The Potential Role of Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions in Colombia's Areas of Limited Statehood for Energy Diversification towards Governance in Energy Democracy
Ramirez, Jacobo; Velázquez, Diego Angelino; Vélez-Zapata, Claudia
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2022
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Ramirez, J., Velázquez, D. A., & Vélez-Zapata, C. (2022). The Potential Role of Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions in Colombia's Areas of Limited Statehood for Energy Diversification towards Governance in Energy Democracy. Energy Policy, 168, 19. [113135]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2022.113135
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Energy Policy 168 (2022) 113135
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The potential role of peace, justice, and strong institutions in Colombia ’ s areas of limited statehood for energy diversification towards governance in energy democracy
Jacobo Ramirez
a,*, Diego Angelino Vel azquez ´
b, Claudia V ´ elez-Zapata
caDepartment of Management, Society and Communication (MSC), Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Dalgas Have 15 Office: 2Ø.024, 2000, Frederiksberg, Denmark
bTEM Foundation, S¨odra Promenaden 51, 211 38, Malm¨o, Sweden
cEscuela Economía, Administraci´on y Negocios-Facultad de Administraci´on, Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, Circular 1 No. 70-01, Bloque 6, Segundo piso, C´odigo Postal 050031, Medellín, Colombia
A R T I C L E I N F O Keywords:
Energy policy Energy democracy
Non-conventional renewable energy Colombia
Governance
Areas of limited statehood SDG 16
A B S T R A C T
We conducted a qualitative study (2019–22) to contextualise Colombia’s energy policy for sustainable devel- opment and renewable energy diversification, focusing on the new governance toolbox of market incentives, weak institutions, security risks in areas of limited statehood, and the role of indigenous people. We also examined how geopolitical events, such as COVID-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, are affecting fossil fuel and decarbonisation strategies. Our findings suggest that weak institutions are a major obstacle to Colom- bia’s energy transition. The Western definition of energy democracy takes for granted good governance in line with SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions; however, in Colombia, the context of social unrest, violence, corruption, and inequality hinders its implementation. Colombia’s energy policy considers green investment a market opportunity rather than a way of institution building or phasing down fossil fuels, and there is no meaningful communication with civil society, especially indigenous people, to develop small-scale green in- vestment initiatives. This study enhances energy policy by emphasising the role of governance and strong in- stitutions in energy democracy. We argue that if governments and corporations were committed to climate change mitigation, they would invest in institution building over renewable energy.
1. Introduction
Energy democracy is a grassroots movement that began in Western countries moving to renewable energy (e.g., Becker and Naumann, 2017; Somerville, 2005; Stephens, 2019). The energy democracy framework opposes the centralised monopoly of the energy sector (Berka and Dreyfus, 2021), instead advocating for decentralised participation and decision-making (Baker, 2018; Mey and Diesendorf, 2018), access to sustainable energy (Berka and Dreyfus, 2021; van Veelen and Eadson, 2020), and the good of the people in relation to energy choice. This model is being considered by several countries to meet Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 7, i.e., “Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy” (United Nations, 2016a). Here, we posit that this model takes for granted good
governance and strong institutions in accordance with SDG 16: “Peace, justice, and strong institutions” (United Nations, 2016b), which limits its success in emerging markets.
To contextualise our arguments (Welch et al., 2022), we analyse Colombia’s energy policy and legal framework with respect to gover- nance: What are the governance challenges for energy diversification in Colombia? We pay particular attention to Colombia’s new governance toolbox of market incentives for energy diversification and sustainable development, which derives from the Paris Agreement (Esguerra et al., 2017); the impacts of weak institutions and security vulnerabilities in Colombia’s areas of limited statehood (ALSs)1; and the role of indige- nous peoples in sustainable energy investments. We also explore how the global geopolitical context, such as the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine, is affecting policies on fossil fuels and decarbonisation.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: jara.msc@cbs.dk (J. Ramirez), diego.angelino@tem.se (D. Angelino Vel´azquez), claudiap.velez@upb.edu.co (C. V´elez-Zapata).
1 Areas of limited statehood (ALSs) are regions in which the state lacks the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions and/or a monopoly on the use of force (Risse, 2012, p. 699). ALSs are not necessarily ungoverned or ungovernable, but rather governed by a variety of non-state-led actor constellations (Esguerra et al., 2017, p. 10).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2022.113135
Received 1 February 2022; Received in revised form 11 June 2022; Accepted 20 June 2022
Good governance and strong institutions are critical for implement- ing energy policy and achieving the energy transition. Colombia, like many economies in Latin America, is classified as a development-in- transition (DiT) country based on its growing GDP but persisting vul- nerabilities (OECD, 2019), particularly in relation to lack of rule of law, violence, and crime in ALSs. Energy policy researchers argue that there is a disconnect in DiT countries between energy democracy and the socio-cultural dimensions of sustainable energy investments (OECD, 2019; Viviana and Castillo, 2019) and a lack of awareness and infor- mation about decarbonisation technologies among businesses, govern- ments, and civil society, particularly among indigenous peoples (e.g., Edsand, 2017). From the viewpoint of energy democracy, the primary axis of energy policy is the needs of society. However, scholars argue that governments and businesses lack an understanding of the socio-cultural aspects of communities’ daily lives and society’s concerns and expectations for sustainable energy investments; thus, these ele- ments are seldom integrated into energy policy (Edsand, 2017; Larsen et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2015; Viviana and Castillo, 2019).
The geography and biodiversity of Colombia provide unique op- portunities for developing non-conventional renewable energy (NRE).
The term NRE is used to define renewable or green energy that is distinguished from the conventional energy matrix. In Colombia, given that 68.3% of electricity production is already from hydroelectric plants (ACOLGEN, 2021;IEA, 2022), NRE refers to energy production (both large and small scale) from the following sources: wind (onshore and offshore), solar, biomass and waste, tidal, and geothermal (UPME, 2015). Researchers (e.g., Arango-Aramburo et al., 2019) suggest that expanding NRE might be more cost-effective than complementing con- ventional fuels with carbon capture and storage systems. However, as is often the case with technologically feasible approaches, the social as- pects of these NRE solutions are overlooked.
