Agency and structure

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logics is a combination of logics guiding behavior at one time. Relationships among different logics within a constellation can be competitive as well as cooperative.

Conflicting institutional demands may engage organizations at an ideological level, prescribing the goals that are legitimate to pursue, or at a functional level, prescribing the means the organization should adopt. Incompatibility at a goal level is substantially more challenging to resolve than one at a mean level. Early research has conceptualized institutional complexity as something imposed on organizations.

Later research has analyzed how organizations engineer ad hoc conflicting logics to pursue new market opportunities. Under this stream, research shows three strategies organizations adopt to deal with institutional complexity: (1) compartmentalization, (2) enrichment, and (3) synthesis. These are all crucial concepts to highlight and remember, as they will all be extensively used in the findings section of Study2. As we’ll see Telenor Group is facing a high degree of complexity as resulting from the co-existence of multiple organizational logics. We will also see how both compartmentalization and enrichment strategies have been adopted in the context of the organization under analysis.

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privileges over another. The three levels are conceptualized as nested; individuals and organizations simultaneously draw on logics and are shaped by them. The notion of institutional logics shaping action, and vice versa, is referred to as

“embedded agency,” which represents one of the core metatheoretical principles of the institutional logics perspective. Embedded agency allows change to occur, as it assumes institutional logics as not static structures, but as malleable to actors’

elaboration (Thornton, et al., 2012). Thus, in their argument, Thornton, et al.

describe individuals as social actors “situated, embedded, and boundedly intentional” (2012, p. 102). Weber, considered one of the fathers behind some of the key concepts of institutional theory, regards action as social because the actor anchors specific meanings to behavior (Scott, 2014).

The plurality of institutional prescriptions produces a diversity of actors’ behavior (Martin, et al., 2017). This diversity should not automatically be interpreted as actor autonomy. In this regard, research has indeed shown how different groups of actors become variously affected by logics’ prescriptions (Goodrick & Reay, 2011; Pache

& Santos, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Martin, et al., 2017). Studies of sustained institutional complexity show that actors might remain bound to their original logic and referent audience, and can either continue acting in accordance with those expectations, or might simultaneously have to satisfy expectations of more than one audience for legitimacy (Martin, et al., 2017). In the latter case, different aspects of actors’ practice get governed by different logics.

The concept of constellation of logics adopted in this piece of research offers an important new way to understand agency (Waldorff, et al., 2013; Martin, et al., 2017). Waldorff and colleagues (2013), for example, argue that it is through the understanding of the arrangement and relationships between logics within a constellation that action can be explained. The authors argue that actions are at the same time constrained and enabled by the constellation of logics. However, it is important to note that studies in this field tend to constrain the analysis at the field level, where the constellation of logics is a result of field level dynamics determining the options provided to different actors (Martin, et al., 2017). Research has given less attention to the concept that constellations may be constructed—as opposed to given—and which dimensions of agency drive their formation (Smets

& Jarzabkowski, 2013; Martin, et al., 2017).

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Neo-institutional theory has historically not been well equipped to explain the partial autonomy of agency and structure (Thornton, et al., 2012); thus, a long structure-agency debate has been developing over the years (Garud, et al., 2007).

Early institutional theory focused on a concept of agency where actors are viewed as constrained by institutional norms (Thornton, et al., 2012). The assumption that structures constrain agency can easily explain stability and continuity, but it does not provide a way to explain change (Garud, et al., 2007). On the other side, however, theories that privilege the role of agency with a focus on intentionality often end up promoting “heroic models of actors and have been criticized for being ahistorical, decontextualized, and universalistic” (Garud, et al., 2007, p. 961). In institutional theory, the structure-agency debate is referred to as “the paradox of embedded agency” (DiMaggio, 1988; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Sewell, 1992;

Holm, 1995; Seo & Creed, 2002; Garud, et al., 2007).

The paradox unfolds as follows: “How can actors change institutions if their actions, intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they wish to change?” (Holm, 1995, p. 398). Researchers have addressed this issue by providing a theorization of agency and structure as mutually constitutive, in a dual relationship. Giddens’ notion of “structuration” (1984), Bourdieu’s notion of

“habitus” (1977), and Sewell’s notion of “dual” structures (1992) are probably the most well-known attempts. For these researchers, structure and agency are not in opposition but they constitute each other. According to this view, actors are knowledgeable agents empowered by the reflective capacity to respond in different ways as prescribed by social norms (Garud, et al., 2007). Conceptualized in this manner, structure does not only constrain agency but also provides the very fabric for agency to take place (Garud, et al., 2007).

