Ethical decision-making studies

2.4.1. Quantitative measurements and context-dependent ethics definitions

The purpose of codes of ethics and their associated ethics programs is to steer employees’ attitudes and behaviours in the direction set out by the code. As noted by Warren et al. (2014:88), much of the theory on ‘ethical awareness’ and behaviour is grounded in social cognitive theories. This literature, focusing as it does on the drivers and inhibitors for such ‘ethical awareness’, has experienced increasing recognition since the early 2000s (Tenbrunsel and Smith‐Crowe 2008). The aim of these studies is often to explain the reasons for (normatively defined) ethical and unethical behaviour (Sparks and Pan 2010:405), and ‘the ethical’ is often either a predefined category to which people can comply to varying degrees, or the ethical is measured as a variable that can be correlated with other variables, such as job-satisfaction (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, and Treviño 2010), demographic variables (O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005), or deviance from normative behaviours amongst employees (Mayer et al. 2009).

Understanding the ethical as a predefined category is, of course, also due to the quantitative

methodology, its epistemology and the inherent need for stable variables in order to derive statistically valid correlations. As pointed out by Lehnert et al. (2015:206) in their review of empirical ethical decision-making literature, most of the studies within previous literature reviews rely on surveys, particularly scenario-based surveys and student samples. Lehnert et al. (2015) underscore the dearth of qualitative studies which, instead of highlighting scenarios, could give us a picture of ethical decision-making in practice (see also Lehnert et al. 2016).

35 While I remain sceptical regarding the possibility to capture, demarcate and hold ‘ethics’ stable as a variable, these studies nevertheless offer insights into the importance of the context of an act, which is said to determine whether or not that act will be perceived as ethical. The ethical decision-making literature often draws on constructs such as ‘ethical climate’, (Arnaud 2010; Victor and Cullen 1988), which is meant to be the local conditions that determine what constitutes ethical conduct, as defined by an ‘Ethical Climate Index’. A related construct is ‘ethical culture’, which refers to those aspects in the organizational context that stimulate ethical conduct (Huhtala et al. 2018; Kangas et al. 2014; Kaptein 2008b). These studies aim to measure ethics at the level of the organization. They endeavour to demonstrate that understandings of ‘the ethical’ indeed vary across contexts. Other research has focused more on individual levels of ‘ethical decision-making’. Common to these studies, however, is that they emphasize the importance of the context, and that ‘the ethical’ is rendered measurable (Jones 1991; Treviño, Weaver, and Reynolds 2006).

The point of departure for this dissertation overlaps with the above approaches. Hence, I will explore how ‘the ethical’ comes to be defined in different contexts. However, instead of a survey or

quantitative approach, I deploy an ethnographic methodology to unfold the details and significance of different national and vocational contexts for how the ethical is understood.

2.4.2. Normative constructs for measuring the ethical

The context-sensitive nature of ethical decision-making, as highlighted in the literature, had led Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008) to criticize the field for not defining ethics and for lacking

normative definitions. As they write in a 2008 literature review, ‘Without a universal understanding of the core dependent variable, research will remain inconsistent, incoherent and atheoretical’

(Tenbrunsel and Smith‐Crowe 2008:548). As mentioned above, these studies tend to treat ethical decision-making as a variable, whereby they measure the extent to which respondents answer

‘correctly’ within their moral community. Thus, as pointed out by Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008), these studies of ethical decision-making are indeed non-normative in the sense that they measure whatever a given community defines as ethical.

While this kind of sensitivity to various definitions of the ethical is certainly an advance over the more normative approaches, the actual constructs used for these measurements and the definitions of the ethical, I would argue, remain highly normative. They establish scales and barriers for what the ethical

36 could consist of. For example, in their article on ethical leadership, Brown et al. (2005) develop an

‘Ethical Leadership Scale’ on the basis of which a leader can be assessed. The scale consists of 10 items, such as ‘listens to what employees have to say’, ‘Defines success not just by results but also the way that they are obtained’ and ‘Has the best interest of employees in mind’ (Brown et al. 2005:125).

Indices such as these thus define the boundaries of what respondents might consider ethical. Although the understanding of what it means to have the best interest of employees in mind might differ, such scales limit respondents’ ability to communicate their own perspectives on what elements would be important to measure in the first place. It is such emic understandings that are the hallmark of an anthropological understanding. Moreover, by relying on such pre-determined indices, the researchers disregard the possibility that respondents may not find it central for their notions of ethical leadership that their leader listens to them or defines success by how results are obtained.

