Denmark’s Super Atlanticism
Pre-print version
Citation Mouritzen, H. (2007). ‘Denmark’s Super Atlanticism’. Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 5(2), pp.
155-67
By Hans Mouritzen, hmo@diis.dk
Denmark has an atlanticist foreign policy predisposition. This means a propensity to act in harmony with the US, notably in high politics. The opposite of Atlanticism is continentalism, i.e. a tendency to follow in the footsteps of the continental European great powers,
Germany and France, and typically combined with a commitment to the deepening of EU integration. Danish foreign and security policy post-9/11 has even become ‘super
atlanticist’. By this I understand an atlanticism that is based on close, intimate cooperation with the United States and whose ingredients are not at first sight linked to the state’s own national interests. As distinct from puppet relationships, though, they may be so in the context of a longer chain of reasoning. Neo-conservatism prevailing in the Bush
administration, and a strong UN orientation being at the core of traditional Danish foreign policy, super atlanticism has been controversial in Danish domestic politics and to its Nordic neighbours, in particular.
My theory is that foreign and security policy is mainly conditioned by ‘present and past geopolitics’, i.e. contemporary geopolitical circumstances and historical
geopolitical lessons (war or occupation in particular). Its main assumption is that present geopolitics has primacy in relation to that of the past, but that past geopolitics may play a role, when present geopolitics allows a favourable action space. As most European states undeniably do in the post-Cold War era. In order to understand post-9/11 Danish foreign policy, we need to understand not only the Danish post-Cold War posture, but also the implications of geopolitical experiences over the last 150 years, in principle. The theory behind ‘present and past geopolitics’1 will be applied rather than tested here.
It should be underlined that ‘super atlanticism’ is not a label occurring in Danish government rhetoric; it is a purely analytic concept. Also, using the concept of super atlanticism does not necessarily imply that many states make use of it. With the
1 Cf. Mouritzen & Wivel 2005a (paperback edition 2007). Specifically, a ‘constellation theory’ of foreign policy is developed, reintroducing geopolitics into IR. Distance or spatiality being the fundamental category of geopolitics, it should help us understand, what distance between states (some of them being ‘pole powers’) means for their behaviour and the relations between them.
considerable action space prevailing in the European post-Cold War arena, it refers to a foreign policy orientation that is indeed possible, but actually not very frequent. Apart from the UK of Tony Blair, only Denmark seems to have been able to maintain a super
atlanticist profile with any foreign policy success and credibility.
The Profile: from Atlanticism to Super Atlanticism
Denmark’s Cold War posture was a repressed version of Atlanticism. Proximate
geopolitical concerns, i.e. Denmark’s frontline location, resulted in a comparatively strong détente orientation and thereby a low NATO profile in key questions (including the famous
‘footnotes’ to NATO communiqués during most of the 1980s). On and off, this led to some US ‘heightened eyebrows’. Still, in virtue of the Danish-American Greenland agreement (1951), Denmark allowed US military presence in Greenland. This improved Denmark’s posture vis à vis the United States (the ‘Greenland card’). Moreover, Denmark never supported a French line of European self-assertion vis à vis the US.
With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the frontline, Denmark generally became mainstream atlanticist, but also with unique peculiarities conditioned by its proximity to the new democracies. As to the Baltic states’ independence and later EU/NATO membership, Danish geopolitical self-interest was at stake: creating a stable bufferzone vis à vis Russia (apart from small state affiliation, of course). During the first years of the ‘Baltic offensive’, Denmark acted unilaterally. The initiatives were to some extent discouraged by the European great powers and only modestly supported by the US.
From the mid-1990s, however, the US was essential to Danish efforts to obtain NATO membership for the three Baltic states (only Iceland co-supported Baltic memberships, until the US had made up its mind). As part of its newly declared ‘active internationalism’, Denmark had also – modestly, but symbolically important – participated with a corvette in the naval blockade of Iraq 1990 – the prelude to the rather uncontroversial, UN-based and US-led Gulf War 1991.
