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the psychological acquisition of knowledge). If such a conceptualisation of evidence is the premise of EBT, we believe it is wrong and easy to argue against.

The confusion is understandable if you look in the dictionary to make sense of the word “evidence”, because the dictionary lists synonyms such as “clarity”,

“certainty”, “indisputability” and “a form of ‘proof’ you cannot contradict”

(Levinsson, 2013, p. 113). This understanding of evidence is difficult to operate with in teaching. Instead of viewing evidence in this way, we believe it should be viewed as part of an argument. Evidence can form the central element in an epistemic justification, and it can also spark disagreement (Feldman, 2009; Feldman

& Conee, 1985). As stated by Thomas (2004), when assessing the relevance of the evidence, sufficiency and veracity are important criteria to consider. The distinc-tion between research-based and practice-based evidence is also essential, and we will draw upon this in the following discussion.

In terms of this presentation of different types of evidence, we will conclude that, in all likelihood, teachers are already employing different kinds of evidence in their teaching as part of an on-going process, but with different abilities and levels of reflection (Kowalski & Lasley II, 2009; Pollard, 2008). From an educa-tional research perspective, we are interested in the conditions of teaching; at present, we know too little about how the different kinds of evidence play a role in the professional lives of teachers.

This is a location- and situation-dependent type of knowledge. Another important distinction is between experiential or practice knowledge in teaching, professional knowledge and research or scientific knowledge (Rasmussen, Kruse, & Holm, 2007).

Each individual teacher, each teaching team, each educational institution, as well as the teaching profession as a whole, possesses a body of practices and knowledge about teaching based on experiences from different situations. It is precisely this body of knowledge we refer to when we talk about the experiential knowledge of teachers (Hoban, 2002; Luhmann, 2006, p. 171ff.; Putnam & Borko, 2000). This type of knowledge is closely linked to the context in which it is produced. Experiential knowledge is partly a result of a teacher’s own teaching practice, partly a result of social conventions and norms within the professional contexts outside the classroom (colleagues, teams, institutions and the profes-sional tradition), but it is also partly a result of the experiences they had as a student (Britzman, 2003; Lortie, 1975). This knowledge both influences and is relevant and important for decisions made in teaching, since it refers to what usually works in concrete settings.

On the other hand, the performance of different pedagogies or didactics is systematic descriptions and reflections that teachers can use to guide their decisions when planning, conducting and evaluating teaching. Pedagogy and di-dactics are not characterised by consensus about what good teaching is. Quite the reverse; they are characterised by significant internal diversity and disagreement.

Different pedagogical positions reflect and present teaching in different ways and, accordingly, they offer different stories about what teaching is or should be (Qvortrup & Wiberg, 2013). This range of perspectives is particularly useful and desirable if, for any reason, teaching has to change direction; for example, when experience and tradition no longer fulfil new ideas or conditions. The risk of basing teaching solely upon experience is that this type of knowledge often remains unquestioned (Hoban, 2002; Lortie, 1975). One reason is that it is both a product of and confirmed by experiences. Another reason is that, to a large extent, this type of knowledge is produced through informal and unintended learning situations and, therefore, is only partly accessible to reflection (Bateson, 2000 [1972], p. 292ff.). Over time, experiential knowledge creates its own self-evident and self-supporting pedagogy or didactic position (Keiding & Qvortrup 2015a, b).

Therefore, it is important that experiential knowledge enters into dialogue with both didactics and empirical educational research. The multiplicity of didac-tics is valuable for teaching when support, new ideas and concepts for reflection are required, but it is also its Achilles heel when supporting a teacher’s didactic choices. As we have argued, this variety offers a broad and colourful palette of perspectives and opportunities for reflection. However, the theories offer little

empirical evidence for their recommendations and, hence, they leave the teacher to judge whether the guidelines and objectives are reliable and, ultimately, wheth-er the theory keeps its promises. Howevwheth-er, in recent years, by monitoring how various teaching methods influence student participation and learning, empirical teaching research has contributed significantly to our knowledge about what does and does not appear to work. The three types of knowledge concern the same topic: pedagogical practice and pedagogical knowledge in the broadest sense.

They differ in the code used to distinguish between knowledge belonging and not belonging to the domain. The inner side of the code indicates the connective value for new knowledge; namely, useful, guiding, and true, respectively. None of these types of knowledge offers unequivocal answers to selection and reasoning;

however, each of them offers arguments for decision making in teaching (ibid.).

The Swiss educational researcher Walter Herzog (2011) criticises the EBT discourse. One of his main points of this critique is that, in his opinion, EBT does not include the network of professional knowledge of teachers described above. Instead, EBT appears to mask a political agenda in which policy-makers implement policies with reference to “educational research”, assuming that this

“real” and “rigorous” knowledge can be directly implemented in practice. Herzog argues that, within this discourse, the word treatment is sometimes used as a bracket between research and practice. Again, we are referring to the slogan of

“what works”. According to Herzog, this is a renewed “technological education fantasy” that has been heard before in the history of education. In his opinion, the “evidence movement” fails to recognise the particularities of teaching practice and signifies a lack of trust in teacher professionalism:

To the power programme of evidence-based education belongs not only the revival of a technological understanding of school and teaching, but also a degradation of teachers to executing organs of educational policies. Professionals rely on trust to be able to perform their work competently (...). This trust must not be blind or undermined by a misguided external control. However, this is exactly what evidence-based education seems to be striving for. Through the interlocking of policy, research and practice, it deprives teachers of the trust that their professional work relies on. Through the replacement of profession by administration, evidence-based education undermines the professional basis of teaching and contributes to its de-professionalisation. (Herzog, 2011, p. 141 - our translation).

Some of the same arguments against EBT are put forward by the educational philosopher Gert Biesta (Biesta, 2010, 2014), who also argues against the “tech-nological model of professional action”, which he believes lies behind EBT. It is important to consider this objection. We believe that, if EBT is viewed simply as

part of a “what works” ideology, then, as Biesta claims, it probably “won’t work”.

However, we would like to defend a more nuanced view of EBT that is aware of the professional knowledge of teachers.

In the following section, we will discuss two central questions related to this view. The first question is: Is there enough evidence? This question relates to uncertainty regarding what kind of evidence “counts” and how much evidence is required to make the right decisions. The second question is: Is evidence enough?

This question relates to the idea that, in some cases, it is not only evidence that justifies a particular practice. With this in mind, we also investigate “the other side” of evidence; namely, the quality of “non-evidence” and how this can form a basis for informed decision-making in teaching.