There is one thing even more vital to science than intelligent methods; and that is, the sincere desire to find out the truth, whatever it may be. (CP 5.84)
The aim of this chapter is to outline the significance‐effect as both the normative significance‐effect and the sub‐cognitive significance‐effect, and to show how these significance‐effects are related to the fundamental signs.
The normative significance‐effect is an effect which is related to the normative fundamental sign, and hence to knowledge communication of technical terms within scientific knowledge domains. The sub‐cognitive significance‐effect is an effect related to the sub‐cognitive fundamental sign – it is an effect depending upon its strength that can enable ideas deep down in the bottomless lake to be affected and brought into upward motion. For both significance‐effects it holds true that they are effects, which are defined as the time span from the second an interpreter has been exposed to a sign to the interpreter has interpreted it. Consequently, the strength of the significance‐
effect depends upon the prior knowledge level or emotional experience of the interpreter. The more experience the interpreter has about a sign, the shorter
the interpretative distance is. The more the interpreter based on experience is able to recognize the feelings or emotions communicated by the sign, the shorter the interpretation distance is. Having this tentative definition in mind, let us take a closer look at the normative significance‐effect.
The normative significance‐effect designates the interpretative distance between a sign (a technical term) and the interpretant (correct interpretation of a technical term) – the shorter the distance is, the more powerful is the normative significance‐effect. The interpreter reflects his level of knowledge in the sign – the normative significance‐effect depends upon how much he
“sees”.
• The normative significance‐effect depends upon the sub‐cognitive significance‐effect
• The normative significance‐effect is related to medisense
• The normative significance‐effect is related to the normative fundamental sign
• The normative significance‐effect is related to the logical interpretant
The interpretative distance of the normative significance‐effect
The normative significance‐effect is an effect of significance or communication of meaning that occurs whenever some mind or minds become exposed to a technical concept. The basic idea of the normative significance‐effect is that the more knowledge an interpreter possesses about a given concept, the more information the concept communicates to the interpreter. The background for the discovery of the normative significance‐effect was the following rather
Chapter 2 – The Significance‐effect
There is one thing even more vital to science than intelligent methods; and that is, the sincere desire to find out the truth, whatever it may be. (CP 5.84)
The aim of this chapter is to outline the significance‐effect as both the normative significance‐effect and the sub‐cognitive significance‐effect, and to show how these significance‐effects are related to the fundamental signs.
The normative significance‐effect is an effect which is related to the normative fundamental sign, and hence to knowledge communication of technical terms within scientific knowledge domains. The sub‐cognitive significance‐effect is an effect related to the sub‐cognitive fundamental sign – it is an effect depending upon its strength that can enable ideas deep down in the bottomless lake to be affected and brought into upward motion. For both significance‐effects it holds true that they are effects, which are defined as the time span from the second an interpreter has been exposed to a sign to the interpreter has interpreted it. Consequently, the strength of the significance‐
effect depends upon the prior knowledge level or emotional experience of the interpreter. The more experience the interpreter has about a sign, the shorter
the interpretative distance is. The more the interpreter based on experience is able to recognize the feelings or emotions communicated by the sign, the shorter the interpretation distance is. Having this tentative definition in mind, let us take a closer look at the normative significance‐effect.
The normative significance‐effect designates the interpretative distance between a sign (a technical term) and the interpretant (correct interpretation of a technical term) – the shorter the distance is, the more powerful is the normative significance‐effect. The interpreter reflects his level of knowledge in the sign – the normative significance‐effect depends upon how much he
“sees”.