Simultaneously with this heightened profile, Danish voters had shocked the elite on June 2 1992 by voting ‘no’, albeit with a narrow margin, to the EU Maastricht Treaty. Danish opt-outs from the Treaty were confirmed by the voters in a new referendum the following year. The military opt-out implied that Denmark would not participate in the military cooperation (ESDP) that became a crucial part of the EU agenda with the British- French St. Malo agreement of 1998. This opt-out, even if forced upon the elite, is an
integral part of the Danish non-continentalist profile. Denmark is only modestly europeanized in defence matters.2
During the 1990s, Denmark contributed to UN and NATO troops in Ex- Yougoslavia. Even if the NATO humanitarian intervention regarding Kosovo took place without a UN mandate,3 Denmark became less exposed to criticism than with the later 2003 Iraq operation, because so many European states participated.4
A further atlanticist aspect of Danish foreign policy has been the extraordinary emphasis on EU and NATO enlargement in general, not delimited to its Baltic ‘darlings’ – both during the 1990s and some years after 9/11. This emphasis has been in neat
correspondence with American support for both of these processes.5 The US has seen EU widening and, hence, European stability projection rather than EU deepening as its
interest – the ‘Copenhagen to Copenhagen’ process, as it was called in Danish PR.6
‘Copenhagen to Copenhagen’, thus, conveniently rode on two horses simultaneously:
Atlanticism (supporting US stability projection) and Europeanism (a ‘Europe whole and free’) – but distinct from continentalism.
Danish atlanticism has been reinforced in recent years. In contrast to previous mainstream atlanticism, post-9/11 atlanticism is super atlanticist. Apart from non-
controversial troops in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, Denmark participated in the US-led military operation against Iraq in the spring of 2003. From Europe, only the UK, Poland, and Denmark chose to join militarily.7 With Denmark’s traditional UN engagement and emphasis on international law, participation in this operation - with its highly doubtful UN legality - was unexpected and controversial8 (upon the May 2003 UN recognition of a stabilization force in Iraq, additional states chose to contribute in the less controversial phases of the operation, of course). Even Denmark’s decision to pull out, as late as February 2007, was made after close and ‘solidaric’ consultation with the US, the UK and the Iraqi government.
2 Cf. Olsen & Pilegaard 2005.
3 Cf. Jakobsen 2000.
4 Admittedly, though, there were also traces of super atlanticism in the 1990s and even issues, where Denmark was accused – rightly or wrongly – of being a US ‘errand boy’. For instance, Danish China policy fluctuated with US preferences during the 1990s as displayed in the UN human rights commission, for instance (Brødsgaard 2000).
5 Cf. Hamilton 2005.
6 Whereas the EU membership criteria were agreed upon at the Copenhagen summit in 1993, the
completion of the last round of enlargement negotiations took place at the Copenhagen summit in 2002. The latter was a technically impressive performance by the Danish EU Presidency, which enabled a much needed improvement of Denmark’s EU image.
7 Cf. Mouritzen 2006
8 Cf. Knudsen 2004.
Almost simultaneously with Iraq came the ‘Arabiske Initiativ’ […], intended to attack terrorism at its roots by spreading democracy to the area. This progresses in close cooperation with the US ‘Wider Middle East Initiative’ and originated outside the EU or NATO frameworks that might have been natural. During 2004 and 2005, moreover, after the Atlantic debacle over Iraq, Denmark has been remarkably active to reinvigorate
Atlantic relations, both in NATO9 and the EU-US framework.10 For instance, a new Atlantic Charter has been proposed, presumably after consultation with the US. Also, unlike any other country, Denmark has formulated a catalogue of proposals for ‘concrete EU-US actions in strategic areas’. In addition, a ‘greenhouse dialogue’ takes place bilaterally between Denmark and the US - between ‘close friends’ - regarding proposals that are not yet considered mature for the EU-US context.
However, Danish EU enlargement enthusiasm has been moderated – or even terminated – after the ‘big bang’, the inclusion of ten new members in 2004. This has been most visible in relation to a possible Turkish membership. Denmark in no way stands alone with scepticism in this question, but it represents almost a U-turn in relation to the previous enlargement enthusiasm.11 This is all the more intriguing, because it conflicts with the US (and UK) interest in Turkish EU membership. In other words, super atlanticism does not apply in this regard.
