engagement with Parliament, civil society and the media. (Parliamentary and civil society oversight of the armed forces as well as activities of the intelligence community and ONS have remained weak points.) By the time SILSEP was initiated in 1999, civil society’s role in security-related transformation had not been formally defined, and engagement was ad hoc. Comprehensive, structured involvement of civil society in the security system transformation process only began in 2006. However, it is a point worth emphasizing that it was recognized early on that checks and balances would be necessary if the democratic process in Sierra Leone was to be enhanced.
At the same time, with the UK Government’s 2000 White Paper on International Development, Eliminating World Poverty, it was recognised that an essential condition for sustained development and poverty elimination was simply that security is decisive25. At the core of this standpoint was an acknowledgement that without effective civil control over accountable and effective armed forces, long-term peace and stability would be difficult to achieve and sustain, in all probability impossible. This was also backed up by significant evidence on the ground that the general population understandably put ‘security’ at or near the top of their concerns.
Introduction
My Government wants to create a police service which will be a credit to the Nation.
The Role of the Police
The Sierra Leone Police will assist in returning our communities to peace and prosperity by acting in a manner which will:
eventually remove the need for the deployment of military and para-military forces in our villages, communities and city streets,
ensure the safety and security of all people and their property,
respect the human rights of all individuals,
prevent and detect crime by using the most effective methods which can be made available to them,
take account of local concerns through community consultation,
at all levels be free from corruption.
Equal Opportunities
The personnel policies of the Sierra Leone Police will be the same for all members, regardless of sex or ethnic origin. All recruitment, training, postings, promotions and opportunities for development will be based on a published equal opportunities policy.
The Role of My Government
The Government will do all in its power to ensure that the Sierra Leone Police is:
directed and managed in accordance with The Constitution,
locally managed so as to ensure that community views are always taken into consideration,
adequately resourced and financed,
well equipped to undertake its duties,
professionally trained,
dynamically led, and
that the terms and conditions of service for members of the Sierra Leone Police reflect the importance of the task they perform.
The Role of the People
In order that our police officers can successfully fulfil our expectations, it is essential that all people of Sierra Leone help and support them at all times.
Conclusion
Our aim is to see a reborn Sierra Leone Police, which will be a force for good in our Nation.
His Excellency the President Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
Box 1: The Sierra Leone Policing Charter – August 1998
Significantly, in the same year and at this very early stage of the police reform process, the future policing doctrine of Sierra Leone was first defined as Local Needs Policing, which has guided police reform to this day. In its basic form, Local Needs Policing was defined as: “Policing that meets the expectations and need of the local community and reflects national standards and objectives”28. Further details on how the concept of Local Needs Policing was developed in Sierra Leone are provided in Box 2, as recalled by Adrian Horn, one of the key advisers to the SLP in the early stages of the transformation process, who initiated the concept.
Box 2: Local Needs Policing29
“We needed some simple, key statements on what the Government and the police wanted and valued, and a policing model for the future.
“My previous involvements in developing change were usually constrained by systems and procedures which only allowed tinkering and not ‘blue sky’ thinking. This new challenge was different. We knew that future policing in Sierra Leone had to be based in the community and work within the community. It had to address a number of fundamental issues.
“There was a need for a complete restructuring of the police service in Sierra Leone.
Restructuring necessitates not merely the drawing up of a new organisational structure.
To achieve sustainable change, there has to be alteration in the attitudes and behaviour of all police officers, together with a critical shift in the management culture of the organisation.
“Everybody who we met and talked to from outside Sierra Leone all had different experiences of policing and worked with different models. Often these were called
‘Community Policing,’ but there were as many models and concepts of ‘Community Policing’ as there were people. What was needed was a model that encapsulated all the good things that were suitable to the needs of Sierra Leone – not a model from outside that may not work.
“We were also conscious that, despite Sierra Leone being a relatively small country, there were great variations in the style of policing required in particular areas and at different times. The policing requirements in Kono were very different to those required in Freetown or Bo. The style of policing would have to respond to changing circumstances and needs as time went on.
“So, stripping it all back to basics, and applying KISS (Keep It Simple) principles, a system of policing was required that met the needs and expectations of the local community. However, there had to be standards and compliance with policy, systems and procedures. The second key element was that such a system of policing
had to be delivered within national standards. The third element was to determine the most efficient and effective management structure and working practices that delivered this model of policing.
“What shall we call it? This was important. The name would be an important marketing tool, and move everyone away from their own pre-conceived ideas about community policing. It would help ensure that a model was developed that was based on what Sierra Leone required, not what a ‘foreign’ model dictated.
“Applying KISS, the name was obvious – Local Needs Policing, with the simple acronym LNP. Putting these elements together, we can define LNP as:
‘A system of policing that meets the needs and expectations of the local community, delivered within a national framework of standards and guidelines.’
“The basic organisational structure was the Local Command Unit (LCU): ‘A body of people, effectively and efficiently managed, accountable and with devolved authority, and designed to deliver the policing needs of the local community’.