In this paper, we analyse Colombia’s energy policy with respect to state-led governance to define the relationships between actors, insti- tutional responsibilities, and, where appropriate, sanctions for actions that are detrimental to the public interest (de Melo et al., 2016; Roth- stein, 2012). Colombia has implemented an attractive legal framework for NRE, with economic incentives for investors, and there is apparent political will to align the energy policy to new modes of global
governance for sustainable development and climate change mitigation, such as COP26 and the Paris Agreement (Esguerra et al., 2017; Gobierno de Colombia, 2016; 2022; MME, 2021a; United Nations Western Europe, 2021). However, economists (e.g., Åslund, 2000; Rodrik, 2000) have proposed that market incentives are not sufficient without strong in- stitutions to develop and maintain state-led governance according to the principles of “good governance” (e.g., rule of law, low corruption) in energy democracy. Colombia’s socio-economic system and security vulnerabilities present critical risks to devising and implementing en- ergy policy, and the country still faces challenges surrounding gover- nance and peace. We posit that by overlooking SDG 16, market incentives in NRE might fail to provide good for the people. Thus, to achieve the proposed energy diversification peacefully, Colombian en- ergy policy may need to directly address SDG 16 (United Nations, 2016b) by continuing to work on the transition to peace and building just and strong institutions to support peaceful and inclusive societies.
This work contributes to the contextualisation of energy policy in DiT countries. First, we contextualise Colombian energy policy, which is an example of an ideology divorced from the energy system’s social, ecological, and political connections (e.g., Viviana and Castillo, 2019). It is based on a conventional and apolitical energy paradigm that em- phasises the economic toolbox. Colombia’s energy policy, particularly its National Energy Plan 2050(E2050), lacks transparent decision-making, accountability, the exchange of high-quality infor- mation on energy and the environment, and the participation of civil society, which compromises governance in energy democracy.
In this article, Sections 2 and 3 provide an overview of our theoret- ical framework for energy policy and the methods used to conduct this study. Section 4 presents the research context, the legal framework of Colombia’s energy system, and socio-political issues surrounding public consultation in Colombia. Finally, Sections 5 and 6 present a critical discussion of the E2050 plan and recommendations to policymakers.
2. Literature review 2.1. Energy policy
Energy policy addresses how a country generates, stores, and con- verts energy (Kleinpeter, 1995). It also addresses energy use to ensure demand does not exceed supply, with consideration of energy efficiency and the environment (Sokołowski and Heffron, 2022). Researchers (e.g., Miller et al., 2015; Viviana and Castillo, 2019) have called for energy policy to shift from a techno-economic strategy for energy production and distribution to a strategy that simultaneously encompasses social-cultural engagements and agreements on the benefits of decar- bonisation for society (e.g., Renn et al., 2020; Scrase et al., 2009). We suggest discussing decarbonisation energy policies around two central concepts: strong institutions to develop and maintain good governance, and energy democracy (Becker and Naumann, 2017; Rothstein, 2012).
These concepts are presented in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.
2.2. Strong institutions and good governance
There is extensive literature on the importance of institutions for development (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2005; Rodrik, 2000; Savoia et al., 2010). Institutions –not by the definition of educational or professional organisations or notable individuals, but as humanly devised structures of rules and norms that shape and constrain political, economic, and human behaviour (North, 1986, 1991) –explain and predict our in- teractions as socities and our “expectations of what people will do” (Lin and Nugent, 1995, p. 2307).Institutions form a basis for the legal framework, including laws, policies, norms, customs, and regulations.
Having strong institutions implies that the ruling government has high accountability, low corruption, and public trust while effecting the rule of law and sharing high-quality information to facilitate transparent decision-making processes and public participation (Shyu, 2021;
Abbreviations
CREG Energy and Gas Regulatory Commission [Comisi´on de Regulaci´on de Energía y Gas]
DANCP Directorate of the National Prior Consultation Authority [Direcci´on de la Autoridad Nacional de Consulta Previa]
E2050 Colombian National Energy Plan toward 2050 FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia]
FDI Foreign direct investment
FENOGE Non-conventional Energy and Efficient Energy Management Fund [Fondo de Energías No convencionales y Gesti´on Eficiente de la Energía]
DiT Development-in-transition
MME Ministry of Mines and Energy [Ministerio de Minas y Energía]
MNE Multinational enterprise;
NRE Non-conventional renewable energy SDGs Sustainable development goals SME Small and medium enterprise;
UPME Mining and Energy Planning Unit [Unidad de Planeaci´on Minero Energ´etica]
WB World Bank
ZNI Noninterconnected zone [Zona no interconectada]
Sovacool, 2021; United Nations, 2016b). SDG 16 aims to build strong and just institutions to support peaceful and inclusive societies world- wide by 2030 (United Nations, 2015b). The following targets of Goal 16 specifically relate to the creation of strong institutions for all modes of coordinating social action in human society (B¨orzel and Risse, 2021) for the good of the people (United Nations, 2016b):
•Target 16.3: “Promote the rule of law at the national and interna- tional levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.”
•Target 16.10: “Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements.”
Institution building in accordance with SDG 16 is essential for developing energy policies that respond to the growing demand to provide collective goods and services for energy security, access to clean energy, and climate change adaptation and mitigation. In addition, building strong institutions can benefit social insurance and help orga- nisations to decrease transaction costs (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Rodrik, 2000; Rodrik et al., 2004). Governments worldwide are implementing energy policies towards climate neutrality through coercive and normative frameworks at national and international levels; an example of this is the European Union’s strategy to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (European Commission, 2022). The establish- ment of intergovernmental bodies, such as the United Nations’ Inter- governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has created global normative frameworks aimed at regulating rule-making itself and coordinating governance contributions for individual governments (United Nations, 2015a). These frameworks, such as the United Nations’
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and the SDGs, pro- vide new governance toolboxes for sustainable development based on coercive and normative approaches that can complement state-led governance (Esguerra et al., 2017; Lobel, 2012).
