities, hermeneutical interpretation will become justified knowledge (or not) on the basis of argumentation. (Bernstein 1983, Schwandt 2000). In this project, I follow Bernstein's suggestion and aim for sound argumentation and good reasons in order to gain valid interpretations. Thus, practical reasoning and well-reasoned argumentation will serve as a criterion for the validity of the research results.