Apart from this clear exception, what are the conditions or other reasons that have favoured Danish super atlanticism in recent years? And what are the mechanisms behind atlanticism in the first place? We shall seek the answers to these two questions within both contemporary and past geopolitics.
Explaining Atlanticism
9 Denmark supported the US proposal regarding a ‘strengthened political dialogue’ in NATO that was part of the background for the current reform process (January 2006). This work was headed by a Danish diplomat, now seconded to NATO.
10 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ‘Working Together Post 9/11: New Global Challenges for America and Europe’, speech at Rice University, USA, 22 April 2004; Ulrik Federspiel, speech at the ’World Affairs Council of Northern California’, San Francisco, 23 June 2004. Cf. also ’Catalogue of proposals for concrete EU-US actions in strategic areas’ (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 27 December 2004), online, HTTP:
[www.um.dk], or foreign minister Per Stig Møller’s speech to the ‘American Club Copenhagen’, 6 June 2005.
In the latter speech, there is both a stressing of the classical Danish virtue of ‘concreteness’ and an emphasis on strategy, a ‘truly strategic dialogue’.
11 In a speech of 7 May 2007 at Aarhus University, the foreign minister classified Turkey together with Ukraine and Caucasus: ‘Geostrategically, our values and future are best safeguarded through a process that leads the EU neighbours closer to the EU. This pertains to Ukraine, Caucasus and Turkey. Also Russia should be included in what in the 19. century was labelled the ‘European Concert’’.
‘Atlanticism’ vs. ‘continentalism’ was a frequent distinction already during Cold War bipolarity, as applied to West European foreign and security policies. The fundamental mechanism behind atlanticism was formulated by Henry Kissinger, for instance:
‘The smaller countries in particular fear that European integration will result in the
hegemony of powerful neighbours. They see no advantage in European autonomy [from the US, HM]. Since they must follow the lead of a dominant country in any event, they prefer the hegemony of an ally 3000 miles away and with a tradition of using its power with restraint.’ (Kissinger 1965, p. 241).
He could have mentioned states like Denmark, Norway, or the Netherlands as smaller atlanticists. Atlanticism, in this interpretation, consists in the power balancing of continental European great powers. Its incentive is to prevent influence marginalisation in the shadow of one such great power – or a condominium of great powers. It is theoretically noteworthy that we are dealing with proximate power balancing, rather than balancing the strongest power in the system – the US superpower (as predicted by neorealism, Waltz 1979).12 However, it is political balancing rather than threat balancing (Walt 1987) that is at stake.
Unlike in previous times, it is hardly military intervention that is feared.
The balancing takes place by safeguarding that the UK and the US are present in European high politics - also literally present with military forces (NATO). Even the slightest tendency towards a German-French high politics hegemony, as might be seen in the ESDP, is feared and counteracted. One method is expressed in the formula that the ESDP should not be an alternative to NATO – at best a supplement. Another one is EU enlargement with fellow atlanticist countries, so that any purely European security and defence cooperation can be watered down. First and foremost, however, the US and its public must be kept in a good mood vis à vis Europe, so that unilateralism or, even worse, ‘neo isolationism’ can be preempted.
The general trend after the Cold War has been twofold: with the demise of the Soviet threat, European states are less dependent on US protection and, hence, have higher action space. Simultaneously, their military-strategic interest to the US has been drastically reduced, making them less influential. In sum, while European states have increased their action space, they have at the same time been threatened by influence marginalisation vis à vis the US.
12 Of course, proximate power balancing may resemble bandwagoning with the US, from a superficial point of view (i.e. to accomodate the strongest power in the system).
