The previous analysis and discussion lead us to conclude that the UNGC operates in challenging contexts through being hosted by organizations that provide the most comprehensive outreach possible. This might include -- as in the case of China -- organizations with governmental connections and with influence on large private actors.
Inherent in this approach, there are potential trade-offs the UNGC must take into account, such as a harm of reputation, compromising certain UN values, a risk of free-riders, and providing an easy way for companies to bluewash themselves. One may then argue that the rationale behind this approach is that the long-term ‘bigger picture’ is prioritized rather than being too strict and narrow with regards to who can be a member of the UNGC.
country, the violation of labour rights, and the increasing variety of international CSR standards and codes of conduct adopted by specific industries through their domestic industry associations. Social media may also be argued to act as a driver through encouraging and forcing transparency of business operations. Institutional factors hindering the development of CSR include the restricted environment for NGOs, CSOs and the ‘Firewall of China’s’ attempted censorship on media. The cultural hesitance of accepting the allegedly ‘Western’ values of CSR, can also be argued to be a hindrance, which can furthermore be observed in the ambivalent relationship to human rights, and the acceptance of the ‘universal’ dimension of them. Lastly, the Chinese government’s overall priority of economic prosperity, for example through awarding points to local government officials for reaching economic growth targets, is argued to act as one of biggest hindrances of CSR development. These findings set the institutional framework in which UNGC Network China navigates, and were used in the analysis in the next sub-question.
2. How does UNGC Network China navigate in its institutional context?
UNGC Network China is hosted by the CEC, a special commission of the Chinese government, directly under the State Council. The approval of CEC as a host of Network China has provided a connection to the Chinese government, as well as access to a large network of companies and business associations in China. Throughout the year, the network hosts a variety of events, among them the annual ‘Caring for Climate’ summit, focusing on practical solutions for companies with regards to environmental concerns.
Related to the culturally embedded notion of mianzi (face), Network China also honors best practices and ranks companies after their performance with regards to a variety of topics related to CSR. There is however low participation rate of non-business members, arguably due to the restricted environment for NGOs and CSOs. Overall, the most notable ‘Chinese characteristic’ of Network China, is the indirect influence of government on the network through its connection to CEC and Sinopec. It is with these
findings in mind, that the next sub-question discussed how the network’s target—
namely Chinese companies—have responded to the establishment of the network.
3. How have Chinese companies responded before and after Network China was established?
According to the data collected and analysed, it is evident that overall, there are more delisted participants than active ones, since the establishment of the UNGC in 2000.
However, there have been fewer delistings of members after Network China was officially established in 2011, both among the signatories who joined before 2011 and after. The location of members has been classified in so-called ‘tiers’ for the purposes of deciphering and analysing the data, and findings suggests that Network China has more outreach to cities in ‘Tier 1’, but that the network has also been successful in keeping members from ‘Tier 2’, and ‘Tier 3’, engaged. With regards to ownership models, the findings suggest that the establishment of the network is less relevant. Furthermore, the data collected on the different industries among the members point to the fact that
‘controversial’ industries signed up before the network was established. This might be attributed to a wish of bluewashing themselves, or a potential desire to learn and find strategic solutions to their CSR issues.
UNGC Network China has a difficult role in advancing CSR consensus in a country that is to a certain degree resistant to some of the ten principles. This becomes even more complicated when considering a staff of four has the mandate to advance these principles in a country with dozens of millions of businesses. However, UNGC has navigated through the Chinese context, by being hosted by the CEC. This has provided them with connections to the government, and with relevant industry access points. The lack of human and funding resources is also alleviated by having access to the resources of CEC, as well as its outreach to companies.
Nonetheless, along with this governance structure comes a variety of possible friction points related to what the UNGC stands for. As human rights are at the base of all the
ten principles and the UN’s core values, it is easy to point out some contradictions inherent in the current governance structure of Network China. As mentioned in the discussion, there are participants - both people and companies- who arguably are not
‘fit’ to have leader positions in the UNGC. However, one may argue that in order for the UNGC to ‘get a foot in the door’ of the vast country that is China, this might be the
‘Chinese characteristic’ necessary in order to advance the UNGC goals in the future.
Similarly, the UNGC will have to evaluate what other kinds of trade-offs it is willing to make in other challenging contexts in order to advance its goals on a global scale.