These new governance toolboxes for sustainable development offer legal strategies that are distinct from the traditional command-and- control toolboxes. Notably, they have the potential to increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of social regulation (Lobel, 2012, p. 69).
Traditional toolboxes focus on the coercive institutional pillar, which prescribes how organisations and individuals uphold the expected behaviour of the society in which they function; that is, traditional toolboxes use laws and regulations to legally sanction any deviations from the expected behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2014).
The main strategy outside this traditional toolbox focuses on the normative institutional pillar, which refers to prescriptions, i.e., “best practices” and obligations, which are morally governed (Scott, 2014).
Normative systems of how things should be done have been used to define goals or objectives (Scott, 2014, p. 64); for example, the Paris Agreement to limit the global temperature rise to well below 2 ◦C (United Nations, 2015a) is based on a normative system. Normative systems also provide appropriate prescriptions on how to achieve spe- cific goals, such as investing in modern technology (e.g., wind energy) to achieve SDG 7 (United Nations, 2015a). New governance approaches provide regulations on decision-making that are voluntarily endorsed by governments and businesses and that become a collective endeavour (Esguerra et al., 2017; Lobel, 2012). For example, the OECD provides guidelines for multinational enterprises (MNEs) (OECD, 2011) aimed at improving the act of coercive frameworks. These guidelines form another regulative governance toolbox that can help us to understand how new modes of governance for sustainable development are applied.
Market incentive toolboxes might help organisations develop legiti- mation, that is, “the perceived appropriateness of an organisation to a social system in terms of rules, values, norms, and definitions” (Deep- house et al., 2017, p. 33). However, such toolboxes leave no place for
“conscious, deliberate, or purposeful effort to craft formal structures”
(Williamson, 2015, p. 31). In effect, although market incentive tool- boxes can create the appearance of strong institutions, they cannot
contribute to institution building (North, 1986; Williamson, 2015). We posit that market incentive toolboxes that simply implement the insti- tutional prescriptions of Western countries while overlooking local conditions in DiT countries might be inappropriate for the needs of so- ciety in ALSs. “Strong institutions need to be developed locally, relying on hands-on experience, local knowledge, and experimentation”
(Rodrik, 2000, p. 12).
Despite research and focus on the normative and coercive institu- tional pillars, little is discussed in the governance literature on the socio- cognitive institutional pillar, which we argue plays a central role in new governance approaches. The socio-cognitive institutions of a society incorporate shared beliefs, knowledges, behaviours, and interpretative processes that constitute the nature of social reality and create the frames through which meaning is made (Scott, 2014). These socio-cognitive realities affect renewable energy investments; for example, individuals’ socio-cognitive attachment to their landscape, cosmovision, and tangible and intangible objects (e.g., cemeteries, rivers, traditions) is a critical aspect of conflicts in large-scale renewable energy investments around the world (e.g., Jerpåsen and Larsen, 2011;
Kerr et al., 2017). New governance approaches to regulation in relation to the socio-cognitive institutional pillar appear in the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGPs) on Business and Human Rights, endorsed by the United Nations Human Rights Council in June 2011 (United Nations, 2011). The “protect, respect, and remedy” framework of the UNGPs provides an internationally accepted business and human rights frame- work for states and corporations and is considered the “most compre- hensive discussion to date” of the relationship between corporations and human rights. These principles provide an opportunity for governments and businesses to develop dialogue with local communities that might be affected by renewable energy projects.
The implementation of new modes of governance (e.g., the Paris Agreement) does not mean a shift from command-and-control regula- tion to self-regulation (Lobel, 2012, p. 69). A key challenge for regula- tory governance is strong institutions. Furthermore, when studying energy policies and practices in emerging economies, uncertainties derived from a lack of rule of law in ALSs are not well understood (e.g., Azizi, 2022; Borzel and Risse, 2021; ¨ Sovacool and Dunlap, 2022).
However, scholars argue that when coercive toolboxes (Scott, 2014) are ineffective (e.g., when there is an incapacity to establish and operate the basic principles of human rights and enact rule of law), negative eco- nomic effects appear in the transition to green energy (e.g., Sovacool, 2021). Thus, strong institutions provide the “rules of the game” (North, 1990, p. 3) for new governance approaches to climate change mitigation (B¨orzel and Risse, 2021; Esguerra et al., 2017; Rothstein, 2012; Szulecki, 2018).
New modes of governance for sustainable development and climate change mitigation (e.g., IPCC, FCCC) have derived market incentives for businesses and civil society towards meeting decarbonisation targets (European Commission, 2022). The economic literature suggests that market incentives can provide and maintain macroeconomic stability, attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and create jobs (Åslund, 2000;
Rodrik, 2000). However, market incentives need to be underpinned by strong public institutions (Rodrik, 2000, p. 99) so that rules and col- lective goods for climate change mitigation and adaptation in a partic- ular community can be provisioned intentionally (Risse, 2012, p. 700).
In this regard, market incentives are only as strong as the institutions that support market efficiency (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016).
There is a growing consensus between different governments of the need for market incentives for liberalisation and privatisation in sus- tainable energy investments to fight climate change (e.g., European Commission, 2022; Nordberg, 2022). However, we posit that the socio-cognitive institutional pillar is a key dimension of new governance approaches for climate change mitigation. This means redefining governance based on inclusiveness (Berka and Dreyfus, 2021), which we discuss here in terms of energy democracy.