To this general trend should be added the advent of many new EU and NATO-members. As seen from the perspective of an established and ‘privileged’ Western state like Denmark, this obviously increases the risk of marginalisation, due to the many new voices that wish to be heard. On the other hand, the EU and NATO have grown bigger and should be more powerful in the world around. Denmark should have
arithmetically less influence, but on bigger units. There is therefore an extra premium on coalition-building with other member-states.13 This should not be too difficult for Denmark, since the EU and NATO newcomers all happen to be atlanticists (more or less) and thereby share Denmark’s geopolitical orientation.14
According to a ‘compensation theory’, held by some researchers and
prevalent in Danish media, political-military activism outside the EU framework is due to a need to compensate for the Danish EU opt-outs – notably the military one.15 It is an attempt to acquire goodwill by other means. However, I do not believe in this theory. One reason is timing: the political activism in support of the Baltic countries started already 1990, and participation in the Iraq naval blockade took place 1990. Whereas the
referendum with the unexpected no to the Maastricht Treaty (that ultimately led to the EU opt-outs) was held on 2 June 1992. Moreover, wishing to remain a ‘full blood European’
after all, later political-military activism hand in hand with the US could in no way
compensate for a goodwill deficit in Paris, Berlin, or Brussels. Quite to the contrary, one could add, in view of recent Euro-Atlantic bifurcation.
To sum up, Danish atlanticism can be explained by the wish to prevent
influence marginalisation in the shadow of a German-French condominium. After the Cold War, it has also been essential to prevent influence marginalisation vis à vis the faraway superpower, given Europe’s declining strategic importance to the US and the many new voices that wish to be heard. All this is contemporary geopolitics. Specifically, by referring to the disappearance of the Cold War frontline, it can also explain the transformation from repressed atlanticism to a mainstream version of it. However, it is not apparent, how it should be able to explain the recent trend towards super atlanticism. Therefore, we should turn our attention to past geopolitics and see, if we can find a feasible explanation within this category for recent developments.
13 It is therefore natural that the Danish Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs operates with
‘active bilateralism’ as a precondition for influence in the EU. For Denmark there is more emphasis on ‘active and effective targeted bilateral relations with all EU-partners in order to pursue national interests’ (Petersen 2005, p. 7).
14 The EU newcomers of Malta and Cyprus are the only exceptions to this.
15 Cf. Petersen 2006, p. 164.
Explaining Super Atlanticism
Decision-makers, the press, the attentive public and – regarding major traumatic events – the population at large learn foreign policy ‘lessons’, typically originating from the most recent war or other national experience. The lessons prescribe, what should – or should not – be done in a specific situation. They are internalized and persist through socialization and may influence future foreign policy (e.g. Khong 1992). There is room for such
influence these years, since European states, as was noted, have considerable action space in relation to contemporary geopolitics. Can we notice the influence of such ‘past geopolitics’ on current atlanticism?
The most crucial Danish decision, constituting super atlanticism, was the one to participate militarily in the Iraq war. Danish goodwill liquidity in Washington had been impressive since the mid-1990s. According to mainstream atlanticism as practiced by the Netherlands, for example, a positive attitude in the form of diplomatic support would have been enough from a goodwill point of view (at least as judged apriori). No extra effort would be required. Mainstream atlanticism would not have broken with traditional Danish UN respect, and it would not have endangered the domestic foreign policy consensus.
Moreover, the visibility entailed by participation that might attract terrorism to Danish targets, would have been avoided. In other words, there must have been one or more strong factors that intervened in the decision-making process and led to Danish military participation.
It is quite apparent that Anders Fogh Rasmussen – liberal prime minister since 2001 – himself took the decision, after a phone call from President Bush. It seems that foreign minister Per Stig Møller was in no way enthusiastic about it (although reportedly agreeing), one reason being that he was in the middle of a campaign to get Denmark elected to the UN Security Council, stressing Denmark’s efforts to promote international law and UN legality.16 Besides, there are indications that communication between the two was less than optimal at the time.17 At any rate, inferences about the motives of an
individual, here the prime minister, are always difficult to make. The crucial question is, if any Danish prime minister, given the parameters and stimuli he received, would have acted like Fogh Rasmussen, or it was a personally coloured decision?