• The normative significance‐effect depends upon the sub‐cognitive significance‐effect
• The normative significance‐effect is related to medisense
• The normative significance‐effect is related to the normative fundamental sign
• The normative significance‐effect is related to the logical interpretant
The interpretative distance of the normative significance‐effect
The normative significance‐effect is an effect of significance or communication of meaning that occurs whenever some mind or minds become exposed to a technical concept. The basic idea of the normative significance‐effect is that the more knowledge an interpreter possesses about a given concept, the more information the concept communicates to the interpreter. The background for the discovery of the normative significance‐effect was the following rather
trivial row of observations: a concept such as activity stemming from the knowledge domain OT communicates more precise and structured knowledge to an occupational therapist than the same concept seems to communicate to someone outside the knowledge domain. The concept semeiosis communicates more precise and structured knowledge to a semeiotician than to someone without prior knowledge of semeiotic. An x‐ray picture communicates more knowledge to a surgeon than to a layman. Consequently, it seems that concepts communicate knowledge (i) in accordance to the universe of discourse and (ii) in accordance to the collateral knowledge of the interpreter: the more knowledge the interpreter seems to have about a given concept, the greater effect in terms of knowledge communication the concept seems to have upon the interpreter. In this way, the knowledge level of the interpreter becomes reflected in the concept. The normative significance‐
effect is observed and described within technical languages within knowledge domains (Thellefsen 2002).
Consequently, it seems to be an undeniable fact that the more knowledge an interpreter possesses concerning a given concept, the shorter the interpretational distance is. This is the basic definition of the normative significance‐effect (Thellefsen & Thellefsen 2004, Thellefsen, Sørensen &
Andersen 2006).
The normative significance‐effect is the effect of sign‐mediated communication. And it is interesting for researchers in communication studies, because it proves that concepts communicate meaning in accordance with the existing knowledge level of the interpreter. The knowledge level is the
interpreter’s amount of knowledge relevant to a given sign. It shows that all kinds of communication are dynamic; it shows e.g. that scientific communication creates symbolic structures – i.e. terminologies, taxonomies and standards ‐ it shows that, within scientific terminologies, some concepts carry more weight, they are more significant, or they are of greater value than others simply because they include, communicate, and maintain basic values agreed on by a historical knowledge domain. These fundamental concepts form a conceptual structure that I refer to as the fundamental sign – or that which is common in a community, its sense of community, the sub‐cognitive fundamental sign (Thellefsen 2002, 2004, 2005a). With the discovery of the normative significance‐effect, it is possible to show that knowledge is organized in accordance with the normative fundamental sign of any knowledge domain.
The general formal conditions of the normative significance‐effect
One of the main points of the significance‐effect is that the knowledge level of the interpreter becomes reflected in the concept. It seems that signs are able to release and refer to a certain experienced memory in the interpreter.
Within scientific knowledge domains, this experienced memory seems primarily to be logically and rationally based. Communicating the concept
“semeiosis” to an interpreter within the knowledge domain of sign theories will probably cause an interpretant concerning the technical aspect of sign development, i.e. unlimited semeiosis as a sign development and sign interpretation. In other cases, e.g. within the fields of marketing and
trivial row of observations: a concept such as activity stemming from the knowledge domain OT communicates more precise and structured knowledge to an occupational therapist than the same concept seems to communicate to someone outside the knowledge domain. The concept semeiosis communicates more precise and structured knowledge to a semeiotician than to someone without prior knowledge of semeiotic. An x‐ray picture communicates more knowledge to a surgeon than to a layman. Consequently, it seems that concepts communicate knowledge (i) in accordance to the universe of discourse and (ii) in accordance to the collateral knowledge of the interpreter: the more knowledge the interpreter seems to have about a given concept, the greater effect in terms of knowledge communication the concept seems to have upon the interpreter. In this way, the knowledge level of the interpreter becomes reflected in the concept. The normative significance‐
effect is observed and described within technical languages within knowledge domains (Thellefsen 2002).
Consequently, it seems to be an undeniable fact that the more knowledge an interpreter possesses concerning a given concept, the shorter the interpretational distance is. This is the basic definition of the normative significance‐effect (Thellefsen & Thellefsen 2004, Thellefsen, Sørensen &
Andersen 2006).
The normative significance‐effect is the effect of sign‐mediated communication. And it is interesting for researchers in communication studies, because it proves that concepts communicate meaning in accordance with the existing knowledge level of the interpreter. The knowledge level is the
interpreter’s amount of knowledge relevant to a given sign. It shows that all kinds of communication are dynamic; it shows e.g. that scientific communication creates symbolic structures – i.e. terminologies, taxonomies and standards ‐ it shows that, within scientific terminologies, some concepts carry more weight, they are more significant, or they are of greater value than others simply because they include, communicate, and maintain basic values agreed on by a historical knowledge domain. These fundamental concepts form a conceptual structure that I refer to as the fundamental sign – or that which is common in a community, its sense of community, the sub‐cognitive fundamental sign (Thellefsen 2002, 2004, 2005a). With the discovery of the normative significance‐effect, it is possible to show that knowledge is organized in accordance with the normative fundamental sign of any knowledge domain.