2.3. Energy democracy
The energy democracy framework provides a strategy for the participation of individuals, communities, and small businesses in sus- tainable energy projects. Energy democracy originated in European countries in the transition to renewable energy (Becker and Naumann, 2017; Genus and Iskandarova, 2020; Somerville, 2005; Stephens, 2019;
van Veelen and Eadson, 2020). It calls for the decentralisation of
“decision-making and participation” in the “production, consumption, trade, planning, and regulation of energy” (Berka and Dreyfus, 2021, p.
2). There are three main aspects to the ideal of energy democracy: 1) transformation of infrastructure; 2) creation of opportunities for new stakeholders; and 3) consolidation of citizenship, justice, and democracy (Berka and Dreyfus, 2021). The prevailing vision of energy democracy advocates for decentralised renewable energy sources that are not connected to the grid, such as small-scale renewable energy projects and collaborative or community-run programmes (Becker et al., 2019).
It has been suggested that community renewable energy projects are key to achieving energy democracy (Somerville, 2005): by implement- ing frames and structures of participatory decision-making and equi- table sharing of gains from the production and supply of renewable energy, governments can introduce a decentralised framework that promotes energy democracy (Walker and Devine-Wright, 2008; Wirth, 2014). These arguments are discussed based on the interconnection between governance and energy democracy in the following section.
2.4. Governance in energy democracy
We argue that governance and energy democracy are interconnected because the energy transition necessitates not only large-scale renew- able energy projects but also the integration of societal needs and the participation of individuals and small businesses while adhering to the ideals of good governance. The discourse on “good governance” for state-building includes economic growth and rights-based governance for the participation of civil society and social coordination to provide collective goods (e.g., Esguerra et al., 2017). However, in DiT countries (see Appendix A), the strength of institutions is uncertain (McDermott et al., 2019; OECD, 2019; Rodrik, 2000).
In attempts to improve the macroeconomic situation, improve living standards, and reduce poverty in their countries, the governments of emerging, developing, or “transition” economies in the Global South (OECD, 2019) have implemented regulative and normative reforms, such as opening their economies to FDI and investing in education.
However, vulnerabilities remain, notably with respect to the rule of law and respect of human rights (Maher et al., 2022). In an effort to reduce disputes with indigenous inhabitants, there have been calls for the integration of local communities’ concerns when devising public pol- icies. This has had some success in countries such as Australia (Clean Energy Council, 2018). However, community engagement prospects for energy democracy may be more limited in DiT countries (OECD, 2019;
Rodrik, 2000) because the lack of strong institutions and good gover- nance hinders the establishment of coercive and normative institutional pillars (B¨orzel and Risse, 2021; North, 1990; Scott, 2014) to provide collective access to clean energy. Thus, in DiT countries, the imple- mentation of energy democracy may diverge from that in Western countries (Somerville, 2005; van Veelen and van der Horst, 2018).
2.5. Governance in energy policy in development-in-transition (DiT) countries
Emerging research on DiT countries implicitly discusses governance challenges in NRE investments (e.g., Sovacool, 2021). In particular, the lack of strong institutions in DiT countries to develop good governance leads to a risk of corruption in NRE investments (Ramirez and B¨ohm, 2021). Scholars argue that a weak rule of law, a high corruption index, and security risks engender nepotism, tender rigging, bribery, and tax
evasion in wind and solar investments (Sovacool, 2021, p. 3). In Kenya, the construction of wind-energy projects has been linked to an increase in prostitution, alcoholism, and violence owing to the creation of tem- poral jobs (Renkens, 2019). Another emerging concern is the assassi- nation of human rights defenders in relation to NRE investments around the world (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2020; 2021;
Caney, 2009; Olawuyi, 2018). Since 2010, 198 charges of human rights violations against human rights defenders, including indigenous people, have been linked to renewable energy investments worldwide, with 121 (61%) of these occurrences occurring in DiT countries (Business &
Human Rights Resource Centre, 2020).
There has been progress in research on the implications of weak institutions for sustainable energy investments (e.g., Sovacool and Dunlap, 2022). However, few scholars have explored the design of en- ergy policies in DiT countries with respect to governance in energy de- mocracy (e.g., Ramirez, 2021; Vanegas Cantarero, 2020). There is a gap in the literature on the contextualisation of energy policies with respect to international normative new governance toolboxes for climate change mitigation (e.g., the Paris Agreement). This is particularly important as renewable energy investments are taking place in the ALSs of DiT countries (e.g., Sovacool, 2021). In light of this gap in the liter- ature, we conducted qualitative research on Colombia’s energy policy to develop an interpretation and explanatory discussion of context-specific phenomena on energy policies in DiT countries.
3. Methodology
To contextualise Colombia’s E2050 plan and legal framework for NRE investments, as well as the implementation and consequences in an ALS, we collected data from different sources to identify features rele- vant to discussing governance in energy democracy (Welch et al., 2022).
3.1. Data collection
We conducted several initial and follow-up interviews with 40 diverse actors (see Table 1). Our interviewees’ statements and responses are anonymised, and each correspondent is assigned an acronym and Table 1
Respondents of interviews conducted between 2019 and 2022.
Respondents Acronym No. of
interviewees Initial
interviews Follow-up interviews Native Colombian
Wayúu people (the ancestral owners of La Guajira’s territory)
WP 10 10 face-to-
face 15 online
Representatives of the Colombian government
CG 14 14 online 5 face-to-
face, 15 online Representatives of
MNEs in the Colombian energy sector
CMNE 5 5 online None
Representatives of SMEs in the Colombian energy sector
CSME 3 5 online None
Representatives of non- governmental organisations (NGOs)
NGO 2 2 face-to-
face 25 online
Representatives of
financial institutions FI 2 2 online None
Academics A 2 2 online None
Consultancy
organisations CO 2 2 face-to-
face 5 face-to- face, 3 online
Total 40 42 68
number (e.g., WP1 for the first Wayúu correspondent). See Appendix B for further information on the data collection process.
This article also draws from secondary data: publicly available documents on the energy system in Colombia, private sector reports, government documents such as the Colombian normative and legal energy frameworks, and social media channels of the Colombian gov- ernment and Wayúu people (e.g., Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn).