16 Cf. Per Stig Møller, ’Danmark i Sikkerhedsrådet’, Berlingske Tidende 8 February 2003.
17 ’Fogh bag facaden’, TV documentary, DR1 22 April 2003. For instance, the decision to sign the US support statement by eight European state leaders (United we stand, 30 January 2003) was made by the prime minister himself, without consulting the foreign minister (or Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
The reasons, he presented for the decision, were several.18 First of all, the security of smaller countries is better safeguarded by a ‘North Atlantic superpower than by the fragile and changing balance of power between Germany, France and Great Britain’.19 Moreover, ‘Europe cannot solve important security issues, when it comes from sounds to things’ (Bosnia and Kosovo were quoted as examples). This is straight contemporary geopolitics, even formulated in an unusually outspoken manner.20 Reportedly, Iraq
participation was essential to Bush personally21 and further improved Denmark’s standing in Washington.22 As so few European states had actually joined militarily, the few that did counted disproportionally for Bush in political terms. It was essential to the prime minister and his nearest advisors that the war effort did not end up strengthening the US
unilateralists and a general Euro-sceptic attitude in Washington.
To this was added reasons of past geopolitics by the prime minister: ‘Denmark cannot sail under a ‘flag of convenience’ and let others fight for its freedom and peace.
There has been too much of that in Denmark’s past’.23 Denmark must itself be ready to defend important values by offering a military contribution. Here the argument was moral, hinting that old sins should be compensated. The Iraq decision was described as a
showdown over the policy of ‘passive’ and ‘humble adaptation’ of previous times: from 1864 to 1945 vis à vis Germany, including the ‘hypocrisy’ during World War I and the
‘mean’ collaboration with the occupation power during World War II24, and later vis à vis the Soviet Union. The ‘embarassing footnote-policy’ in NATO in the 1980s was
emphasized as an example of the latter.
The lesson drawn from the various historical examples was obviously negative: don’t repeat previous alleged ‘failures’. The argument was moral rather than utilitarian: it is degrading to do, as Denmark has often done in the past. In the light of this and several subsequent statements, it seems obvious that the prime minister was
attempting to teach the public a lesson: here you can see a paradigm example of how a
18 Cf. the article by Anders Fogh Rasmussen ‘Hvad kan det nytte?’ in Berlingske Tidende, 26 March 2003.
19 After the European Iraq crisis 2002-03, there is now a precedence regarding Franco-German cohesion against the US/UK in a high politics issue. If it has happened once, it can happen again. This, of course, is likely to reinforce Danish fears and thereby Danish Atlanticism for the future.
20 Fogh Rasmussen has never been an ideological ‘European’. Cf. also his statement: ‘I belong to those who…do not believe in one common [EU] foreign policy – but one that is as common as possible’ (quoted in
‘Irak-krigen: Danmark tilbage på sidesporet’, Berlingske Tidende, 22 March 2003).
21 According to sources in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
22 For an example of positive US press coverage of Danish foreign policy, cf. David Sands, ‘Danish troops to stay in Iraq’, Washington Times, 5 May 2006.
23 Cf. again Anders Fogh Rasmussen ‘Hvad kan det nytte?’ in Berlingske Tidende, 26 March 2003.
24 Cf. also Anders Fogh Rasmussen, ’60 år efter: Samarbejdspolitikken var et moralsk svigt’, Politiken 29/8- 2003.
state should act when facing this type of challenge, and how Denmark should have behaved in previous times and, by inference, should also do in a corresponding future situation. Statements in connection with the 60 years anniversaries of the end of Danish- German collaboration (29. august 1943) and the end of the German occupation (5. may 1945) have been exploited for explaining participation in the Iraq war.25 Of course, the moral reasons may be interpreted as a post hoc construction, in the light of the failed search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. However, this is hardly so, since the reasons were presented already in the indicated newspaper article less than a week after the inception of the war operation.26 Moreover, the coherence and emotional flavour of the argument make it appear real. It seems, in other words, that the prime minister had a personal educational ‘project’. He had not only learnt a historical lesson for himself; he wished to use the opportunity, as prime minister in the situation, to propagate this lesson to the public. Taken together, both contemporary and past geopolitics seem to have been efficient in ‘pushing’ Denmark to participate in the Iraq war.