Similarly, constructs such as ‘Machiavellianism’⁴ are measured and established as predictors for normatively defined unethical behaviour, while constructs such as ‘moral identity’ are established in order to describe the characteristics of ‘moral’ individuals, here defined as people who are e.g. caring, compassionate and fair (see e.g. Moore et al. 2012; O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005). Here, the

researchers’ own definition of unethical behaviour, not to mention an idea of the ‘moral individual’

forms the basis for these studies and conclusions. Hence, contrary to Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe (2008), I would argue that these ostensibly non-normative studies are in fact normative in their design and discourse. And while there is surely value to such normative research designs, they tell us little about how ethical or unethical behaviour unfolds in practice, nor how ethical behaviour would actually be defined by relevant organizational actors.

In short, within ethical decision-making studies, it is most often the researcher who defines what is ethical and what is unethical. I would argue, however, that a focus on predefined behavioural

categories of ethical and unethical causes us to risk missing important insights about how ‘the ethical’ is defined in practice and under specific circumstances. As also pointed out by Painter-Morland (2008), business ethics research is burdened by a conceptualization of ‘moral agents’ who make decisions in an objective and rational manner (according to a universal standard of rationality). Rather than exploring the reasons why people act in what the researcher might define as ethical or unethical ways, I would point to the importance of also exploring what constitutes ‘the ethical’ in different contexts, for

4 As Moore et al. write, ‘Machiavellianism represents an individual’s propensity to be manipulative and ruthless in the pursuit of self-interested goals’ (Moore et al. 2012:7). Machiavellianism is measured by using a standard 20-item questionnaire where respondents are asked to rate the extent to which they agree with statements such as

‘It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there’ (Moore et al. 2012:16).

37 different groups of actors. It is this kind of practical ethical configuration that is the focus of this

dissertation.

2.4.3. Ethical decision-making as a distinct category of actions

Ethical decision-making scholars often demarcate ethical actions and decisions as distinct categories of action separate from social life in general. Two of the most prominent understandings of individual ethical decision-making are Rest’s four component model (Rest 1986) and Jones’ development of this model into the Issue-Contingent Model (Jones 1991). The point of departure for Rest’s model is that a so-called ‘moral agent’ recognizes a ‘moral issue’. The main contribution of Jones’ model is the notion of ‘moral intensity’, which is the perceived severity of the moral issue about which a moral agent makes a decision (Jones 1991:368,372-373). Thus, within these models, the moral issue is assumed to be distinct, an entity that can presumably be recognized as such by a moral agent. Since the publication of these models, a large number of studies have attempted to test them, correlating various individual or societal factors with ethical decision-making. Five extensive literature reviews in the Journal of Business Ethics have covered these studies (Craft 2013; Ford and Richardson 1994; Lehnert et al. 2015; Loe, Ferrell, and Mansfield 2000; O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005). However, within the reviewed studies and the models on which they are based, ethical decision-making continues to be distinguished as a particular category of decision-making, the implication being that some decisions are ethically salient, while other decisions lie outside the realm of the ethical. This, I would argue, is a misconception of the ethical, as the ethical cannot be separated from social life in general. Later in this chapter, I will offer an alternative conceptualization of the ethical as inherent in the everyday.

2.4.4. Key issues

In sum, the critique I voice is threefold. First, the design of most studies on ethical decision-making comprises a limiting framework for exploring the ethical, as the questions and scales within which the ethical is measured are constrained by the researcher’s definitions rather than allowing for alternative understandings or informants’ own concepts of ‘the ethical’. While it is clear that no research can be entirely free of the researcher’s own conceptions, my point here is that predefined research designs, coupled with the quantitative approach, prevent us from even approaching organizational actors’ own understandings of ‘the ethical’.

38 Second, ethical decision-making is demarcated as a distinct category of decision-making, and ethical behaviour is viewed as a specific type of behaviour (for more behavior categories, see also Kish-Gephart et al. 2010), as if they were distinguishable from other types of behaviour and decision-making. What I argue, in contrast, is that the ethical is inherent in all actions and decisions. We thus need to explore where and how ‘the ethical’ penetrates social life, including the social life of organizations and even the most ordinary situations.

Third, while I find the definitions of the ethical as context-dependent insightful, within quantitative studies, this context is defined as a statistical average of respondents’ answers that can be captured, measured and held stable as a variable. The downside of such studies is that we risk losing important insights about the complexities and different aspects of these contexts. The present dissertation intends to contribute to expanding this area of research by providing an ethnographic perspective on ethical decision-making as an immanent part of everyday action, and it explores ethical judgments as they unfold in everyday practice.