3.2. Data analysis
Qualitative software (NVivo 11) was used to store the data from desk research and interview transcripts. We triangulated our data by comparing, contrasting, and supplementing the informants’ statements with prior research and secondary data. This process ensured the trustworthiness of our findings, led to a more comprehensive under- standing of the E2050 plan, and aided in the identification of insights and themes. We analysed the empirical data with a focus on potential challenges for NRE investments in the Colombian geopolitical setting.
We analysed 1) remarks on the sociocultural backdrop in La Guajira (a key region in Colombia for wind energy investments in 2021); 2) claims about the legislative foundation for the E2050 plan; and 3) assertions about Colombia’s security risk.
4. Results
4.1. National Energy Plan E2050
Colombia’s Green Growth Policy, which was approved on July 10, 2018 (CONPES 3934), seeks to improve productivity and economic competitiveness by 2030 while ensuring social inclusion and the effi- cient use of natural capital in a climate-friendly manner (Consejo Nacional de Política Economica y Social, 2018). The green growth ´ strategy integrates policies, activities, and goals that are consistent with the tenets of the 2018–22 National Development Plan (“Pact for Colombia, Pact for Equity”), which seeks to achieve a balance between conservation and productivity to ensure Colombia’s natural resources are a strategic asset and remain so for the foreseeable future (e.g., Minambiente, 2022a).
Colombia’s E2050 plan responds to the impacts of climate change and recognises the need to transform the Colombian energy system through an efficient, diversified, and resilient energy matrix (UPME, 2015). The E2050 plan involves six pillars: 1) structure of the energy system; 2) capital and investment; 3) regulation and public policy; 4) demand and participation; 5) infrastructure and innovative business environment; and 6) governance (MME, 2018c).
Appendix C discusses Colombia’s current energy system. In brief, the energy system relies heavily on hydroelectric power and thermal energy (gas, coal, and steam), with hydropower plants providing 68.3% of the country’s electricity supply (ACOLGEN, 2021). NRE represents just 1%
of Colombia’s energy supply; however, considering the dominance of hydroelectricity, one could argue that Colombia’s energy matrix is already “green” (Interview: CG4). The E2050 plan is supported by co- ercive and normative frameworks, which emphasise market incentives for NRE investments. The legal framework of the E2050 plan is pre- sented in Appendix D, and the associated economic toolbox for energy diversification is presented in Section 4.2.
4.2. Economic toolbox for energy diversification in Colombia
Colombia has implemented an economic toolbox for energy diver- sification based on a coercive framework. This toolbox is derived from new governance toolboxes such as the Paris Agreement. While these new governance toolboxes go beyond market incentives, Colombia’s energy policy is focused on economic aspects in line with its market-based economy, as discussed in Appendix E. An important regulation, enforced in 2014, is Law 1715: Regulation for the integration of NRE into
the national energy system. Law 1715 establishes four main market in- centives for investing in Colombia’s energy system (UPME, 2017), which are listed in Table 2. All companies able to provide Colombian public services can access the fiscal incentives and public tenders in the energy system (Interviews: CG6).
Law 1715 also establishes an innovative and complementary special fund, the Non-conventional Energy and Efficient Energy Management Fund (FENOGE [Fondo de Energías No convencionales y Gesti´on Eficiente de la Energía]), which aims to support NRE projects and provides a market incentive for potential investors to implement pilot projects (FENOGE, 2021). FENOGE is regulated by Decree 1543 of September 16, 2017 (MME, 2017). This decree establishes a democratic energy governance system with the aim of ensuring the fund’s success in terms of economic and financial resources, which is necessary for it to be effective.
Another important legal enforcement was approved in March 2021, namely, Law 1955 of 2019, through which the 2018–22 National Development Plan established a pathway for the diversification of Colombia’s energy matrix (Article 296) (Congreso de Colombia, 2021).
Through this law, wholesale energy suppliers are obligated to purchase between 8% and 10% of their energy from NRE sources through long-term contracts by 2023, with the aim of achieving a complemen- tary and resilient energy matrix and meeting commitments to reduce carbon emissions.
In 2021, Colombia passed Law 2099, which provisions for “the En- ergy Transition, the revitalisation of the energy market, [and] the eco- nomic reactivation of the country” (El Expediente, 2021). Law 2099 was sanctioned by Congress on June 19, 2021 and approved by the Executive Power on July 10, 2021. This regulation modifies Law 1715 of 2014.
Law 2099 introduces several changes to the value-added tax (VAT) regime regarding NRE sources and efficient energy management. One notable aspect of this law is that it has the potential to affect the freedom of landowners to determine the use of their land. See, for example, the following declaration regarding social interest and public utilities (Article 4 of Law 2099):
[The] promotion [and] production of energy from non-conventional sources are declared as a matter of public utility and social, public interest and of national convenience, fundamentally to ensure the diversification of the full and timely energy supply, the competi- tiveness of the Colombian economy, the protection of the environ- ment, the efficient use of energy and the preservation and conservation of renewable natural resources. This qualification of public utility or social interest will have the appropriate effects for its primacy in everything related to land use planning, urban planning, environmental planning, economic development, positive
Table 2
Colombian market incentives for investing in renewable energy sector projects, as identified in Law 1715
Sections of the Act & type of incentive
Description
Tax Chapter III Article 11
•Deduction of 50% of the investment profits for tax purposes on the project for 5 years. This applies to energy generation projects only.
•Tax exemption on imports of machinery and other necessary supplies for the project.
VAT Chapter III Article 12
•Waiver of VAT on the purchase of equipment, elements, and machinery or the acquisition of necessary services for the project.
Depreciation Chapter III Article 13
•Accelerated depreciation of applicable assets, equipment, machinery, and civil projects needed for the project (which provides tax relief over time).