The general formal conditions of the normative significance‐effect
One of the main points of the significance‐effect is that the knowledge level of the interpreter becomes reflected in the concept. It seems that signs are able to release and refer to a certain experienced memory in the interpreter.
Within scientific knowledge domains, this experienced memory seems primarily to be logically and rationally based. Communicating the concept
“semeiosis” to an interpreter within the knowledge domain of sign theories will probably cause an interpretant concerning the technical aspect of sign development, i.e. unlimited semeiosis as a sign development and sign interpretation. In other cases, e.g. within the fields of marketing and
commercials, signs may be strategically used to awaken certain emotional memories enabling us to relate to a given product, and the awakening of emotional memories might eventually persuade us to buy the given product.
This kind of significance‐effect is not based on rational persuasion, but rather on emotional considerations. If the sign does awaken emotional or rational effects in the interpreter, it must be because the interpreter shares qualities or values with the sign to such a degree that the interpreter is able to reflect himself in the sign, i.e. agree on the premises and conclusion of the argument, or be sympathetic about the values communicated by an utterer.
Consequently, both the normative and the sub‐cognitive significance‐effect are tied to the individual as a kind of quasi‐empathetic11 experience, but the effect is by no means solely individual. Both the normative and the sub‐cognitive significance‐effect are developed within the scope of Peircean semeiotic;
therefore it is rooted in the same scholastic realism. This means that any communication involves an utterer and an interpreter, and in order for the communication to be successful to some degree it must be general. If this is
11 It is quasi‐empathetic experience since the interpreter reflects himself in the sign because he is able to identify qualities in the sign, which he himself contains or desires to contain. He sees himself through the “eyes” of the sign, so to speak. He learns from the sign, and the sign learns from him As Peirce writes in the article “Some consequences of Four Incapacities” (1868): “But since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn round and say: "You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought." In fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other; each increase of a man's information involves and is involved by, a corresponding increase of a word's information”. (CP. 5.313)
not the case, the utterer cannot communicate to an exterior world and not even to his future self; thus no intelligible communication can take place.
It is also possible to imagine a whole group of people, e.g. a user group, a group of brand users, or the inhabitants of a knowledge domain, becoming exposed to the same signs, i.e. a given brand or a given terminology, and experiencing nearly the same significance‐effect. Here, the significance‐effect is not tied to the individual, although it is the individual who experiences the significance‐effect. Rather, it is tied to the characteristics of the group of people. In a scientific knowledge domain, the researchers share the same terminology; within a user group, the users share interest in e.g. a particular computer game and, amongst brand users, it is the emotional effects of the brand values which are shared and then maintain the group. Sharing of the effects of values creates a sense of community; such a sense of community may, if it is strong enough, evolve into a knowledge domain and, along this evolution, a certain use of language may arise, e.g. a terminology. So, it works both ways. The users maintain their object of interest, and the object maintains its user group; hence, a reciprocal relationship exists. Consequently, I believe that any community is created by communication, as I argued in chapter 1. Communication creates the community, and communication maintains and strengthens the community. Ultimately, it can also destroy the community if the group no longer shares the same set of values and/or sentiments.
Consequently, the significance‐effect is the interpretative effect caused by a meaning intentionally communicated by an utterer to an interpreter
commercials, signs may be strategically used to awaken certain emotional memories enabling us to relate to a given product, and the awakening of emotional memories might eventually persuade us to buy the given product.
This kind of significance‐effect is not based on rational persuasion, but rather on emotional considerations. If the sign does awaken emotional or rational effects in the interpreter, it must be because the interpreter shares qualities or values with the sign to such a degree that the interpreter is able to reflect himself in the sign, i.e. agree on the premises and conclusion of the argument, or be sympathetic about the values communicated by an utterer.
