The Development of an
This was done in the context of an as yet non-functioning military and only a partially-developed SLP. By early 2004, findings of the Security Sector Review being produced at the time noted that the economy – as opposed to more traditional security threats – was a key threat to achieving the future vision for the country114. As the outgoing Commander IMATT, Adrian Freer, noted in late 2003: “Within Sierra Leone, although the current situation is calm, the failure of the Government to stimulate the economy and address the resultant levels of unemployment and under-employment are of great concern […].
Without this, and despite security sector reforms, neither long-term stability for the country nor the foreign investment necessary for economic recovery can be assured”115. These threats to the stability of Sierra Leone very much remain in place today.
It was becoming obvious that without economic development, neither long- term stability nor foreign investment was a given. Achieving success in the economic sphere to rival the gains in the security system proved difficult, remains difficult and could become a decisively destabilizing factor in the future. It was becoming clear at this time that the Government could not survive without direct budgetary support and other types of aid from donors.
The UK decided to create a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), described in Box 13, which had long-term consequences for UK development policy in Sierra Leone and for the country’s post-war reforms in general.
The period from 2002-2005 also constituted a major turning point in terms of producing strategy and development objectives and linkages between the two.
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and Security Sector Review were being prepared. Justice sector programming, which had largely focused on enhancing police capacity under the CCSSP, was broadened into a more holistic approach to encompass the courts and prison services under JSDP, which was being planned during these years. Thus, a recognisable SSR approach began to be developed and linkages that had been formed in the prior period began to be operationalised. Serious issues of the geographical reach of security forces and their lack of capacity began to be addressed, even if challenges remained substantial.
Box 13: The Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Sierra Leone
In 2002, the UK Government made an unusual, far-reaching decision, spearheaded by then UK Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, to agree to a ten-year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Government of Sierra Leone.
Such a long-term commitment was a novelty in development thinking at the time. It bound both parties to a series of commitments until 2012, and was a consequence of the alignment of UK national and developmental interests. Moreover, it was coupled with a broader geopolitical UK commitment to demonstrate that a joined-up defence, diplomatic and developmental effort, as evidenced by the newly created Global and Africa Conflict Prevention Pools (GCPP and ACPP, respectively), could deliver stability. In other words, working together could produce a situation where the result would be worth more than the sum of its departmental parts116. It was “something that helped us enormously”, one of the main CCSSP advisers has noted, “at least you knew that you had the support. In ’98-’99 real, serious risks were taken. Also some very serious personal decisions – this is the reality. If somebody is going to commit to a change process, my horizon is 15-20 years”117.
There were key principles adhered to as part of the MoU. The principle of national ownership, often quoted but rarely observed, was at the core of the MoU and the Government of Sierra Leone was presented in writing with the activities planned to be undertaken by the UK Government and the sectoral and financial commitments required to deliver them. Similarly, in signing the document, Sierra Leone demonstrated buy-in at the highest political level to a strategy that included, inter alia, objectives on reshaping the army and developing and implementing a national anti-corruption strategy. The MoU amounted to a form of benevolent donor conditionality, with the Government of Sierra Leone being provided with a series of political and financial guarantees deemed necessary to lay the foundations for a comprehensive post-conflict development programme.
The MoU also provided a mechanism for conditionality in the form of performance- related budget support, another usual aspect of a development programme in a country with as a high fiduciary risk as Sierra Leone. Despite the potential carrot-and-stick of the risk of up to £5 million per year being either provided or withheld based on Government performance, this mechanism of conditionality was ultimately not used as effectively as it could have been. Departments responsible for delivering against the benchmarks contained within the MoU often were not aware of their deliverables. In addition, at least with respect to the MoD that was only coming into being, the MoU was signed without its involvement (i.e. pledges were made without knowing whether they could be delivered upon). With the added weakness of not having a Minister of Defence involved in the daily business of the ministry, the political guidance on how to implement the aspects of the MoU relevant to the armed forces, such as producing a long-term plan for down-sizing, simply was not forthcoming.