•Exemption from payment of import tariff duties for machinery, equipment, materials, and supplies destined exclusively for pre-investment and project investment work.
Source: UPME (2017).
assessment in the administrative procedures of concurrence and se- lection, and forced expropriation (MME, 2021b, p. 1–2).
Table 3 summarises key coercive frameworks in Colombia and our analysis of governance in energy democracy. Table 3 suggests a strong political will to establish Colombia as a forerunner of energy transition in DiT countries. The legal framework appears to conform with new governance regulations regarding the importance of market incentives for liberalisation and privatisation of NRE investments to combat climate change (e.g., European Commission, 2022). However, the E2050 legal framework is silent on decarbonisation in Colombia, which is discussed in Section 4.3.
4.3. Contradictory energy policies towards E2050
The Colombian government envisions the diversification of the en- ergy matrix with NRE as an opportunity to future-proof its energy sys- tem and has implemented laws such as Law 1715 to regulate the integration of NRE. Furthermore, there appears to be political will in Colombia to continue strengthening the legal framework to provide a positive context for investment, collaboration, and transfer practices related to NRE (Interviews: CMNE2). On April 11, 2022, Colombian President Iv´an Duque rang the bell of the New York Stock Exchange to signal the launch of the Green Taxonomy strategy (Gobierno de Colombia, 2022), a commitment that seeks to mobilise resources for environmental sustainability, focused on climate change adaptation and carbon neutrality by 2050 (Gaviria Gonz´alez, 2022). In his speech at the New York Stock Exchange, President Duque declared:
We [Colombia] are the fourth country in the world to implement a Green Taxonomy, which defines our mitigation policies and actions, greenhouse gas emissions, water and soil protection, the circular economy and the protection of nature. … this taxonomy, with the precision of measurable actions and results, [will] attract more in- vestment to what we today call green finance (Duque, 2022b).
However, Colombia’s energy policy is ambiguous in terms of a na- tional strategy to phase out or phase down reliance on fossil fuels. The E2050 plan is indicative of the Colombian government’s long-term vision for diversification of the energy matrix from 1% to 13% with NRE by 2025 (UPME, 2015), rather than total decarbonisation. This is becoming more relevant given the significant demand for energy worldwide. While writing this article, the war in Ukraine erupted, which has put pressure on European countries to stop buying oil, gas, and coal from Russia (Bloomberg, 2022). In April 2022, our interviewees stated that the geopolitical state in Europe appears to be driving demand for extractive resources such as oil, gas, and coal (Interviews: CG7) and has increased market incentives for Colombia to export coal to countries such as Germany (Interviews: CO9). Therefore, Colombia’s current en- ergy policy is to continue consuming and exporting fossil fuels (In- terviews: CG5), and the government is investigating innovative technologies such as carbon capture to make fossil fuel exploitation greener (Interviews: CG10). A Colombian government representative commented:
… we still have many minerals [in Colombia] needed to build wind turbines and solar panels. We are committed to the E2050 plan, but there has been an increase in the international market [coal and minerals], which is a significant source of revenue for Colombia.
(Interview: CG7)
Furthermore, capitalising on the uncertainty of global oil and gas production caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on 25 March 2022, the National Environmental Licensing Authority (ANLA) approved resolution No. 00648 for the first fracking pilot projects in Puerto Wilches in the department of Santander, known as Kal´e and Platero (Minambiente, 2022b). This project, which will be managed by the state oil company Ecopetrol, has added fuel to the existing social
Table 3
Relevant legal framework for governance in energy democracy.
Law/Norm/
Resolution Relevance Implications for energy
policy Resolution No. 00648
(25 March 2022)
•Environmental Licence is granted for an Integral Research Pilot Project in unconventional deposits with hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling and other decisions are adopted.
•First fracking pilot project in Puerto Wilches.
•Fracking was not debated in the Congress of the Colombia Republic, which is fundamental for energy policy.
•Fracking projects that would generate emissions that far exceed those described as
“ambitious”
commitments of the country in climate matters.
Law 2099(July 10, 2021):
Dispositions for the energy transition, market dynamisation, and economic recovery
•Updates and changes Law 1715 and other norms. Changes to the tax incentives defined in Law 1715 are particularly relevant.
•Regulates benefits and incentives for smart meters and geothermal, solar, and electric mobility.
•Hydrogen is expressly defined in terms of green and blue hydrogen.
•CREG may now appoint legal experts.
•Restructures and regulates the function of FENOGE and creates a new fund,
“FONENERGIA.”
•Creation of the “Clean Production” label as an incentive for the private sector to invest in clean energy.
•The decision-making regarding the energy system is concentrated on the MME (national government).
•Does not mention
“Energy democracy,”
“Energy governance,” or other terms indicative of energy democracy.
•Modifies the National Operation Council by aggregating demand and distribution.
Nevertheless, the integration of the council results in an
overrepresentation of the biggest players in the energy system. This is contrary to conditions that could foster energy democracy.
•The promotion and production of NRE is declared as a subject of public utility, social, and national convenience.
Law 1715 (13 May 2014):
Regulation for the integration of NRE into the national energy system
•The principal norm on NRE.
•Defines NRE as small hydroelectric, wind (onshore and offshore), geothermic, solar, tidal, etc.
•States that NRE is necessary for sustainable development, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and providing energy security.
•Establishes incentives for investing in NRE.
•Regulation of FENOGE.
•Recognises the role of international cooperation in NRE.
•Prioritises NRE projects defined as strategic for expropriation. Without major protocols and instruments, this could lead to conflicts in communities that are unsure about the installation of these projects on their land.
•The primary actors are the MME, MH, Minambiente, UPME, and CREG. The only actors outside the national government that are mentioned are regional autonomic corporations.
•Highlights the importance of developing hybrid models that use the local installed capacities but is not clear about how to engage other actors at the local level.