Consequently, both the normative and the sub‐cognitive significance‐effect are tied to the individual as a kind of quasi‐empathetic11 experience, but the effect is by no means solely individual. Both the normative and the sub‐cognitive significance‐effect are developed within the scope of Peircean semeiotic;
therefore it is rooted in the same scholastic realism. This means that any communication involves an utterer and an interpreter, and in order for the communication to be successful to some degree it must be general. If this is
11 It is quasi‐empathetic experience since the interpreter reflects himself in the sign because he is able to identify qualities in the sign, which he himself contains or desires to contain. He sees himself through the “eyes” of the sign, so to speak. He learns from the sign, and the sign learns from him As Peirce writes in the article “Some consequences of Four Incapacities” (1868): “But since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn round and say: "You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought." In fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other; each increase of a man's information involves and is involved by, a corresponding increase of a word's information”. (CP. 5.313)
not the case, the utterer cannot communicate to an exterior world and not even to his future self; thus no intelligible communication can take place.
It is also possible to imagine a whole group of people, e.g. a user group, a group of brand users, or the inhabitants of a knowledge domain, becoming exposed to the same signs, i.e. a given brand or a given terminology, and experiencing nearly the same significance‐effect. Here, the significance‐effect is not tied to the individual, although it is the individual who experiences the significance‐effect. Rather, it is tied to the characteristics of the group of people. In a scientific knowledge domain, the researchers share the same terminology; within a user group, the users share interest in e.g. a particular computer game and, amongst brand users, it is the emotional effects of the brand values which are shared and then maintain the group. Sharing of the effects of values creates a sense of community; such a sense of community may, if it is strong enough, evolve into a knowledge domain and, along this evolution, a certain use of language may arise, e.g. a terminology. So, it works both ways. The users maintain their object of interest, and the object maintains its user group; hence, a reciprocal relationship exists. Consequently, I believe that any community is created by communication, as I argued in chapter 1. Communication creates the community, and communication maintains and strengthens the community. Ultimately, it can also destroy the community if the group no longer shares the same set of values and/or sentiments.
Consequently, the significance‐effect is the interpretative effect caused by a meaning intentionally communicated by an utterer to an interpreter
through mediation of a sign. In essence, the meaning communicated is similar to the meaning interpreted. This means that the interpreter must be able to interpret the message in the right way, or at least in nearly the right way, which is the way intended by the utterer. The conditions for the release of the normative significance‐effect are the following:
• Communication has to take place inside a universe of discourse
• Utterer and interpreter must share collateral experiences
• The conditions for communication and community defined by Peirce must be met
• The cominterpretant must occur
The normative significance‐effect depends upon the sub‐cognitive significance‐effect
As we saw with the three categories firstness, secondness and thirdness, thirdness depends on firstness and secondness. Medisense depends on primisense and altersense. The argument depends on rheme and dicent sign.
The logical interpretant depends on the emotional interpretant and the energetic interpretant, etc. In the same way, the normative significance‐effect depends on the sub‐cognitive significance‐effect. Therefore, a knowledge domain not consisting of a sub‐cognitive fundamental sign, and therefore no sub‐cognitive significance‐effect, is not authentic, it has no genuine force of attraction whatsoever. This is the case with MARKK, and I will return to this in chapter 3.
The normative significance‐effect is related to the normative fundamental sign
As an effect, it is related to the normative fundamental sign. A concept within a knowledge domain communicates knowledge in relation to this knowledge level. The more the interpreter knows about the concept, the shorter the interpretative distance. Both concepts are related to technical terms.
The normative significance‐effect is related to the logical interpretant
As was the case with the normative fundamental sign, the normative significance‐effect is also related to the logical interpretant. The normative significance‐effect may be summarized in the following table:
The normative significance‐effect The normative significance‐effect designates the interpretative distance between concept and the correct
interpretation – the shorter the distance is, the more forceful the normative
significance‐effect is. The interpreter reflects his knowledge level in the concept – the normative significance‐effect depends on how much the interpreter “sees”. The normative significance‐effect depends on the sub‐cognitive significance‐effect.
