Theories of Citizenship

T.H. Marshall (1950) is often cited as laying the foundations for modern citizenship studies, though his definitions do not go uncontested (e.g. Tilly, 1995; Turner 1990). Marshall’s (1950, 1992) theory of citizenship concerned the vertical relation between an individual and a governing body—though not a necessarily a state—and the three domains from which rights and obligations proceeded: civic, political, and social. Marshall (1992) claimed that civil rights entail liberty of the person; freedom of speech, thoughts, and faith; and the right to justice and to own property. He explained that political rights enable individuals to participate and exercise political power in local governments and that social rights encompass welfare, security, sharing in society, and living a civilized life in accordance with the prevalent norms and standards of society.

Since Marshall’s conceptualization, citizenship theory has developed. A number of scholars (e.g.

Bosniak, 2000, 2006; Lister, 2007; Kivisto & Faist, 2009; Purcell, 2003; Shklar, 1991; Yuval-Davis, 2006) have acknowledged the multitude of definitions, applications, and contestations of citizenship.

Purcell (2003) has observed that due to globalization and migration, a comprehensive definition is increasingly difficult to pin down and a number of scholars (e.g. Bloemraad et al., 2008; Christensen &

Jensen, 2011; Delanty, 2003; Joppke, 1999) have also claimed that both immigration and globalization fundamentally challenge the classic, nation-state based citizenship model. Yuval-Davis (2006) has written that “there has never been a complete overlap between the boundaries of the national

community and the boundaries of the population that lives in a particular state” (p. 207) and Varsanyi (2005) has furthermore acknowledged that undocumented immigration is becoming more prominent

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precisely due to globalization. Thus, explicitly defining “citizenship” theoretically is difficult precisely because the lived realities are constantly changing.

3.4.1.1 Dimensions of Citizenship

Though there is no consensus, Sklar (1991) has claimed that “there is no notion more central in politics than citizenship” (p.1). What is generally accepted in international law is that citizenship entails a relationship between an individual and the nation-state, and the rights and responsibilities resulting from this relationship (e.g. Bauböck, 2010; Marshall, 1992; Tilly, 1995, Turner, 1993; Vink &

Bauböck, 2013). However, various citizenship scholars have observed that the legal aspect is only one dimension of citizenship. For example, Carens (2000) claimed that citizenship entails the legal, political, and psychological. Vink and Bauböck (2013) described citizenship as the three dimensional combination of membership status; rights and duties; and active civic, social, and political

participation. Coutin (1999) argued that citizenship entails the formal legal relationship between an individual and the state, the active engagement of an individual in community life, the collective identity to a nation, or a matter of individual rights and justice. Bosniak (2000) wrote that “in an effort to bring order to what is otherwise a very chaotic field, several analysts have proposed organizing schema” (p. 455), which includes citizenship as: legal status, rights, political activity, and collective identity or sentiment. While relatively new, this sentimental aspect of citizenship is gaining traction in scholarship, and scholars increasingly argue that how individuals feel about their place in their societies is just as important as their citizenship-as-legal identity (e.g. Bloemraad et al., 2008; Kostakopoulou, 2003). In fact, Delanty (2003) argued that the “cognitive dimension” of citizenship, e.g. how people make sense of and perceive their places in society, as well as undertake actions, is one of the most important dimensions of citizenship and furthermore suggested the need for more knowledge and theoretical framework to understand these processes.

Rather than arriving at a precise definition, what is important in this context is to acknowledge that there are various facets of citizenship that go beyond legal status. Notably, as Bosniak (2000) has emphasized, the various dimensions of citizenship influence each other; the way individuals feel about and experience citizenship is a combination of political, legal, and social worlds. This idea is

reinforced by Marshall’s (1992) observation that citizenship status does not eliminate inequalities.

Human rights scholar Bhabha (2009, 2011) has argued that while citizenship status is no guarantee for

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the attainment of a good life, both Bhabha (2009, 2011) and Blitz (2011) have also argued that lack of legal recognition affects the enjoyment of civil and political rights; lives outside of legality are

precarious. Bhabha (2011) wrote: “despite the optimistic rhetoric of universal rights proclaimed in international legal instruments…claims for the enjoyment of human citizenship and its associated benefits are increasingly mediated by proof of legal identity, nationality, or immigration status” (p. 13).

The relationship between the legal and sentimental dimensions of citizenship appears to be a

complicated one, which is why an exploration of the relationship between ULS and SofB in everyday life can lead to greater understanding of the need for legal status in everyday life.

Furthermore, citizenship status is no guarantee that individuals are committed to or attached to their nations. For example, Aleinikoff and Rumbaut (1998) have claimed that “people who are formally and legally recognized as members may not perceive themselves as full members…and persons formally excluded from membership may feel and act as if they are full members” (p. 14-15). Similarly, Yuval-Davis (2006) has also found that belonging does not necessarily nor always constitute a feature of citizenship. This scholarship points to the duality of citizenship: citizenship as legal status to a nation-state does not guarantee SofB to that particular nation-nation-state, yet to achieve a SofB to the peoples, places, and nation, legal or citizenship status, recognition, or validation is not necessarily required.

Together, this scholarship on citizenship demonstrates the complexity of citizenship’s interrelated dimensions. It furthermore suggests that the 1.5GUY can achieve SofB despite their ULS, as the way that legal recognition is produced from above is not necessarily how belonging is practiced in everyday life. An exploration of individuals living outside the legal boundaries of citizenship can potentially shed light on conceptual framework through which to understand these processes, including how non-citizens experiences this emotional dimensions.