•Regarding the evaluation of environmental impacts, the law recognises coordination
(continued on next page)
unrest from the political opposition and civil society in ALSs such as Santander. The authorisation was pushed through “in less than five months, with numerous voices of rejection, serious questioning of the process, and [an] increase in acts of violence in Magdalena Medio, including death threats that led to the exile of an activist from the re- gion” (Alianza Colombia Libre de Fracking, 2022). This has prompted legal disputes to protect the fundamental right to prior consultation of the Afro-Colombian population (Interview: NGO1; SWI Swissinfo.ch., 2022).
Colombia and Duque’s contradictory energy policies towards E2050 have been criticised by human rights defenders, political opposition, and journalists (Gaviria Gonz´alez, 2022). One critic wrote:
Today, a fracking licence is approved in Colombia, while a few months ago, this “president” said at the UN that the defence of the environment was his priority (Panch´on, 2022).
Colombia has developed a sophisticated legal framework, including investment incentives, taxation, and, most recently, a strategy for green taxonomy (Gobierno de Colombia, 2022). However, without strong in- stitutions, implementing a purely market-based legal framework in en- ergy policies is insufficient (e.g., Åslund, 2000; Rodrik, 2000). Market incentives must be backed by strong public institutions (Rodrik, 2000) to develop deliberate provision of rules and collective goods for climate change mitigation and adaptation for the sake of their energy future and the collective good. Therefore, the violence, corruption, and inequalities in Colombia’s ALSs present a critical challenge for governance in energy democracy and the E2050 plan. These aspects are presented in Section 4.4.
4.4. NRE in Colombia’s areas of limited statehood (ALSs)
In recent years, Colombia has made important progress in opening Table 3 (continued)
Law/Norm/
Resolution Relevance Implications for energy
policy with CAR and Minambiente but without elaborating on the concept of energy- democratic governance.
Resolution CREG-038 (9 Apr, 2018)
•Regulation for integrating operative and commercial aspects of small- and large-scale cogeneration in ZNIs.
•Recognises the role of users (people and companies) in energy self-generation for self- consumption and distribution.
•The technical aspects and requirements of the generators are very specific in terms of what CREG needs to apply to the system.
•Although this is an instrument that gives a wider perspective on how to participate within the energy system, it is not clear how it addresses energy democracy or concepts of governance.
•Participation and engagement are emphasised for the commercial model.
Resolution CREG-030
(26 Feb 2018) •Regulation for the activities of small- and large-scale self-genera- tion into the inter- connected system.
•The introduction highlights the objective of Law 142, which establishes an open energy market in terms of competence but without any mention of democratic governance.
•The definition of self- generation may encom- pass other actors in a framework close to en- ergy democracy.
•Technical aspects of the connection and access to the definition of self- generators could result in involuntary failure to participate in the energy system without the proper support of in- stitutions and activities, especially with commu- nities, civil society orga- nisations, cooperatives, and others.
Decree 1543 (Ministry of Mines, 16 Sept 2017)
•Main regulation for FENOGE.
•Decision-making on economic and financial resources is part of effective energy- democratic governance.
•Decisions are primarily made by the National Executive Power. The Directive Committee, the most important governance body, lacks representation because the committee comprises only five members of the MME/UPME. This committee approves the budget, plans, programs, and activities of FENOGE.
Table 3 (continued) Law/Norm/
Resolution Relevance Implications for energy
policy Law 143 (12 July
1994)
•Establishes the activities of generation, interconnection, transmission, distribution, and commercialisation of electricity.
•Recognises the possibility for economic, public, private, or mixed actors to participate in the operation of such projects.
•Defines “self-generator.”
•Establishes the CREG.
•The state is responsible for promoting free market and competence, impeding dominance of the market, and protecting users’ rights.
•Establishes the necessity of having social, economic, and environmental criteria for the energy system.
•Includes the principles of solidarity and redistribution, meaning that tariffs must ensure that lower-income in- dividuals can afford the electricity for their basic needs. However, the participation of in- dividuals beyond their role as consumers is not considered.
Source: Table developed by the authors based on information from El Congreso de Colombia (1994), El Expediente (2021), MME (2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2021b), and UPME (2014, 2017).
Abbreviations: CAR, Corporaciones Aut´onomas Regionales; CREG, Energy and Gas Regulatory Commission; FENOGE, Non-conventional Energy and Efficient En- ergy Management Fund; FONENERGIA, Fondo Único de Soluciones Energ´eticas;
NRE, non-conventional renewable energy; MME, Ministry of Mines and Energy;
MH, Ministerio de Hacienda y Cr´edito Público [Ministry of Finance and Public Credit]; Minambiente, Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible; UPME, Unidad de Planeacion Minero Energetica; ZNI, non-interconnected zones.
up its economy, achieving stable GDP growth, and stabilising its internal market. However, Colombia is still in the midst of a transition period following the signing of a peace accord between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia]) in 2016 (Lordan-Perret et al., 2019). The peace agreement marked the legal end of the civil conflict, but the legacy of more than 60 years of armed conflict still marks Colombia. In the 2021 Global Terrorism Index, Colombia scored 7.070/10, which means it has the 14th highest impact of terrorism of all indexed countries (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2021). Fig. 1 presents the intensity of narco-paramilitary forces in Colombia. The regions with high narco-paramilitary intensity are considered ALSs (see Appendix F).
These ALSs are beyond socio-political boundaries and represent greater governance demands in terms of armed and social conflict owing to different historical, social, political, and economic conditions (e.g., Azizi, 2022; Rosso-Cer´on and Kafarov, 2015).
There are currently 33 solar and 13 wind energy projects underway in Colombia (MME, 2021c), which are indicated in Fig. 2 (Google Maps, 2021; Orrego, 2021; Gonz´alez Posso and Barney, 2019). The areas with the best conditions for wind projects are the departments of La Guajira, Magdalena, and Atl´antico, while the departments of Sucre, Cesar,
Montería, and Atl´antico have “almost infinite” solar potential (Inter- view: CG2). Unfortunately, these areas closely overlap the ALSs shown in Fig. 1.
