was partly a consequence of the lack of political will to institute radical changes within the ministry. The net result has been that the SLP continue to operate in the accountability regime set out by the Police Council. Of equal importance has been the converse issue of the SLP not being appropriately represented in Cabinet due to a weak Ministry of Internal Affairs.
At the same time, the separation of the ONS from the Office of the President remains both a core strength and an Achilles’ heel. The current professional reputation of the National Security Coordinator means that the ONS remains apolitical, but in terms of sustainability there is a long way to go to create the kind of internal culture that would allow the ONS to develop a comprehensive succession strategy and build on the considerable successes of the ONS to date. This is particularly important, given that the ONS is an island of competence amongst a number of Government institutions that lack capacity to lead. There is a danger that the ONS will step beyond its mandate, and whilst a strong ONS is necessary to a secure future of Sierra Leone, it cannot do everything.
The Parliamentary Oversight Committee on Defence, Internal and Presidential Affairs (POCDI&PA) is specifically mandated to oversee agencies that provide security. However, the Committee faces a number of substantial challenges to performing its role effectively. As point of departure there is a lack of clarity surrounding the Committee’s functions, noticeable in the Committee’s name.
In addition, while the Committee’s mandate is restricted to issues of defence, internal and presidential affairs and does not include security as provided by the SLP and intelligence, it has effectively extended its remit to these areas.
There has also been an overlap between the POCDI&PA mandate and other parliamentary oversight committees, as the former does not have exclusive power and authority over defence appointments or budgetary issues. Other challenges to the efficient work of POCDI&PA include the lack of human financial and material resources. Finally, the selection of the 16 Committee members, of whom one is a woman, is not based on knowledge of the security system – appointments occur through consultation with party leaders in Parliament246.
In concluding this section on oversight mechanisms, the critical role of civil society in promoting accountability and contributing to decision-making processes around security should be noted. Important initiatives have been taken through mechanisms such as the Security Sector Review and programmes such as Conciliation Resources’ Strengthening Citizens’ Security programme.
As with the rest of the security actors in Sierra Leone, the issue of lack of resources and at times operational capacity has been decisive and remains a substantial challenge to the transformation process in the near to long-term.
Conclusion
Elections in 2002 were held in the immediate aftermath of conflict and in an environment that had not yet fully stabilized. Moreover, they were held when there was significant in-country security and logistics support from the UN.
Even so, it was a testament to how far the SLP in particular had come in a short period of time that they were able to ensure that the elections were a success. The 2007 elections, on the other hand, in some ways held much greater challenges, both for the SLP and Sierra Leone’s security system as a whole. In simple terms, they operated with less ‘background security’ support, but in an arguably much more stable environment. The SLP published their Election Strategy in April 2006; its main thrust was to work with the National Security Architecture247.
At the ONS-level, discussions had begun by mid-2006 on security needs to enable the conduct of the elections. As elections drew closer, the coordination forum provided by the ONS for the National Electoral Commission (NEC), the SLP and other security institutions engendered a structured approach that covered all aspects of the elections – before, during and after248. In the rather tense atmosphere surrounding the elections, ONS leadership was vital in showing, domestically and internationally, that the security system was indeed a coherent system of actors that spoke with one voice. In the end, the SLPP lost the elections to the APC and a new Government took over. Considering the state of affairs in Sierra Leone in the early 2000s, this is a significant measure of success for the security system transformation process. It becomes an all the more significant success when one considers that political buy-in to
the security system transformation process had diminished considerably by 2005 (by 2007, NSC meetings had not been held for two years). While general commitment to the transformation process might have been there, the 2007 general elections had become the main preoccupation of the Government.
Any strategic considerations on behalf of the UK into 2008 must involve the development of a strategy for its exit from the security system transformation process. This is an extremely difficult and sensitive process. The role of the UK in Sierra Leone, particularly for the last eight years, has created a strong tie between the two Governments. In some cases, the UK acts both as an important catalyst for change, but also as a guarantor of political independence amongst a set of institutions that became heavily politicised in the pre-war period and were all but destroyed during the conflict. An exit strategy has to be planned carefully and phased in, so as to prevent the lack of oversight and civilian capacity across Government leading to a further politicisation of organisations in a position to abuse power. If this occurs, Sierra Leone will find itself back in the same set of circumstances that led to the war in the first place. Moreover, as ONS and CISU create more distinct identities, what cooperation is going to look like needs to be carefully considered.
This is all the more stark when the lack of resources available to the Government of Sierra Leone is considered. Sierra Leone has none, the state is virtually bankrupt, and is almost entirely dependent on external resources. The only reason why the country is stable is that external resources provide funding.
Unrealistic expectations of progress driven by planning imperatives of development agencies remain a key issue. As one participant notes: “We throw it into Sierra Leone and expect it to be sorted in three or four years. I think we need to be realistic with the time frames involved”249. One of the key features of the successes in Sierra Leone is the long-term nature of the initial involvement of the UK and the MoU. This has been an unusually long commitment, but the result has been to instil confidence in the future that is all too absent in several other development environments. Once the period of the MoU is over, a return to a three-year project cycle with the accompanying uncertainty could have a significantly negative effect on confidence of and in the system of security institutions that has been established250.