“Within these two simple definitions were all the elements required to rebuild the Sierra Leone Police and address the many concerns that had been expressed”.
Box 2: Continued
In 1998, a survey conducted by the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF) (summarised in Table 1) confirmed that the SLP were not well regarded by the public.
Although this is a relatively small survey, the lack of public confidence in the SLP at the time, particularly the perception that the SLP were totally corrupt, was pervasive among the people. Attacking institutional corruption, especially prevalent amongst higher ranks of the SLP, became one of the main targets of reform and was one of the central challenges of the new Local Needs Policing doctrine. Clearly, police reform had a lot to accomplish before the people began to see their police force as their protectors.
1998 was also a time where, as one senior DfID advisor noted, “the security sector did not exist. Not only did we not tackle the military in DfID generally, or in the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), we also were not
considering the legal sector or the police as part of the security sector at that time”31. Thus, while being vital, developments within the SLP were treated in relative isolation vis-à-vis other security-related programming. This is not to say that regular meetings and informal coordination were not taking place both within and across the programmes involved in security transformation in Sierra Leone. However, programmes were not integrated, and at the time, the need to do so was not clearly articulated or fully realized.
Following the 1999 deployment of the SILSEP team to the MoD and the Office of the National Security Advisor, by 2000, there was a recognition, at least on paper, that SLP reforms should be linked with reforms under SILSEP as well as the Law Development Project (see below). It was also accepted that links needed to be established to the Anti-Corruption Programme, efforts to rebuild professionalism and efficiency in the civil service, and – because of the complementary role of traditional and customary systems of policing and justice – work conducted to restore civil society and support amongst paramount chiefs and local government. However, without formalized linkages between the
Table 1: The Image of the SLP30
different programmes, a joined up approach could not be realized and each programme continued largely in isolation.
When rebels invaded Freetown in January 1999, the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF) was forced to leave the country and all activities effectively ground to a halt. Only in August that year, following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, was the full CPDTF able to redeploy and recommence work. It was clearly and urgently understood that while the process of transforming the security system initially had been initiated out of concern over the involvement of the armed forces in politics, the brunt of security tasks in a stable Sierra Leone would fall on the SLP. This policy has been followed consistently ever since, even if the armed forces are called upon to back up the police in cases of emergency.
At the same time, with respect to the implementation of DDR in 1999 and beyond, it had become clear that the SLP would be instrumental in enabling conflict prevention and providing stability in the resettlement and rehabilitation process of ex-combatants. The task at hand was substantial, not least in logistical terms. For instance, all personnel files had been destroyed and, as recalled by one of the procurement advisors involved at the time, a police force of several thousands existed in name, but with ”12 working vehicles and no reasonable uniforms”32.
In particular, there was very limited SLP presence outside of Freetown, let alone open lines of communication to the leadership in the capital. The establishment of a working police force in rural areas was therefore regarded as urgently needed. This was important, both in terms of establishing security, but also in terms of establishing the legitimacy of the state as a security provider across the country. This process picked up from 1999 and accelerated through 2001-2002, initially spreading to Port Loko, Moyamba, Kenema, Pujehun and Bonthe, areas that were relatively stable at the time, compared to places such as Kono and Makeni. This led to DfID support of the SLP through a procurement programme for vehicles and communications equipment to support for the reestablishment of civilian policing. (When the project came to an end in mid-
2007, a total of £2.3 million had been spent on vehicle and communications equipment through two projects)33.
The CPDTF was transformed into the Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) in 2000. Although initially referred to as a
‘Commonwealth Project’, in reality funding for the project was provided entirely by DfID and, after 2001, through additional funding from the UK’s Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP). The main focus of the CCSSP – as had been the case with the CPDTF – was to support operational activities of the SLP, including capacity-building. As part of this process, Operation Phoenix was implemented to introduce ‘effective visible policing’. As the title of the operation suggests, its focus was on re-establishing the SLP’s:
“…rightful primacy in the maintenance of public tranquillity and law enforcement […]. There is a need for visible targeted policing to be introduced on a twenty-four hour basis every day of the year.
Such policing will be essential to the peace process by increasing public confidence in the rule of law and indirectly encouraging inward investment to the country”34.
The general breakdown of state institutions and infrastructure during the war had also had a fundamental impact on the SLP. Almost all police buildings, as point of departure neglected before the war, suffered further damage by the rebel forces; lines of command had been cut and pockets of SLP officers worked without guidance from headquarters in Freetown. Whilst the police force had not been implicated in coups in the direct way that the armed forces had, the SLP had in large measure lost the confidence of the population through a combination of perceptions of corruption, impotence in the face of the rebels, and generally aggressive behaviour prior to the war. Tasks were, as noted by one of the police officers engaged in reform efforts, performed “with blatant disregard for Human Rights […]. The Sierra Leone Police was considered a spent force at the time, with little or no logistical support to enhance its capability […]”35. The police had effectively become a self-enclosed organization, lacking in openness, pro-activeness and orientation towards community accountability.
In short, there was no reference to either modern day policing or strategic planning.