The remaining items in the super Atlantic profile – bilateral US-Danish cooperation connected to the US ‘Wider Middle East intiative’ and a possible Atlantic charter – were in themselves much less controversial. Denmark seems to specialize in anticipating palatable US policy initiatives and subsequently enter as a close cooperation partner in their further development and implementation.27 It is debatable, of course, how much influence this gives on the superpower. At any rate, closeness to the superpower administration entails an information advantage and a status in relation to most European powers that seems to be valuable. Conversely, Denmark is only interesting to the US bilaterally, at least in the long run, if it is ‘fullblood European’ and can credibly exert influence in the EU. Moreover, if Danish reputation should be more or less ruined as a consequence of the ‘Muhammad crisis’,28 the US may quickly lose interest in further bilateral projects. Even if it may be too early to judge, though, the US-Danish relationship seems surprisingly unaffected by this crisis.
25 The prime minister has been criticized by historians for trying to win easy moral victories by playing ‘hero’
in a later, much more favourable historical epoch. Cf. ‘1940-45: Historikere vrede over Fogh’, Politiken 3/5- 2005.
26 Cf. Anders Fogh Rasmussen ‘Hvad kan det nytte?’ in Berlingske Tidende, 26 March 2003.
27 Cf. Rynning 2003.
28 Also labeled the ‘cartoons crisis’, since it was initiated by cartoons of the prophet Mohammad in the Danish daily Jyllands-posten. The prime minister refused to meet with Muslim ambassadors and discuss the matter, even less to apologize for the cartoons. Such a meeting would, according to Fogh Rasmussen, have been an infringement on the value of freedom of speech. Cf. Petersen 2006.
It is not surprising that Denmark, as a super atlanticist, supports the current NATO reform process.It is more remarkable, at least at first sight, that Denmark actively supports reform of the EU-US dialogue. Denmark favours a strategic approach at the Atlantic arena (within the framework of the present NTA or perhaps a new Charter).29 Such an approach is unusual for a small power and even more so for one that is famous for its pragmatic and piecemeal, not to say reluctant, approach to the EU. Apart from the
collective benefits that could be reaped from strategic Atlantic debate, the incentive is here probably to preempt some less favourable proposals. In other words, instead of sitting on its hands and jealously guarding the favourable national status quo, Denmark chooses to take the lead regarding reform of both NATO and the EU-US dialogue. Instead of obtaining an ‘acceptable’ reform, it may be possible – in close cooperation with the US – to get something better. The ‘US connection’ is, as in other issues, probably the key to
understanding the Danish posture. Closeness to the US administration enables a more offensive and pro-active course than would otherwise be possible.
Since there are more European states than Denmark who wish this form of
‘most favoured’ status, we may be witnessing a Danish ‘goodwill competition’ with, notably, the Netherlands and Poland (the UK being in a class of its own)30. There is, reportedly, competition to take part among the ‘big and the good’ in certain informal deliberations with the US. On the other hand, both the Netherlands and Poland have lost reputation in this competition: the Netherlands in virtue of its non-belligerency 200331 and its popular ‘no’ to the EU Constitutional Treaty; Poland due to its nationalist self-assertion under the
Kachinsky twins.
The cost of the ‘most favoured’ status might, of course, be that Danish initiatives, at least in high politics, were regarded as coming from Washington or be
inspired therefrom. Even worse, a puppet image would reduce Danish influence in general terms, notably in continental Europe. Regarding the Constitutional Treaty negotiations, however, no important influence losses can be reported.32 Denmark has allegedly
displayed its US independence regarding issues like the Kyoto protocol, the International
29 The Bush administration was not keen on a ten year celebration of Clinton’s NTA (as suggested by Denmark); instead, a new Charter might be the way forward. This possibility was advocated officially by Denmark, until the EU Constitutional Treaty was frozen.
30 Cf. Marsh 2003, for instance.
31 Reportedly, the US finds that the Netherlands ‘has not done enough to legitimize the coalition intervention in Iraq’ (confidential interview).
32 The Danish level of ambitions, though, was low in these negotiations. Cf. also Laursen 2004.
Criminal Court, or the disagreement over Turkish EU membership. More likely, some of the new East European EU or NATO members may suffer from a US puppet image.