3.4.1.2 The Right to Stay

3.4.1.2.1 Expanding the Boundaries of Citizenship

Scholars have begun to question the boundaries of nation-state based citizenship. For example, Bosniak (2000) and Coutin (1999) have both asked if citizenship is necessarily bound to the nation-state, especially as existing immigration policies do not adequately address the lived realities of individuals living between the contradictions of residency and ULS. While discussing the expanding boundaries of citizenship, scholars have discussed the right to stay (e.g. Carens 2010), as well as made

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arguments for the legal recognition for undocumented immigrants. Coutin (1999) has argued that

“unauthorized immigrants who demonstrate civic involvement, social deservedness, and national loyalty can argue that they merit legal residency” (p. 587; see also Coutin, 2002) due to their social participation such as going to school, building a family, establishing a residency, and working.

Brubaker (2010) has also argued that “the longer the period of settlement without citizenship, and the more integrated such resident non-members…the stronger is their case for full membership” (p. 72).

Notably, the traditional framework of citizenship no longer captures the lived realities of individuals living within the confines of a nation-state, but outside the borders of legal recognition. It is precisely due to these contradictions that studying the everyday SofB for the youth who live these contradictions is both empirically and theoretically interesting.

3.4.1.2.2 Spatial Rights

In discussions of how belonging is experienced and negotiated, Yuval-Davis (2006) has pointed to

“spatial rights” which result from citizenship status, for example the right to enter a state, territory, or political community; the right to remain once one has entered; the right to migrate; the right of abode;

the right to work; and the right to plan a future when one lives. The right to mobility and residency has been furthermore established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which established that

“everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state”

(Article 13:1,2). The reality, however, is that not everyone has the right to indefinite stay within their current place of residency—a fundamental right which comes from citizenship status. Bhabha (1999) has conceptualized the capacity to be expelled from a nation as “a critical signifier of non-belonging”

(p. 19) and argued that the “the right to unqualified indefinite residence is a key attribute of nationality”

(p. 19). Bhabha (1999) has further observed that while non-legal individuals may “live permanently and feel they ‘belong’” (p. 12), long-term residency alone cannot guarantee the right to stay: “place itself is not a sufficient criterion of qualification” (p. 12). The same notion extends to 1.5GUY: though they are long-term residents, they are not shielded from the possibilities of displacement, which likely has an impact on their everyday SofB.

3.4.1.2.3 Disbelonging

The potential for displacement from one’s place of residency has been conceptualized by Australian Ecofeminist and Philosopher Plumwood (2002) to be “disbelonging.” Though this concept has been

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used in a different geographic, cultural, and legal context to capture aboriginal rights, the concept can nonetheless shed light on the emotional impact of the inability to be spatially secure. Plumwood (2002) wrote that “those who are most vulnerable and powerless are most at risk of losing control over their ability to remain in a home place or place of attachment” (2002:362). Plumwood (2002) has furthermore argued that disbelonging is not a passive state, but rather an active process of denial or rejection of ties, origins, or attachments. Due to the conscious and purposeful denial, the concept of disbelonging is reminiscent of non-recognition. Together, both concepts can potentially help capture the emotional reactions related to perceived social injustices in everyday life as experienced by 1.5GUY, including the relationship between ULS and SofB.

3.4.1.2.4 The “Condition of Illegality”

Scholars studying undocumented immigration in the United States have conceptualized the ability to be displaced due to lack of legal or citizenship status as the “condition of illegality” (de Genova 1998, 2002; de Genova & Peutz 2010; Kanstroom 2010, 2012). Anthropologist de Genova (2002) has explained this to be a “spatialized social condition,” which “reproduces the physical borders of nation-states in the everyday life of innumerable places throughout the interiors of the migrant-receiving states” (p. 439), including racializing immigrants as “‘illegal aliens’” (p. 439). Some scholars (e.g.

Coutin, 2005; de Genova, 2002) have argued that the constant repression and surveillance leads to vulnerability in everyday life. In her research on undocumented immigrants in Israel, Willen (2007) conceptualized the threat of deportation as “abjectivity,” or the potential to be cast away or expelled.

Willen (2007) found that legal abjectivity has “profound impact on undocumented migrants’ modes of being-in-the-world” (p. 27; see also Gonzales & Chavez, 2012), including consequences which

manifests themselves through somatic symptoms. However, Coutin (2003), Delgado (1993), Willen (2007) and Zlolniski (2006) have, in various social, geographic, and historical contexts, also found that lack of legal status does not necessarily nor always influence undocumented people’s everyday lives.

More research is required to understand how ULS does and does not impact everyday lives, including how the “condition of illegality” influences SofB for 1.5GUY.

3.4.1.2.5 Liminal Legality

Another legal nuance that could influence the everyday lives of 1.5GUY and is related to legal

recognition is the concept of “liminal legality.” Menjívar (2006) originally applied the term to capture

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the movement between legal and non-legal statuses, as well as the extended indefiniteness, instability, and ambiguity that results from various temporary legal statuses for undocumented adults in the United States. As previously noted (section 2.5.4) some 1.5GUY are potentially eligible for a temporary, two-year legal stay through DACA, which in theory mitigates their vulnerability to deportation. Due to the temporary protections that DACA provides, Cebulko (2014) used the term in reference to the 1.5GUY who have no long-term legal status, as well as youth whose legal statues can change between

undocumented, DACAmented, and other short term legal statuses. Bloemraad (2013) has found that legal statuses marked by fluidity can offer both hope to individuals awaiting legalization, but can also reinforce ambiguity precariousness. Purcell (2007) has argued that it is critical for governments to provide stability when enforcing the law in liberal democracies. Because DACA is temporary and unstable, this scholarship together suggests that temporary legal recognition has implications for social injustices, including experiences of non-recognition that shape SofB. Further, discussions about this non-binary concept inspire questions about if SofB is liminal or ambiguous, rather than binary—

questions that an empirical exploration can answer.