This was the state of affairs in the SLP when the then President, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, appointed expatriate and retired UK Police officer Keith Biddle as Inspector-General of Police (IGP) in November 1999. Biddle was appointed to the position for an initial two-year period (which was extended until June 2003).
He had come to Sierra Leone as head of the CPDTF and planned to launch the programme in 1997, but was delayed until 1998 due to the AFRC coup. Biddle’s appointment as IGP was a far less contentious choice than, for example, appointing a UK national as the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Biddle’s leadership and direction proved vital in a difficult environment. He played a crucial role developing confidence in the rebuilding of the SLP, since all parties viewed him as not subject to political interference and loyalties, which a Sierra Leonean candidate inevitably would have been. This role as an external catalyst helped develop confidence amongst younger officers and was undoubtedly aided by Biddle’s own strong personality and willingness to be both visible and to make decisions on the ground.
Biddle’s leadership meant that difficult decisions were made, including restructuring of the rank structure, which had become extremely top-heavy.
As one senior SLP officer noted “we needed a neutral person to come in. He cleaned up”36. Another SLP officer noted that “If outsiders had not come, there would have been a lot of political pressure on the IGP at the time”37. The decision to reduce the number of SLP ranks from 22 to 10 provided much needed space to clarify and redefine the roles and responsibilities of police personnel. The ranks of Sub-Inspector and Corporal were removed completely;
those affected were demoted to Sergeants and Constables, respectively, a move that was extremely sensitive given the SLP’s military-style rank-conscious organisation. This controversial decision continues to be felt within the organization today.
One of the key effects of reducing the number of ranks was the shortening of internal lines of communication and flattening of the hierarchy. It also affected the extremely centralised command system in which the Office of the Inspector General of Police controlled virtually all police matters. The situation was summed up by one senior SLP officer as “when the phone rings and the IGP calls, one salutes the phone”38. This centralisation had narrowed the decision- making structure significantly, centring it around one individual, the IFP. A key element in the transformation process instigated by Biddle therefore became the development of a strong management team that was partly filled by younger officers being speedily promoted up through the SLP hierarchy. “From the outset of the CPDTF we asked DfID to earmark £350,000 for senior management training and development. Well-educated officers with reputations for integrity and hard work were selected for the programme which was centred on a series of special courses delivered at the UK Police Staff College at Bramshill. Some 60 SLP officers went through this training, which produced a mainly young and vibrant senior management cadre. Thus, in order to ensure sustainable, improved SLP management, the traditional seniority system of promotions and appointments was broken”39.
With the formation of what became known as the Executive Management Board, the highest decision-making body in the SLP was put in place and a culture of open debate around decisions and policies was instituted that proved invaluable in creating a sense of community among SLP’s leadership. This further developed confidence amongst the SLP, as expressed by Kadi Fakondo, Assistant Inspector-General of the SLP: “We knew what we wanted, we were advised, mentored, we were very confident at that [senior] level. It could easily have been ‘yes sir, yes sir, yes sir’ if they had come in uniform. The fact that they consulted before taking anything to the Police Council [the highest decision- making body for the SLP] made all the difference. There was this sense that we knew where we wanted to go”40. This clear management structure and more open officer-management communications were crucial in getting SLP officers to buy in to the new service that was being established.
One of the key innovations in the immediate aftermath of the conflict was the establishment of Family Support Units (FSUs) within the SLP. They were a direct response to urgently needed public services and were spearheaded by current SLP Assistant Inspector-General Kadi Fakondo, one of the SLP’s key figures in post-conflict Sierra Leone. The aims and outline of the innovative FSU programme are described by Ms Fakondo in Box 3.
Fundamentally, the requirements of a democratic police force are that it is able to identify and deal with threats against the state, including violent disorder and armed criminality. It was recognized that this would require work with sensitive issues such as intelligence gathering within the Special Branch and the re- arming of the Operational Support Group within the Special Security Division.
For example, development assistance before the African and Global Conflict Prevention Pools were established in the early 2000s, was deemed appropriate only for non-lethal equipment and associated training and non-covert special branch activities. Support for other elements was passed on for consideration by the FCO.
One of the most controversial decisions taken in the late 1990s was to invest substantially in the Special Security Division (SSD). Up until the 1992 coup, the SSD had been Siaka Stevens’ personal security force, and consequently there was a strong inclination in the executive branch to dismantle the SSD altogether following the war. However, when the RUF and remnants of the AFRC attacked Freetown in January 1999, the SSD came to play a vital role in the defence of the city. This loyalty led to a complete shift in perceptions of the force and fuelled debates on disbanding the armed forces, replacing them with an expanded and armed police force41.
At the same time as the doctrine of police primacy was being consolidated, ECOMOG was withdrawing from military and policing activity and Sierra Leone was left, suddenly, with no army, except a small Nigerian force. Consequently, the then ECOMOG commander, forced by circumstances, stated that given the doctrine of police primacy, the SLP should start policing – and fast. The security vacuum created by ECOMOG’s withdrawal was in danger of being