The Turkish Anomaly
As was noted, increasing Danish reluctance and footdragging vis à vis Turkish EU membership does not fit into the picture of super atlanticism. The US and the UK, in particular, want to project euro-atlantic stability and democracy to Turkey and its salient environment. Normally, this is, indeed, Denmark’s ‘cup of tea’. As seen here, the causes of Danish reluctance are twofold: Denmark’s new EU location and its domestic opinion in this issue. As to the former factor, Denmark is now, after the 2004 EU enlargement, a centrally located EU country, in contrast to its previous geographical periphery status. Whereas an EU periphery country typically wishes its neighbouring outsiders to join, for both trade and security reasons, a centrally located country hardly has such incentives. This is a question of geographical contiguity, or lack thereof.33 The historic wishes to get Sweden, Poland, or the Baltic countries into the EU cannot be transferred to Ukraine, Georgia, or Turkey (and only with difficulty to Romania, Bulgaria, and the West Balkan countries). Instead, it is now Lithuania and Poland that display the greatest enthusiasm in relation to the membership of neighbouring outsiders. Interconnected with this reason is also popular reluctance vis à vis
‘far away’ countries; general popular xenophobia also applies to Turkey that is often described as culturally ‘too different’ in heated domestic debates.34 Taken together, it seems obvious that the Danish government is currently subject to cross pressure between, on the one hand, the US-UK connection, favouring Turkish membership, and, on the other hand, Denmark’s new EU location together with its popular Turkey phobia. However, we have not yet seen the end of this issue that will remain for many years on the Euro-Atlantic agenda.
Perspectives for the Future
Danish super atlanticism started in late 2001. The neo-conservative Bush administration coming into office in January 2001, the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks, and finally Fogh Rasmussen becoming Danish prime minister in November 2001 were all essential
33 Cf. Mouritzen & Wivel 2005b, p. 168.
34 In September 2005, 33,1% of the Danes answered ‘yes’, vs. 52,4% ‘no’, to the question: ‘Do you think the European Union on 3 October shall start negotiations with Turkey on accession to the EU?’ (opinion poll by Catinet/Ritzau). Cf. Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2006 (eds. N. Hvidt & H. Mouritzen), p. 213.
preconditions for Danish super atlanticism to unfold. Fogh Rasmussen was willing to follow also in the controversial steps of the Bush administration in its responses to terror.
Danish atlanticism will persist, as long as Denmark’s salient environment remains the same, and influence marginalisation continues to be a challenge. There are no signs of change in these regards. Of course, the nuances of atlanticism may vary, depending on which Euro-Atlantic scenario that will prevail.35 In fact, Danish atlanticism will be the most visible and controversial in case of Euro-Atlantic crisis and bifurcation - as during the 2001-05 Bush administration and the Iraq conflict. As super atlanticism seems to a large extent to depend on the personal educational project of the present prime minister, its fate will, of course, depend on his remaining in office. Moreover, it will be weakened, if Danish utility to the US decreases as a consequence of the Muhammad crisis. Currently, however, the Danish prime minister seems to proceed with the course analysed here and downplay any such implications of the ‘Muhammad crisis’.36
The tendencies characterizing Danish foreign policy after 2001 may not be remarkable in a great power context. However, for a traditional small power, it is indeed revolutionary that its prime minister uses security policy as an instrument to teach the public a lesson of how to conduct an honourable foreign policy (let alone the partly military substance of the lesson). Likewise, a strategic perspective is noteworthy, given a small power’s low radius of activity. The considerable action space in the post-Cold War era combined with the risk of being marginalized by all the new EU and NATO members has been at the root of these new tendencies. However, and in spite of official rhetoric, they are not prescribed by the external environment. This is obvious from the fact that other states enjoying the same considerable action space have followed different paths (like the other Nordic countries in relation to Iraq, for instance), partly because they have different past geopolitics. It has been possible, rather than necessary, for Fogh
Rasmussen to follow in the footsteps of Tony Blair and UK super atlanticism.
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36 Cf. an interview with Fogh Rasmussen (’Fogh: Danmark må gøre op med småstatsmentaliteten’) in Mandag Morgen, 30, 11 September 2006. Cf. also Larsen 2007.
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