Particularly interesting in the context of this study is Sewell’s theory of structure.

Sewell theorizes structures as dual, constituted by schemas (virtual) and resources (actual) that mutually affect each other (1992). Sewell argues that structures are virtual; they are not material, they do not exist in time and space, but “are put into practice in the production and reproduction of social life” (1992, p. 6). Structures consist of schemas, conceptualized as procedures that guide the enactment of the production and reproduction of social life. Schemas are characterized by generalizability (they are general procedures) and transposability (they can be applied in a variety of contexts). Structures also consist of resources. Sewell ties the

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concept of resources to one of power, arguing that “resources are anything that can serve as a source of power in social interactions” (1992, p. 9). The author posits that resources can be human (e.g., strength, knowledge) as well as nonhuman (e.g., objects). Therefore, conceiving human beings as agents implies conceptualizing them as empowered by access to resources. Sewell (1992) argues that structure and human agency presuppose each other. Structures are indeed enacted by

“knowledgeable human agents” (1992, p. 4); therefore, structures enable human agency. The concepts of knowledgeable and enabling imply that agents put their structurally formed capacities in place in new, creative, and innovative ways contingent to the context. Social actors are here conceptualized as able to apply several different schemas while having access to a wide range of resources. Under this light, Sewell defines agency as “entailing the capacity to transpose and extend schemas to new contexts” (1992, p. 18). In other words, in Sewell’s argument, actors are empowered by structures to enact schemas and mobilize resources. Thus, agency is a fundamental constituent aspect of structure.

Finally, also relevant for the purpose of this study is Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) theory of agency. The authors conceptualize human agency as “a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment)” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 963). By so doing, Emirbayer and Mische argue that the agentic action of social dimension can only be captured within the flow of time. Since actors are constantly embedded in multiple temporalities at any given time, social actors can be thought as oriented toward the past, present, and future at once. The work of Emirbayer and Mische is extremely relevant in the context of this research as it accounts for change, as the authors put it “by differentiating between the different dimensions of agency, we can help to account for variability and change in actors’

capacities for imaginative and critical intervention in the diverse contexts within which they act” (1998, p. 970). Emirbayer and Mische (1998) therefore conceptualize agency as encompassing three elements:

• Iterational element. It is the selective reactivation of past patterns as replication of routines. It anchors actors in the past.

• Projective element. It is the imaginative generation of possible future trajectories. It projects actors in the future.

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• Pragmatic-evaluative element. It is the capacity to make practical judgments among alternative trajectories. It enables actors to respond to evolving situations and emerging demands.

As mentioned in the above section dedicated to organizational logics, Spicer and Sewell (2010) argue that the emergence of contradictions and tensions between the discourses making up the organizational logics, offers the opportunity for actors to exercise projective agency that promotes, transforms, and hybridizes discourses.

Projective agency is deployed in response to these contradictions and tensions, creating the opportunity for organizational logics to change. In the deployment of projective actions, the authors argue, individuals or groups articulate a project to influence future activities, by identifying a collective problem and possible solutions to that problem. Actors seek to justify the project through the mobilization of a coherent discourse. The articulation of efficacious discourses is vital to develop and defend legitimacy.

Take Away Concepts

An institutional logic perspective assumes institutional logics to shape action, and vice versa. This notion is referred to as embedded agency, which represents one of the core metatheoretical principles of the institutional logics perspective. Embedded agency allows change to occur, as it assumes institutional logics as not static structures, but as malleable to actors’ elaboration. Within the specific context of organizational logics’ transformation, the concept of projective agency is key.

Projective agency is the capacity of actors to imagine and generate future possible trajectories. This is important to note as the findings of Study2 will show how in response to organizational logics’ contradictions and tensions, organizational actors exercise projective agency to create the opportunity for the customer logic to be increasingly diffused and entrenched in the intra-organizational environment, and service design increasingly adopted.