The Lomé Peace Accord of July 1999 required a plan for the integration of all ex-combatant groups, including the SLA, into a single military force for Sierra Leone. The military reintegration programme (MRP) was originally produced by MODAT in April 2000 in response to a formal request from the Government of Sierra Leone and the NCDDR to conform to this agreement. However, the MRP sparked controversy. In 2000, a collaboration between the Sierra Leonean NGO Campaign for Good Governance, the SLP, the Ministry of Defence, and
the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONS was not yet established at the time) provided the opportunity for civil society to engage in discussions on how best to take the MRP forward. An obvious public concern was raised around the implications of reintegrating ex-combatants into the military and the future role of the CDF who, like the army, were accused of committing human rights abuses during the war89.
The new cease-fire, signed in May 2001, revitalised the DDR programme.
Planning for the implementation of the previously endorsed MRP, which had been held in abeyance since April 2000, became a high priority. The MRP was reviewed, amended, endorsed and formally initiated in early June 2001 with the opening of the Temporary Holding Centre (THC) at Kabatha Junction. The formal MRP selection process started at the newly established Personnel Screening Centre (PSC) at Lunghi in mid-June. The first of the successful ex- combatants arrived at the Holding and Basic Training Centre (HBTC), which had been built by SLA Engineers and at Mape a few days later. The reintegration plan itself was carried out in six phases, as listed in Box 9.
The military reintegration plan aimed to implement an RSLAF recruit selection process from ex-combatant groups. It was to provide a credible alternative to the civilian reintegration plan and in the process establish apolitical professional armed forces. It was assumed that a maximum of 3000 ex-combatants from RUF, CDF and AFRC would enter the RSLAF via the programme. A total of 2,091 ex-combatants had graduated from the IMATT-supported Armed Forces Training Centre in May 2002 at the last basic intake. A commissioning parade for platoon commanders in August brought the programme to a close with a total of around 2,400 trained. Headline statistics for the MRP are provided in Table 2.
Stage 1 – disarmament and demobilization: A country-wide process, recommenced in Kambia and Port Loko in May 2001 and closed in Pujehun, Kenema and Kailahun in January 2002. At this stage all ex-combatants were briefed on the military reintegration programme as part of the pre-discharge orientation process. Despite wide publicity, many ex-combatants missed the deadline to disarm in their own region.
Stage 2 – potential recruit decision: Temporary holding camps opened in June 2001 and closed in March 2002. Potential recruits were brought into a military environment. They were placed in syndicates of 30 to undergo drills and formal screening based on their medical and marital status and age. Background checks were also conducted by both SLP and RSLAF intelligence agencies.
Stage 3 – individual assessment: A personnel selection centre opened at Lunghi in early June 2001; the final Selection Tribunal was held in early March 2002.
Potential recruits completed a full medical to existing RSLAF entry standards, plus physical, education and military experience tests. At culmination of the personnel selection centre all potential recruits attended a selection tribunal. This was normally chaired by a UNAMSIL Colonel and included RUF and CDF liaison officers employed by NCDDR. IMATT officers provided the secretariat, acted as impartial observers and indeed Chairman on several occasions. Successful applicants were offered entry to RSLAF.
Stage 4 – holding and basic training group: Opened in mid-June 2001 and closed in March 2002. Recruits were put in platoons. Now formally soldiers and paid as such, they were subjected to military discipline and undertook basic military training.
Stage 5 – integrated bridging training: The first ex-combatant recruits started training in late July 2001; and the last passed training in mid-May 2002. Recruits were now issued with uniforms, weapons and equipment for the first time. A subsequent 9-week programme delivered basic infantry training within a platoon framework.
Stage 6 – posting to first RSLAF unit: Trained soldiers joined units as individual reinforcements, posted as manning priorities dictated. Subject to satisfactory performance and recommendation in their first report at the 6-month point, their temporary rank was substantiated.
Box 9: The Six Stages of the Military Reintegration Programme
Number entering the military rein tegratio n pro gramme (processed by temporary hold ing camps an d person al selection centres)
298 2
Overall pass rate at p ersonal selectio n centres (varied from 55 % to 90%) 80%
Numbers starting formal military training 238 5
Overall RUF/CDF ratio jo in ing RSLAF (v aried fro m 51 :49 to 79:22) 65:3 5
To tal passing basic trainin g 234 9
Overall pass rate in trainin g 98%
Table 2: Headline Statistics of the Military Reintegration Programme
Due to the long-term developmental implications of reintegration into civilian life, entering the new armed force of Sierra Leone became one of the most viable reintegration opportunities, not least because it proved to be relatively successful. It provided one meaningful form of vocational training for those disarmed and demobilized who wanted to pursue a military career. Furthermore, while numbers were fairly modest, the programme was significant as it lent credence to the notion of the future RSLAF as an army of reconciliation.
A number of concerns were raised about the rigorousness of the screening of candidates, including the human rights record of ex-combatants, psychological suitability to hold arms and willingness to abide by the concept of civilian management and oversight of the armed forces. Screening processes appeared to focus primarily on physical health and criminal record. It should be noted here that the process was taking place in a framework of generally very few records existing at all, let alone dating from the period of the war. The process was carried out according to a series of principles presented in Box 10.
Given that down-sizing of the armed forces was such a key issue, there were concerns about entrants to the programme only being offered one-year contracts with little prospect of alternative employment. Because there was no detailed long-term strategy in place setting out the overall objectives for the security
system transformation process, including in the MRP, there was no plan for the end goal of a down-sizing exercise either. In the early 2000s, no one was willing to make the politically sensitive decision of a complete overhaul of the armed forces, not least IMATT, which held an executive mandate during this period. While making this decision certainly did not become easier later on, it remains an issue which Sierra Leone needs to address, including out of affordability concerns.
It has been said that the number of RUF, AFRC and CDF combatants integrated into RSLAF was small and thus insignificant. Yet, as noted above, the symbolic value of the Military Reintegration Programme was critical. All soldiers were mixed up in their various units and sub-units; thus, no elements of the RSLAF ended up as exclusively ‘ex-SLA’, ‘ex-RUF’ or ‘ex-CDF’.