To contextualise ALSs in relation to NRE, we consider the case of La Guajira. La Guajira is a geopolitically important region owing to its geographical location in the Caribbean basin and border with Venezuela (UPME, 2015). Moreover, due to its abundance of natural resources (coal, oil, wind, and sun), it has emerged as the “epicentre” of the energy transition (Mesa, 2021). Thus, it was declared a “Strategic Zone of Comprehensive Intervention” by the Colombian government (Gobierno de Colombia, 2019). However, according to an NGO representative, corruption is prevalent in La Guajira, and there is little desire for the goods and services produced there (Interview: NGO1). A study by the Private Competitiveness Council ranked Colombia 96th out of 180 countries for corruption, with legal fragility; 79% of Colombians have an unfavourable view of the justice system; and drug trafficking, para- military groups, and guerrilla, para-political, and organised crime groups are all rife (Consejo Privado de Competitividad, 2021).
Furthermore, the lack of trust in the local and federal governments was a recurrent topic in interviews with actors in the Colombian business sector (Interviews: CMNE2, CSME1).
Fig. 1.Narco-paramilitary intensity in Colombia, 2008–2019. “low”, “medium”, and “high” intensity refer to 1–3, 4–6, and 7–11 years of narco-paramilitary activity between 2008 and 2019 and the intensity to which the municipalities that make up the department are affected.
Source: Adapted figure by the authors based on Gonz´alez Posso et al. (2020).
On January 22, 2022, the president of Colombia, Iv´an Duque, in- augurated the “La Guajira I” wind park (Duque, 2022a), the second wind park to be built in Colombia and the first in 17 years.2 The National Army of Colombia has stationed troops at the site of the La Guajira I wind farm, claiming they are there to guarantee the safety of the in- habitants of La Guajira as well as the “strategic assets of the State”
(Ej´ercito Nacional de Colombia, 2022). The national army asserts that militarising La Guajira is part of its constitutional obligations to safe- guard the country’s vital assets through Colombia’s “Defence and Se- curity Policy for Legality, Entrepreneurship, and Equity” (Gobierno de Colombia, 2019). Militarisation in ALSs such as La Guajira inevitably raises questions regarding the coherence between governance and sus- tainability, peacebuilding, and quality of life.
A recurrent sentiment of the interviews with Wayúu people and NGOs is that inequality, inequity, discrimination, racial inequity, poverty, hunger, violence, and corruption are common in Colombia, particularly in La Guajira in relation to NRE investments (Interviews:
NGO2, WP2,5–8). Poverty in Colombia was exacerbated by the COVID- 19 pandemic. In December 2021, 20 months since the first COVID-19 case was confirmed in the country, only 69% of Colombians could afford to eat three meals per day, with 14.4 million Colombians eating two meals a day, 1.5 million affording just one meal a day, and 154,800 unable to afford even one meal a day (WFP, 2022). The pandemic also decreased consumer confidence, slowed private and public investments, and contracted spending (Interview: NGO1).
Governance in energy democracy implies that firms should respect existing coercive and normative frameworks, with the government responsible for enacting the rule of law to protect civil society (In- terviews: NGO2, WP3). However, consideration of the socio-cognitive institutional pillar is necessary to peacefully achieve the planned en- ergy diversification. These arguments are presented in Section 4.5.
4.5. Socio-cognitive institutional pillar for governance in energy democracy
The Colombian government appears to emphasise collaboration with businesses, foreign governments, and agencies to support the E2050 plan (Interviews: CG2, FI1, CO1). However, there is little emphasis on collaboration with civil society. For example, local people in La Guajira
express dissatisfaction with the way the E2050 plan is being imple- mented (Interviews: WP2). One concern relates to the consultation processes for NRE investments in La Guajira, which Wayúu people—the ancestral owners of La Guajira’s territory—claim fail to consider their socio-cognitive life-visions in relation to their sacred sites (e.g., ceme- teries, rivers) (Interviews: WP5–8; Schwartz, 2021). Furthermore, NGOs and Wayúu people (Interviews: WP2, NGO2) assert that the consultation processes do not follow international conventions such as International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 169 (“Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention”), ratified by Colombia in 1991 (ILO, 2017), or the UNGPs on Business and Human Rights (United Nations, 2011), or the declaration of the Organization of American States (2016), which has been endorsed by all Latin American countries to provide indigenous peoples the right to the conservation and protection of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and resources.
According to our respondents, green investments have fuelled social unrest and created new conflicts between the Wayúu people and rep- resentatives of the government and businesses (Interviews: NGO1, WP1–3). This is especially true in Colombia’s ALSs, where military and paramilitary forces are deployed against the will of indigenous peoples (Interviews: NGO2). An NGO representative provided another critical reflection of the E2050 plan:
The Colombian government presents a narrative in which NRE will provide jobs and access to new energy sources. However, because there are no NRE education programs [in La Guajira], there is no human capital to fill the promised jobs. Furthermore, there are no concrete plans for it. The main goals of the E2050 plan appear to be at best ignorant in different parts of Colombia. (Interview: NGO1) During our fieldwork in La Guajira in 2019, we collected a number of statements that suggested a lack of knowledge among local people of the E2050 plan and the implications of the construction of wind parks in their territories. A Wayúu man stated:
Wind energy firms have started consultation processes with some communities in a community-by-community manner. However, communities close to those in the consultation process do not know that the firms are coming to take over the communities. (Interview:
WP7)
Constructive dialogue with indigenous peoples may help to deter- mine how best to persuade governments to uphold their duty to protect, with appropriate action to respect indigenous peoples in instances Fig. 2. Location of wind and solar farms in Colombia.
Source: Figure designed by the authors based on data from Google Maps (2021), Orrego (2021), and Gonz´alez Posso and Barney (2019).
2 The first wind park in Colombia, Jepirachi, was completed in 2004.
